THE CASE FOR CHRISTIANITY

CLEMENT F. ROGERS

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BY THE SAME AUTHOR

QUESTION TIME IN HYDE PARK

LECTURES IN HYDE PARK

WHY MEN BELIEVE

PASTORAL THEOLOGY AND THE MODERN WORLD ETC.

THE CASE FOR CHRISTIANITY

An Outline of Popular Apologetics

BY

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
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HARPER & BROTHERS LIMITED
NEW YORK LONDON
1928

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Printed in Great Britain by
Unwin Brothers, Ltd., Woking

"We must speak to the many so that they will listen—that they will like to listen—that they will understand. It is of no use addressing them with the forms of science, or the rigour of accuracy, or the tedium of exhaustive discussion. The multitude are impatient of system, desirous of brevity, puzzled by formality." —WALTER BAGEHOT, *Literary Studies*, "The First Edinburgh Reviewers," Dent's Everyman's Library, vol. i, p. 3.

"Qu'on ne dise pas que je n'ai rien dit de nouveau: la disposition des matières est nouvelle." (Let no one say that I have said nothing new: the matter is newly put.)—PASCAL, *Pensées*, ed. Brunschvicg, No. 22.

PREFACE

An apology is, I feel, needed for writing another book of Theology when there are so many and such good books already to hand—books, too, written by men with a much better right to speak. But few of these books are read by the great reading public. I am constantly wanting some general book on Christianity to give to people who want to know about our religion. This is one of our great needs; but *the* book has not been written. I do not suppose, of course, that this will be it, but the only way is to keep on trying.

I am insufficiently equipped, I fear, for the task—I do not know enough—but the people who ask know less, and I have had some experience in finding out what they want to know. For eight years I let myself be heckled every Sunday afternoon in Hyde Park for an hour or more. So when I was asked to write a short handbook of Apologetics I tried, but soon found it could not be done. The book grew too big. A handbook should put together clearly what more advanced works take it for granted that you know. There is nothing in this book that has not been better said elsewhere, but I did not know any one book that had put it all together, so I tried to meet the need. If there is little original in it, at least I think "the order is new," and the whole is at any rate the outcome of a need felt in practical experience.

This may, perhaps, disarm criticism on two points—that the text is too dogmatic, and that the references are overdone. I hope the two objections cancel one another out.

Many writers incorporate long passages from other authors into their text; I am sure this is a mistake. I always tell my students at King's College, when taking the Homiletic class, "It sounds a conceited thing to say, but if a quotation is of more than about three lines, it is better to summarise it in your own words. Long quotations break the thread of your discourse."

But I also tell them: "You must make no statement you cannot support by some authority of fact or judgment." So, while I am sure that the best writing is that in which the author says what he wants to say, there should be abundance of reference and illustration, if possible at the foot of the page, for all he says, so that the reader may stop and read, or return to it at his leisure.

And further, while I would hope that this book may be found by the ordinary reader to be what he wants, I should like it to be of use to students, if not to scholars, also. It is intended to be a guide to further study. I always feel exasperated when learned authors quote interesting words and do not tell you where to find them, and I am always more inclined to buy a book with notes, even if it costs a little more. In nearly every case in the following pages a reference implies advice to read a book, or at least a context.

But students do not remain in their studies all their days. They have also to go out and teach, and many cannot afford to buy the books I mention, even if they can get to them in libraries. So I have aimed at giving, not the mere reference but the whole passages (translating them when in a foreign language), so that they may have ready to hand a supply of quotations to use for practical purposes in propaganda when they have earned the right to use them by reading

them in their contexts. This is also my excuse for the very frequent references to quotations in other works of my own. It may be a convenience to some to find them collected there instead of having to look them up, scattered as they are, in a number of other volumes. This book gives a continuous background, reversing the order, to my *Question Time in Hyde Park*; and I am aiming in it and my other books at getting together a body of Practical, Apologetic, and Pastoral Theology for actual use.

I should like to record my indebtedness to St. Deiniol's Library at Hawarden, where the greater part of this, as of other of my works, has been put together and written.

CLEMENT F. ROGERS.

King's College Hostel,
Vincent Square,
January 9, 1928.

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PART I

CHRISTIAN LIFE AND RELIGION

CHAPTER I

THE THINGS THAT MATTER

"There are two ways, one of life and one of death, but the difference is great between the two ways."—*The Teaching of the Twelve Apostles*, chap. i.

People do not read ordinary books of theology. We who are interested in them, or who write them, are surprised to find that men remain, for the most part, quite indifferent to the stream of publications that issue from the press. Apologetic Theology is addressed to those who reject traditional Christian teaching, or, perhaps, are simply bored by its usual presentation, but they are not eager to read apologetic works. Is the reason, perhaps, that they begin at the wrong end—at the end which logically comes first, with arguments for belief in God or the meaning of Faith, whereas, in life, logic comes after experience? For it is in practical things, in the things of the world around them, that they *are* interested. Above all, they are curious about right conduct; they love argument about what you should do; they are roused by gossip; they will read novels; they go to the play. On these matters, and on the problems involved in them, they have their ideas—ideas which often block the way to the understanding of other things.

Yet this aversion from theology does not prevent their arguing about religion. This they are very fond of doing, especially with a parson who lies low and does not begin the subject, or who comes out into the open to be heckled.[1] Indeed, it is often asked, "Why do men quarrel so about religion?" and the answer is not difficult to find. They

[1] Cp. below, p. 225, *The Uneducated Mind*, and my *Question Time in Hyde Park* (S.P.C.K., 1924), for such questions and my answers as given there, as well as for quotations from other authors illustrating or supporting my replies (hereafter quoted as Q.T.).

quarrel about religion for the same reason that they quarrel about politics; because politics and religion—how we are to live with one another here and how we are to live both here and hereafter—are the two things that matter. When Mr. Murray praised the ancient philosophers "for the candour and good-humour with which those of different sects disputed with each other," Dr. Johnson replied: "Sir, they disputed with good-humour because they were not in earnest as to religion. No, sir! every man will dispute with great good-humour upon a subject in which he is not interested." [1] It is a pity that people quarrel so, but it is very natural, and on the whole the person who loses his temper over important matters is better than the superior person who is indifferent to the claims of both sides. When all is said, uncomfortable as you feel after making an exhibition of yourself, you experience a certain satisfaction in realising that you care enough about the things that really matter to be drawn.

But not only are politics of less importance than religion; on another ground there is less excuse for quarrelling about them than about religion; for the divisions in politics are less fundamental. Men are naturally Liberal or Conservative—some look to the past, others to the future. There are individualists and socialists; some lay stress on the fact that—

> . . . in the sea of life enisled,
> With echoing straits between us thrown,
> Dotting the shoreless watery wild,
> We mortal millions live *alone*.[2]

Others insist that man, as a member of society, only finds his true self in his relations with his fellows. Both elements

[1] Boswell's *Life of Samuel Johnson, LL.D.*, April 3, 1776. Quoted, Q.T., p. 182. Cp. S. T. Coleridge, *Aids to Reflection, Moral and Religious Aphorisms*, xxvi. "Toleration is a herb of spontaneous growth in the soil of indifference; but the weed has none of the virtues of the medicinal plant, reared by humility in the garden of zeal."

[2] M. Arnold, *To Marguerite—Continued.*

are needed in government; one supplies what the other lacks. There is safety in criticism and value in having an opposition. Each element is found in varying degrees in each man, but it is a mistake to make these your main divisions in life.

For in religious controversy every now and then the real issues stand out. For the most part it consists of mere intellectual discussion in which there is almost always a sense of unreality. The points argued are not those which influence action; they lie on the surface of men's characters. The disputants are merely trying to catch you out; but every now and then you get a sudden feeling of "touching bottom." A breach seems to open out in the fog of talk and conflicting opinion, and the parting of the ways is clearly seen. You are suddenly conscious that there is a fundamental difference in points of view between which there is no compromise. You feel that these differences must be settled first, that they block the way, and till it is settled which is right and which is wrong, discussion on other points is a mere superficial play of words.

What are some of these?

I

To begin with those concerned with passive qualities. These may not be the chief, but they are very real. If the Kingdom of God comes with power it is also within. Indeed, Christians are accused of confining their idea of virtue to negative qualities of self-restraint, endurance, and sacrifice.[1] It was said again and again during the war that

[1] E.g. B. Russell, *Principles of Social Reconstruction* (Allen & Unwin, 1916), p. 203. "If a religious view of life and the world is ever to reconquer the thoughts and feelings of free-minded men and women, much that we are accustomed to associate with religion will have to be discarded. The first and greatest change that is required is to establish a morality of initiative, not a morality of submission; a morality of hope rather than of fear; of things to be done rather than of things to be left undone. . . . The religious life that we seek . . . will give praise to positive achievement rather than negative sinlessness,

this was why religion did not appeal to the soldier. This is, of course, an unfair judgment of Christianity, even if it be a fair criticism of some Christians, and it is not altogether untrue that to rule yourself is the antecedent condition of ruling others.

To take an instance, the grudging or "grousing" spirit (there is no other word that so exactly expresses what I mean —the Germans have the word "grollen") is very widespread to-day. It prompts the idea that you are worse off, absolutely and not merely relatively, because others are better off. When we have to work on a fine day we feel we have a grievance, but the fact that other people are enjoying themselves makes it really no worse for us.[1] The labourers in

to the joy of life, the quick affection, the creative instinct, by which the world may grow young and beautiful and filled with vigour." Quoted by W. R. Matthews, *Studies in Christian Philosophy* (Macmillan, 1921), p. 70, who adds: "What a depth of misunderstanding, not only and not chiefly in the writer, is revealed when we reflect that these words are written against Christianity!"

[1] Cp. Sir Thomas Browne, *Letter to a Friend*. "Emulation may be plausible and indignation allowable, but admit no treaty with that passion which no circumstance can make good. A displacency at the good of others, because they enjoy it although we do not want it, is an absurd depravity sticking fast unto nature, from its primitive corruption which he that can well subdue were a Christian of the first magnitude, and for aught I know may have one foot already in heaven."

It is not so clear that actual inequalities, too great as they undoubtedly are in general, may not in some cases actually contribute to the welfare of the less fortunate, who would be worse off without them. Cp., for instance, H. Rashdall, *Conscience and Christ* (Duckworth, 1916), p. 203. "It might, indeed, be contended that from the nature of things it is impossible that everyone should enjoy more than a very moderate share of such higher goods as Art, Knowledge, Culture, and that no one ought to get more of these things than is possible for everyone. But, as a matter of fact, it is quite impossible that all should enjoy even a moderate amount of culture unless some men enjoy a much higher amount. The scientific discoveries which all may know of, and the scientific inventions which all may use, have resulted from the labours of men who have devoted the bulk of their time and energy to Science. The books which all may read have been written by men who have devoted their lives to reading more, and thinking more, than those who read them. The little insight into the nature of the Universe, and the little enjoyment of beauty which are possible to those who spend most of their days in manual labour, come from the work of those who have spent most of their time in intellectual or artistic pursuits."

Cp. Hartley Withers, *The Case for Capitalism* (Eveleigh Nash & Grayson, 1920), chap. vi, "The Achievements of Capitalism," pp. 113–37, and

the vineyard who grumbled because the others had a piece of luck had no real cause for complaint.[1] They got their penny, the recognised fair wage. It was very natural, no doubt, for them to feel aggrieved, but it was very base. If they wanted to compare themselves with others, they would have done better to have thought of those who had neither work nor wage. Little Ann's mother had got at the heart of the matter when she said to her daughter, envious of the elegant ladies in a beautiful chariot :—

> If you would have look'd on the contrary side,
> Your tears would have dried up again.[2]

Now this passion is deliberately appealed to as a motive-power in much endeavour after social reform, which has

chap. xii, "Capitalism and Freedom," p. 274. "These inequalities would be lessened rapidly if the attitude of capitalist employers towards those who worked for them were modified as suggested above. But we want to see them attacked at the other end at the same time, by the wage-earners recognising that Capitalism is not an evil monster that robs them, but a system that has improved their lot and given life to millions who could not have been born without the industrial development that has taken place under it."

[1] Cp. A. Loisy, *Évangiles Synoptiques*, vol. ii, p. 229, quoted in H. Rashdall's *Conscience and Christ*, p. 172. "Au fond la parabole est la même que celle du Fils prodigue," though fewer people sympathise with the elder brother.

[2] *Original Poems for Infant Minds*, by several Young Persons (Jane, Adelaide, and Ann Taylor), London, 1830. "A True Story," p. 1. Little Ann and her mother pass

> "... by the great house of a lord,
> A beautiful chariot there came,
> To take some most elegant ladies abroad,
> Who straightway got into the same.
>
> The ladies in feathers and jewels were seen,
> The chariot was painted all o'er,
> The footmen behind were in silver and green,
> The horses were prancing before."

Little Ann says :—

> "You say God is kind to the folks that are good,
> But surely it cannot be true;
> Or else I am certain, almost, that He wou'd
> Give such a fine carriage to you."

But her mother points to a poor beggar-woman and shows her, in the words quoted above, "how foolish it was to complain."

for its chief activity denunciation. Men are continually denouncing the idle rich, or millionaires, or unearned increment, and the unfairness of the capitalist system;[1] but that is not the way to make men happy or contented, nor is it a very good way to effect social reform. There is much that wants reforming, but reform will hardly come by concentrating your attention on others, and certainly not by injuring them. The man with a grievance is, as we all know, the most useless person at getting anything done. It is quite right to be dissatisfied, especially with yourself and your surroundings—quite right to better yourself, but you will not do so merely by injuring others. God may call you into a very different state of life from that in which you were born or now find yourself, and you are quite right to obey His call wherever it may lead you; but it is at least open to question whether a man does not gain a truer happiness, and help the world more, by staying in a state of life, and bettering a whole class so that all may live in content in it, by doing his duty in that state of life in which (to misquote the Catechism) it hath pleased God to call him, and so getting rid of class distinctions, which, say what we will, are very real, by levelling up to the highest and not by dragging down to the lowest.[2] The man who looks at those

[1] Mandell Creighton, *Life and Letters* (Longmans, 1907), vol. i, p. 325. "It is a cheap line to denounce." Quoted in full in Q.T., p. 308. See also pp. 238, 262.

[2] Cp. Ruskin, *Unto This Last*, essay iv, § 83, quoted by C. G. Montefiore, *Liberal Judaism* (Macmillan, 1918), p. 268. "That your neighbour should, or should not, remain content with his position is not your business; but it is very much your business to remain content with your own. What is chiefly needed in England at the present day is to show the quantity of pleasure that may be obtained by a consistent, well-administered competence, modest, confessed, hard, laborious. We need examples of people who, leaving Heaven to decide whether they are to rise in the world, decide for themselves that they will be happy in it, and have resolved to seek—not greater wealth but simpler pleasure, not higher fortune but deeper felicity; making the first of possessions self-possession, and honouring themselves in the harmless pride and calm pursuits of peace."

Cp. A. Seth Pringle Pattison, *The Idea of God* (Oxford, 1917), p. 410. "The conception of the meaning of life, embodied in the figure of One who spoke of Himself as being among men as one that serveth, this was the

classes which are worse off than himself, and tries to raise them, after all does the best work. He helps them and relieves the rest of a burden that drags them down. How great is the contrast between the appeal to envy and covetousness and that to pity and charity it is easy to see.

Still more clearly is the difference visible when we consider other and allied ideas arising out of this fundamental contrast. There is nothing degrading in being in the second place. Someone must play second fiddle if there is to be an orchestra; but this is directly contrary to the natural idea of the successful man. It is a very common mistake to think that you show your superiority by being rude and self-assertive; and when you think out this simple difference into the larger contrast of serving or ruling, serving is seen to be immeasurably the greater. Not only are there millions to serve and only one self to gratify by rule, but the power of service lies in the fact that it makes you indispensable. That was the mistake of Germany. She was dominating the world by the service rendered in her learning and her music, and we were glad of it; she tried instead to rule by force, and we would not have it. Again and again in history the conquered have given their laws to the conquerors because they served them—in art, in philosophy, in religion. So it was with the Jews and the Greeks, with the Greeks and the Romans, with the Romans and the barbarian tribes of the North, *Victi victoribus leges dederunt*,[1] and the men con-

victory that overcame the world. It was the final abandonment of the hedonistic ideal through the recognition of the inherent emptiness of the self-centred life. The whole standard of judgment upon life and the purpose of the world is accordingly changed."

[1] "The conquered gave their laws to their conquerors." Said originally by Seneca of the Jews: "Cum interim usque eo sceleratissimæ gentis consuetudo convaluit, ut per omnes jam terras recepta sit, victi victoribus leges dederunt." (When, meanwhile, the customs of that most accursed nation have gained such strength that they have been now received into all lands, the conquered have given laws to the conquerors.)

Quoted by Augustine, *De Civ. Dei*, vi, 11. It is often applied to the Greeks and the Romans, and to the Romans and their barbarian invaders. [P.T.O.

quered by service never minded their defeat. When Pasteur vowed his revenge on the devastators of his country, against whom, as a cripple, he could not fight, and took it by the services which he rendered to them and to all mankind, he won a far greater victory than did the Germans at Sedan.[1] The health and wealth of the world depend on how far men recognise the contrast and choose the right.[2]

We may go one step farther. Plato gave it as his opinion long ago that it was better to be wronged than to wrong. He would rather neither, but if one or the other had to be,

Cp. Horace, Ep. II, i, 158 :—

> Grecia capta ferum victorem cepit et artes
> Intulit agresti Latio.

(Captive Greece led her fierce conqueror captive and brought the arts to rustic Latium.)

[1] The story is finely told in Sir Arthur Quiller-Couch's *Studies in Literature*, First Series (Cambridge, 1918), as the closing section of the last essay, "Patriotism in English Literature, II."

Cp. Bacon, *Novum Organum*, cxxix. "Moreover, the reformation of a state in civil matters is seldom brought in without much violence and confusion; but discoveries carry blessings with them, and confer benefits without causing harm or sorrow to any."

[2] The "colour trouble" can only be solved by this spirit of service, only by regarding inferior or childish races as composed of people to help, not as men and women to be exploited. See my *Pastoral Theology and the Modern World* (Oxford, 1920), pp. 118–20. Cp. H. M. Gwatkin, *The Knowledge of God* (T. & T. Clark, 1907), vol. i, p. 228. "The civilised world has not quite outgrown the old heathen feeling that the stranger is an enemy, and that coloured people, at any rate, are made to be exploited by their betters."

The following quotation from Basil Matthews' *The Clash of Colour* (Edinburgh House Press, 1924), p. 113, is, I think, relevant: "Talking with the sports captain of the College (the Syrian College at Beirut), who was standing by me, I asked, 'What special difficulty do you find in training a team like this?'

"'A real hard nut to crack,' he replied, 'is just this. These fellows come from countries where the whole idea of team playing is unknown. Each at the beginning of his football training wants to dribble the ball down the field at his own feet and score the goal for himself and his own glory. So,' he went on, 'I have won the battle, not only for the boy as a member of a team, but really for his whole life-job, *when I have taught him to pass*.'

"I looked again and realised the simple miracle that had been performed. There was the Armenian full-back (whose father had been massacred by a Turk) passing to the Turk, who had sent the ball out to the forward wing, the Greek, and he to the Persian, who centred to the African captain, who, amid a roar of cheering from the College, scored a brilliant goal."

to the surprise of Polus, he said he would rather be wronged than wrong another.[1] This, again, is one of the dividing principles of the world. From the one belief spring vendettas, persecutions, revenges, with their never-ending chain of reprisals. This is seen not only in savage or semi-civilised peoples; the consequences can be traced in Ireland, in Russia, on the Ruhr. From the other come not only such material benefits as financial credit due to peace and prosperity, and the power of government which comes from the blessing of a short memory and leads to an empire over the world, but also the blood of martyrs, which is the seed of the Church. The strong position is that of the man or nation that can forgive, and sees it is right to forget.

There is one more form in which the right inner disposition shows its contrast with the wrong. Allied to the grudging spirit, to unwillingness to serve, and to the refusal to suffer wrong, is the spirit of suspicion to those above you,[2] the distrust of experts and authority, based on a persistent belief in all that is vile in man.[3] This shows itself in various forms —in anti-clericalism,[4] in anti-vaccination and anti-vivisection

[1] *Gorgias*, 469. Quoted Q.T., p. 82. Cp. 508. "I tell you, Callicles, that to be boxed on the ears wrongfully is not the worst evil that can befall a man, nor to have my face and purse cut open, but that to smite and slay me and mine wrongfully is far more disgraceful and more evil, aye and to destroy and enslave and pillage, or in any way to wrong me and mine, is far more disgraceful and evil to the doer of the wrong than to me who am the sufferer."

Cp. Thomas à Kempis, *De Imitatione Christi*, Bk. I, chap. xxiv. "Habet magnum et salubre purgatorium patiens homo, qui suscipiens injurias plus dolet de alterius malitia quam de sua injuria." (The patient man hath a great and wholesome purgatory who, though he receive injuries, yet grieveth more for the malice of the other than for his own wrong.)

[2] Lord Hugh Cecil, quoted in the *Observer's* "Sayings of the Week," July 26, 1925. "The Labour Party seems to unite a great enthusiasm for education with great distrust for the educated."

[3] R. Browning, *The Ring and the Book*. The Pope, i, 511 :—

> "For I find this black mark impinge the man,
> That he believes in just the vile of life."

[4] It is a significant fact that continental anti-clerical papers are full of objectionable advertisements from which clerical papers, though accepting far too many of ordinary quack medicines, are almost entirely free.

with its distrust of doctors, in class-consciousness with its *a priori* condemnation of the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie.[1] It shows itself in the demand for an "open mind," by which it means a condition of virgin ignorance, and for an unbiased judgment, by which it understands an entire lack of education.[2] How great a bar this attitude is to the diffusion of knowledge, and how serious a factor in keeping down the masses in ignorance, will be easily realised by those who know how widespread it is. Yet these patent and manifest ills are held up by some as ideals of light and guidance.

In all these cases it may be clearly seen how diametrically contrasted is the one disposition to the other, and no less clearly how fatal is the wrong temper to all individual and social betterment, since it is not the grumbler who remedies

[1] Cp. J. R. Illingworth, *Reason and Revelation* (Macmillan, 1902), p. 218. "The man who regulates his life on the principle that other men are not to be trusted may attain a certain selfish security thereby; but he infallibly ruins his own moral character by maintaining such an attitude, he paralyses his capacity for the service of mankind, and he reacts disastrously in countless ways upon the character of those whom he suspects. He becomes personally contemptible and socially destructive. Whereas he who errs on the side of trustfulness, though he may often be deceived, has not only himself a higher moral character for the fact, but also reacts morally upon others, not uncommonly creating in them by his confidence virtues which they did not previously possess; while as an agent in the world, a mover of men, he is incontestably supreme."

Readers of Mrs. Gaskell's *Cranford* will remember that Miss Matty never had short weight in her coals brought again, whereas Mary Smith's father, who said that "such simplicity might be all very well in Cranford but would never do in the world," lost, for all his suspicion of everyone with whom he had dealings, "over a thousand pounds by roguery only last year."

Cp. H. M. Gwatkin, *The Knowledge of God* (T. & T. Clark, 1907), vol. i, p. 210. "There is no surer sign of a degraded character than a vague habit of suspecting our neighbours without definite and reasonable grounds. In general we judge them by ourselves till we see reason to the contrary. So that if we ourselves are false or vile, our impulse is to set down the fairest of actions to the foulest of motives, and in the noblest of men to see no more than the most successful of hypocrites."

[2] Cp. William James, *The Will to Believe* (Longmans, 1923), p. 21. "If you want an absolute duffer in an investigation, you must, after all, take the man who has no interest whatever in its results; he is the warranted incapable, the positive fool. The most useful investigator, because the most sensitive observer, is always he whose eager interest on the one side of the question is balanced by an equally keen nervousness lest he become deceived."

evils for himself or for others; how detrimental to the welfare of society, where good second fiddles are needed, and it is really possible to enjoy playing even a small part in harmony; how disastrous in world policy, where nations should be linked together in the commerce of service; how great a bar to peace at home, where forgetfulness is so great a boon, and how inimical to learning, where we must trust those who know.

II

But, as we saw just now, people resent a mere negative morality, and all these contrasts have their active side.

There is, to begin with, the contrast of rights and duties. There can be little doubt which is the stronger ideal as a motive-power. The man who joins, say, a Friendly Society for what he can get out of it is not so useful a member as he who joins it to help it along and make it go. The one goes on sick benefit as often as he can, and is aggrieved when not ill because he is getting nothing in return for his contributions; the other only goes on sick pay when he must, and is glad, when well, to think that his money is going to help those less fortunate than himself. The one criticises the management; the other comes to court meetings and canvasses for new members. The one malingers, and the other takes office and gives his time to keeping things straight. In proportion as you have members thinking of their rights, the Society goes back; in proportion as you have men with a sense of fraternal duty, it goes forward.

This is not to deny the existence of rights—they have to be claimed at times, especially for others—but duties come first, and it is not the fighting for rights that gives satisfaction at the last.[1] Look at the contrast in the world where the

[1] Cp. Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.*, Bk. V, chap. x (xiv), 8. "*Φανερὸν δ'ἐκ τούτου καὶ ὁ ἐπιεικὴς τίς ἐστιν. ὁ γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων προαιρετικὸς καὶ πρακτικὸς, καὶ ὁ μὴ ἀκριβοδίκαιος ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον, ἀλλ' λαττωτικὸς, καίπερ ἔχων τὸν νόμον βοηθὸν, ἐπιεικής ἐστι, καὶ ἡ ἕξις αὕτη ἐπιείκεια,*

one or the other prevails. At school the duty of the master to the boy is the first consideration. It is his aim to do it, and the whole tradition of his profession is built up on the sense of its prime claim. The surroundings of the school, the pictures on the walls, the time-table, the method of teaching, are all directed to the good of the boy. Then he goes out to work in the shop where the opposite idea is the tradition. He is at once exploited, sent on errands, set to do odd jobs, given all the drudgery and the least educative parts of the work, left to pick up his trade, which therefore takes an absurdly long time to learn, and is too often left with an entire lack of moral care, if not deliberately corrupted in word and deed.

The contrast runs through all industrial life. The capitalist has a perfect "right" to waste the money he has acquired or inherited—at any rate, no one else has any right to it. Organised Labour has a perfect "right" to be reckless of the sufferings of others in calling strikes or suggesting "stay-in" strikes, as long as it keeps within the law. The success of the English nation in colonising, and its almost automatic and unconscious acquisition of empire, have been due to the fact that, on the whole, the English tradition of government has been that the king thinks first of his duties to his people; that the policeman is a man to help you and only if need arises one to keep you in order; that the magistrate,

δικαιοσύνη τις οὖσα καὶ οὐχ ἑτέρα τις ἕξις." (For one who in his moral purpose and action aims at doing what is equitable, who does not insist upon his rights to the damage of his neighbours, but is content to take less than his due, although he has the law on his side, is equitable.) Transl. J. E. C. Welldon (Macmillan, 1897), p. 173.

So Jeannie Deans in her speech to Queen Caroline in Scott's *Heart of Midlothian*: "Alas! it is not when we sleep soft and wake merrily ourselves that we think on other people's sufferings. Our hearts are waxed light within us then, and we are all for righting our ain wrangs and fighting our ain battles. But when the hour of trouble comes to the mind or to the body—and seldom may it visit your leddyship—and when the hour of death comes that comes to high and low—lang and late may it be yours—Oh my Leddy, then it isna what we hae dune for oursells, but what we hae dune for others, that we think on maist pleasantly."

the inspector, the inland revenue officer, and all the whole machinery of government, are part of the Civil *Service*, and its personnel is composed of Civil *Servants*. Conspicuously has this been the case in countries with such climates that men would not go there for choice. In more favoured countries, which attract more of the class who insist on their rights, or where the trading interest is predominant, success has not been so great. There have been difficulties.

For duty is the point. It is the sense of duty that makes democracy possible. Women gained political rights because in the war they recognised national duties. If a political party pursues a class policy and boasts that it is built on class-consciousness, its action will bring disaster. The idea of duty leads to thrift and simplicity, where the insistence on rights leads to extravagance and vulgarity. The one regards wealth as a trust, the other as a privilege. Duty is the mainspring of energy, where rights insisted upon consume what is made by the efforts of others.

As the one or the other is prominent in men's minds, so will the motive in production be for use or for profit. As usually contrasted, these words present a false antithesis. The opposite to use is waste; the contrast to profit is loss. Production must be both for use *and* profit. If profits cannot be made, and things are produced at a loss, work soon ceases and nothing is made to be used. But if we are thinking of the prominence of *motive* in men's minds, only one can come first, and it will make all the difference between good and bad work which is to the fore. The man who thinks of the use of his work will take a pleasure in doing it well; the man who thinks only of his wage will do the least that will pass muster. It is characteristic of students, and of the professions generally, that they think first of their work and secondly of their pay (sometimes perhaps because that pay is assured by a regular salary). For that reason they do what otherwise would never be done, and are socially esteemed as of a higher class than men of trades

or handicrafts, where the same motive for work is not so universally expected.[1]

The putting of rights before duties weakens character. It is a fact of psychology that men respond to a demand made on them. The love of a mother for her child, for whom she has suffered, is greater than the affection of the child for whom the mother has done so much. To confer a benefit does not always make you loved; the ordinary man dislikes the feeling of obligation that a benefit entails, whereas we almost always like people better if we have done something for them.[2] It is well known that people deteriorate if they are dependent. The demoralisation caused by doles is one of the chief problems of charity. The

[1] There is a similar confusion in the common statement that "the first claim on industry is a living wage." This is, of course, literally true, since production ceases if workers die, but by a "living" wage is really meant a wage sufficient for a certain (undefined) degree of comfort and leisure. Obviously the first claim on industry is that of solvency, of making it pay. For if it does not pay it will, sooner or later, collapse, and then both capitalist, merchant or middleman, and wage-earner, as well as the consumer, will have nothing at all. What is meant, of course, is that such a living wage should be the *final* or *ultimate* aim.

[2] Cp. Hooker, *Ecclesiastical Polity*, Bk. V, chap. lxiii, 1. "As to love them of whom we receive good things is duty, because they satisfy our desires in that which else we should want; so to love them on whom we bestow is nature, because in them we behold the effects of our own virtue."

Cp. Pascal, *Pensées*, ed. Brunschvicg, No. 72. "Trop de bienfaits irritent, nous voulons avoir de quoi surpayer la dette. Beneficia eo usque laeta sunt dum videntur exsolvi posse; ubi multum antevenere, pro gratia odium redditur" (Tacitus, *Ann.* iv, 18). (Too many benefits irritate us, we wish to have the means to repay the debt with interest. Benefits only please us as long as we think we can return them; beyond that point dislike takes the place of gratitude.) Quoted probably from Montaigne, *Essais*, L. III, chap. viii, "De l'Art de Conférer," who adds from Seneca, *Epist.*, 81: "Nam qui putat esse turpe non reddere, non vult esse qui reddat." (For he who is ashamed of not returning them wishes he had not got to return them.)

Cp. Mr. Ghandi on the reasons why Christianity fails (as he alleges) in India, quoted from the *Calcutta Guardian*, August 6, 1925, by *The Friend*, September 1925:—

"If you give me statistics to show that so many orphans have been reclaimed and brought up to Christianity so many grown-up people, I will accept it, but I do not feel convinced that that is your mission. In my humble opinion your mission is infinitely superior, you want to find the man in India. If you want to do that, you will have to go to lowly cottages, not to give them something, may be probably to take something."

danger of relying on the State is no less in civic life. There is a fallacy latent in the common challenge, "What has the Church done for the working classes?"[1] As a matter of fact, most of what has been done, or at least attempted *for* them (as distinct from what they have done for themselves), has been done by the Church or other religious agencies—and has caused a general dislike of her and suspicion of church-goers. But where the Church has made demands on men there has been a response. The people in poor districts who are keen on the Church are just those who give of their scanty means and leisure to her service.

The same contrast may be found in men's attitude towards the weak.[2] The idea almost universal in ancient history that cried *Væ victis*, that instituted slavery, that survived in feudalism, that kept women in subjection, is no less common to-day with its cynical assertion that minorities must suffer, not as a statement of fact like "the poor ye have always with you," but as a principle of policy, and has been found a reasoned justification by Nietzsche. It is just as vigorous among those who have suffered. Men who condemn the feudalism of the Middle Ages which kept men down in their caste, will form trade unions to limit the number of skilled workers in a trade. The fierce

[1] Q.T., p. 237.

[2] W. McDougall, *Social Psychology* (Methuen, 1908), p. 112. "This motive (the desire to get the better of others, to emulate, to excel) plays an important part, not only in games, but in many of the most serious activities of life, to which it gives an additional zest. For many a politician it is a principal motive, and many a professional and many a commercial man continues his exertions, under the driving power of this motive, long after the immediate practical ends of his professional activity have been achieved; and in the collective life of societies it plays no small part. But, wherever it enters in, it is recognised that it imparts something of a playful character to the activity; a recognition which often finds expression in the phrase 'playing the game' applied to activities of the most diverse and serious kinds."

See also another passage from the same work quoted in Q.T., p. 261, and the same writer's *Outline of Psychology* (Methuen, 1923), p. 172.

Cp. *The Rule of St. Benedict*, chap. lxxii. "As there is an evil and bitter emulation which separates from God and leads to hell, so there is a good spirit of emulation, which frees men from vice and leads to God and life everlasting."

attack continually made on competition is really an attack on competition to down the weak, for competition is in itself neither good nor bad. It is the essence of all sport, and no one objects, surely, to competition in good works.[1] No! there is all the difference between the temper which says that the weakest must go to the wall and the spirit that is at the bottom of so much that is best in our civilisation, which says, for instance, that place must be given to women just because women as a class are physically weaker.

Though it is more blessed to give than to receive, getting in return for what you give is not wrong. Mutual service is the basis of all commerce, and implies mutual enrichment. But the ideal of the natural man is to get without giving, and leads to refusal to pay the price. This is at the root of all betting. People bet because they want to get their neighbour's money without doing anything in return, or being considered under any obligation to do so.[2] It is not for the excitement or "interest that it adds to the game" that they bet, or, if it is, that is an additional evil since they get it too without paying for it. It is not to be condemned because of the loss it entails and the consequences that too often follow, though these are crying evils. The harm lies in winning. To lose may be foolish, even if you can afford it, but to win is to get "dirty money," money you have done nothing to earn. Or, again, the evil of much that masks itself under the name of Eugenics is the same—the refusal to pay the price. "Birth control," as a system and not in exceptional cases demanded on medical grounds, for which a case can, perhaps, be argued, is, if you think it out, inspired by the same motives. It is of a piece with prostitution, which seeks gratification apart from the responsibilities which sanctify and hallow what else were degrading

[1] See preceding note.

[2] Cp. Peter Green, *Betting and Gambling* (Student Christian Movement, 1925). p. 53. "The essence of gambling consists in trying to get from someone else something for which we render no return." The whole little book should be read.

and base. All "ca'ing canny," all political policy for a class, all shuffling off of responsibility on to the State, are due in the long run to this desire to get without giving.

Again, it is easy to see the issues. Where the dividing-line can be drawn, it makes all the difference on which side men stand. At stake is our national wealth, material and moral, both in quantity and quality, according as men do their utmost or merely that which will pass, choose the highest or that which pays best. Our national character and initiative are in the balance, rising or falling according as men try to do things themselves or get others to do them. The protection and redemption of the weak depends on whether men think their weakness is an opportunity to thrust them down or a challenge to raise them up.

III

But if character depends on the sense of duty, the quality of that character depends upon the nature of the duties preferred. It is a question of values—a matter not merely of psychology but of moral philosophy.

The main issue will be whether material or spiritual aims are set by men before themselves; whether life is regarded as consisting in the abundance of things possessed or in the power to use them; whether it depends on the objects or on the man himself. It depends on the conception of possession and property held—whether negative as the right to prevent others using what you possess, the idea of Stevenson's child that a man's pride and greatness consists in being able to

> Tell the other girls and boys
> Not to meddle with my toys;[1]

or whether possession is positive, in the sense that any book is yours when you have mastered its contents, or any violin

[1] R. L. Stevenson, *A Child's Garland of Verses.*

when you have learned to play it, and your property is that which you have made your own, as God's inalienable property is to have mercy and to forgive. The dividing-line is between those who set their affections on things which demand

Exclusion of participants in good,[1]

and those who recognise that spiritual things are undiminished by sharing or even increased, that

Truth may be passed from mind to mind; beauty does not wane by being admired; goodness is infectious; even happiness radiates from the presence of the happy man; [2]

[1] Dante, *Purgatorio*, xiv, 87 :—

"O gente umana, perchè poni il cuore
La'v'è mestier di consorto divieto?"
(O man, why place thy heart where there doth need
Exclusion of participants in good?)

And xv, 43.

Cp. Augustine, *De Civ. Dei*, xv, 5. "Nullo modo fit minor accedente seu permanente consorte possessio bonitatis, immo possessio bonitatis, quam tanto latius, quanto concordius individua sociorum possidet Charitas." (For the having of goodness grows no less when one comes or stays to share it; nay, rather the having grows more as the love of one for his fellows has what it has in greater harmony.)

Cp. *De Doctr. Christ.*, i, 1. "Omnis res quæ dando non deficit, dum habetur, et non datur, non habetur, quomodo habenda est." (For anything which does not grow less in the giving, if it is had and not given, is not had as it should be had.)

[2] Cp. W. R. Sorley, *Moral Values and the Idea of God* (Cambridge, 1918), p. 46. The whole passage runs: "The great classes of value which have been mentioned—intellectual, moral, æsthetic, and emotional—have nothing in their nature which makes them exclusive. When one man attains truth, or realises goodness, or even enjoys happiness, there is nothing in his experience which makes it impossible or more difficult for others to do the same. Truth may be passed from mind to mind; beauty does not wane by being admired; goodness is infectious; even happiness radiates from the presence of a happy man, if only outward circumstances do not impose a bar. But if men regard outward or material circumstances as themselves possessed of intrinsic value, then such values, or many of them, are exclusive. The full enjoyment of material goods commonly requires their monopoly."

Cp. Benjamin Whichcote. "In worldly and material things, what is used is spent; on intellectual things, what is not used is not had." Quoted by W. R. Inge, *The Platonic Tradition in English Religious Thought* (Longmans, 1926), p. 53.

nay, even that the beauty of music, the colour of a sunset, the inspiration of a great drama, the charm of words fitly spoken, the quick interchange of thought with thought, the sense of union with man and God in common worship, need for their heightened appreciation the sense of co-operation with fellow-men, and, recognising this, seek those things that are above.

On men's choosing the right alternative depend the growth of learning and the spread of art, not only because men will be ready to choose poorly paid professions that deal with intellectual and spiritual things, but because the right choice will guide to a right use of material wealth and the leisure it makes possible. On it will depend the vigour of philanthropy and the life of religion, and, moreover, the abolition of class inferiority, whether of wealth or of education, stressed as it is by the materialistic or even by the rationalistic view of life, and lessened or done away with in the great democracies of art, service, and religion.

This, too, is the dividing principle in the contrast of circumstances or character as the determining factor in life; between the people who hold that the sty makes the pig and those who hold that the pig makes the sty; between those who hold that "a good body will by its own excellence make the soul good" and those who agree with Glaucon and Socrates that "a good soul will, by its excellence, render the body as perfect as it can be." [1] This is not to deny the

[1] Plato, *Republic*, iii, 403. This is the theme of my *Circumstances or Character* (Methuen, 1911).

Cp. J. H. Newman, *Oxford University Sermons* (Longmans, 1898), Sermon VIII, "Human Responsibility Independent of Circumstances," p. 152.

W. R. Inge, *The Legacy of Greece*, "Religion" (Oxford, 1922), p. 38. "Circumstances are but the subject-matter and not the rule of our conduct, nor in any true sense the cause of it." "The contrast (between the Labour movement and the Palestinian Gospel) is well summed up by Belfort Bax in a passage quoted by Professor Gardner. 'According to Christianity, regeneration must come from within. The ethics and religion of modern socialism on the contrary look for regeneration from without, from material conditions and a higher social life.' Here the gauntlet is thrown down to Christ and Plato alike."

[*Continued on next page.*

influence of circumstances, but to say that that of character is greater, if only because man makes, or modifies, or escapes from, the circumstances of his life. It is the man that counts. "Much as can be done by improved laws . . . the heart of the matter lies in character." [1] If this be so, we shall turn our attention to men rather than things, to education rather than making of laws, to the Kingdom of Heaven and its righteousness, not only because the sequel of such seeking is that all these things of which God knows we have need will be added to us, but for its own sake. This false stress on outward things is the underlying mistake of much modern thought, of the denial of the possibility of chastity, of the contented acceptance by whole classes of a lower standard of decency and manners, of legislation that tries "to make people good by Act of Parliament."

And it becomes worse when imposed by the dead weight of custom, when embodied in traditions and established in Governments. If they are opposed to one another, men have to choose between Cæsar and God, and the worship of Cæsar destroys all progress, because the will of Cæsar nowadays means that of the average man. It destroys the liberty of individuals, the expression of free thought if not the thought itself, unless, indeed, men are ready to pay the

J. S. Mill, *Logic*, Bk. VI, chap. ii, 3. "Of Liberty and Necessity," People's Edition, 1886, p. 550. "His (man's) character is formed by his circumstances (including among these his particular organisation); but his own desire to mould it in a particular way is one of these circumstances, and by no means the least influential."

Becky Sharp, it will be remembered, thought she could be a good woman if she had £5,000 a year. See Q.T., p. 266.

[1] C. Gore, *The Incarnation of the Son of God*, Bampton Lectures, 1891, 1st edition, p. 38.

The lines which Dr. Johnson contributed to Goldsmith's "Traveller" are well known:—

> "How small, of all that human hearts endure,
> That part which laws or kings can cause or cure!"

See Leslie Stephen's *English Thought in the Eighteenth Century* (Smith Elder, 1881), vol. ii, p. 208.

penalty of martyrdom as did Antigone of old, in obeying the laws of Zeus

> . . . that know not change.
> They are not of to-day nor yesterday,
> But live for ever.[1]

It destroys the liberty of corporate bodies within the State, of trade unions, schools, universities, and churches. The tyranny of the State has been a menace, as Dr. Figgis has emphasised, ever since the days of Ancient Greece, as, indeed, before it in Egypt, Nineveh, and Babylon.[2]

These contrasts can perhaps be most strikingly seen over men's conception of the law of marriage. The root misconception of its nature, which emphasises its rights rather than its duties, leads in numberless cases to disappointment, to the weakening of love by lack of service, to the desire to get rid of lunatic or immoral husbands or wives, to the refusal to bear children because men are unwilling to pay the price. By considering the material rather than the spiritual, men come to regard it as a (more or less) lasting contract rather than as an indissoluble relationship. They lay stress on its physical side and see no objection to marrying a sister-in-law, and they describe this emotion which we share with the animals as a " union of hearts " without which there is no real marriage, and say that if this passes away divorce should follow and " remarriage " should take place with anyone who can arouse the passion again, thus substituting free-love for matrimony. By putting Cæsar in the place of God they declare that the State can make that which otherwise were adultery not merely legal but right, and justify a reaction to Paganism, lightly throwing away nineteen hundred years of Christian progress.[3]

[1] Sophocles, *Antigone*. Transl. E. H. Plumptre, 453.

[2] N. Figgis, *Churches in the Modern State* (Longmans, 1914).

[3] Cp. Q.T., 269–73, 279–83, and my *Pastoral Theology and the Modern World* (Oxford, 1920), pp. 120–2, and 4, note. Also " The Church and Divorce, " in *The Review of the Churches*, January 1924.

IV

In all these points—and the list might be extended—there are fundamental differences which, when acted upon, lead to immense consequences. In each and every case Christianity is on the right side. I do not say secularists are always in the wrong, but the Church is uniformly and invariably right. The wrong side is often very natural, very plausible and reasonable, but for all that quite wrong, and leads to disastrous consequences. As soon as the case is put clearly we recognise directly that it is so. There is no need of apologetics for this, merely of clear thought. Our moral sense tells us at once what is right and what is wrong.

But the Church claims to give a rational justification of this judgment of the conscience. Men will ask, Why is it so? and so there arises a need of theology, of Christianity interpreted by the intellect, of apologetic theology if you like—that is, of Christianity defended by the intellect. But the Church makes a further claim, a practical one: she claims to guide without argument, for there is no time to stop and debate in a crisis. In life we must act, and often at once; so she speaks with the authority of past experience and consideration—not just thinking of problems for the first time as they arise. Further, she claims to give power from on high to carry out these commands.

In other words, the main problem lies elsewhere—in the theology men do not read, in the Church life and worship they do not join in. The main work must be done, not by reading a book in a chair, still less by arguing in public, but by going down on your knees and letting the grace of God come into your hearts. But the first requisite is to make men see that it matters, to rouse interest. The appeal, that is, is not primarily to their intellect, to men thinking. Apologetic theology at most removes difficulties when interest has been aroused and movement has begun. The appeal is rather to conscience, experience, and common sense—to men judging, feeling, playing their part in the daily trials and opportunities of ordinary life.

CHAPTER II

THE VERDICT OF HISTORY

"Whoever enters on the study of Church History must be prepared for many surprises." Charles Marriott. Quoted by R. W. Church, *Pascal and Other Sermons*, "Bishop Andrewes" (Macmillan, 1896), p. 93.

"The case of historical writers is hard, for if they tell the truth they provoke men, and if they write what is false they offend God." Matthew Paris. Quoted in J. R. Green's *Short History of the English People* (Macmillan, 1874), new ed. 1894, p. 147.

In the last chapter I tried to emphasise the contrasts in men's views as we find them round us. While the majority, I expect, would admit that the contrasts are there, and would agree as to the serious nature of their consequences, many would deny the assertion that in all of them it is Christianity that counts. So here the work of apologetics begins.

"For," they say, "the assumption is not borne out by facts. The whole history of Christianity contradicts it. It presents a bad record—look at the Inquisition! Christendom is split into a thousand sects—look at *Whitaker's Almanack*! It gives no clear lead on great moral questions. It is absurd to talk of the teaching of the Church. It has been in constant opposition to education and has deliberately kept the people ignorant—did not Gregory the Great reprove a bishop for teaching grammar? It has always opposed Science—we can still remember how it welcomed Darwin."

"No!" they continue, "it has always been reactionary. So far from helping it has been *the* great hindrance to progress. The bishops in the House of Lords have always voted against reform." They really say things like this. "The Church supported slavery. After all these years we still go to war with one another. What has Christianity done? Don't you acknowledge that it has been a failure? And if it has, don't you think it is time we tried something else? It is

absurd to tie us down to the teaching of two thousand years ago."

Or else they say: "Why, you can't even tell what Christianity is. It is always changing, and changing for the worse. You have turned the simple teaching of Jesus of Nazareth into creeds and dogmas. Let us at least get back to the Founder." And then they generally tell the story of the man who ended up his speech with the words, "Let us get rid of Christianity and try the teaching of Christ," and sat down amid thunders of applause from the whole house, and not merely from the gallery.[1]

Now the position of defence is always the weaker—witness the popular use of the words "apology" and "apologetic"; but apart from this fact the Christian case often fails because the questions posed have generally been already settled on quite other grounds in the minds of the posers. Certain assumptions have been made *a priori*. The reason given for rejection is often merely an excuse, a rationalisation made to justify a conviction built up by emotion or authority. Men are prejudiced by a bias of education or of temperament, which needs to be considered first. Or, equally often, their judgments are vitiated by absence of qualifications to judge, by ignorance of logic, by defect of historical sense, or by lack of training in moral discrimination. The task before us, therefore, is to discover these preconceptions and to remedy the defects in anticipation by sound education. For it is education which gives a right bias by exercise in clear and exact thought, both in realisation of the working of the world in the past and in judgments of value as to the things of present life.

I

The methods of history must be understood if we are to argue historical questions. If it be really true that we never

[1] For popular answers to such popular objections see my *Question Time in Hyde Park*, Series IV, "Christianity in History," pp. 187–210 ff.

entirely forget anything we have once known, at least memory selects from the mass of experience that which it chooses and finds to be coherent. A large part of its work is to ignore what it does not wish at the time to see. So, in the same way, history specialises on a subject. "The prime necessity for the historian," write MM. Langlois and Seignobos, "when confounded with the chaos of historical facts, is to limit the field of his researches."[1] Moreover, it is the abnormal that interests and attracts attention. This is true of everyday life. The moving object, the bright colour, the loud noise, the dress out of fashion, stand out from the still, quiet-coloured, hushed routine of custom. Again, it is the abnormal that breaks away from the regular and may lead to serious results. The rift within the lute, the breach in the wall, the leak in the dyke, may silence music, cause the surrender of the city, or flood the country. The ninety-and-nine sheep really matter most, but they can look after themselves. The shepherd has to go after the hundredth that is astray in the wilderness.

So history was at first generally political. It told of battles and monarchs because they were exceptional events and persons. It did not trouble to write the "Diary of a Nobody." It told of "the quarrels of popes and kings with wars and pestilences on every page; the men all good for nothing and hardly any women at all," and many others beside Catharine Morland found it very tiresome.[2] So "Thucydides, an Athenian, wrote the history of the war between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians," and confined himself to his subject. He never mentions Socrates and barely alludes to the art of his city. It was only comparatively of late that men selected other special subjects, and the history of prices, economic history, the histories of art,

[1] *Introduction Éaux tudes Historiques*, Ch. V. Langlois et Ch. Seignobos (Paris, 1899), L. III, chap. ii, p. 200. "La première ncéessité qui s'impose à l'historien mis en présence du chaos des faits historiques c'est de limiter son champ de recherches."

[2] Jane Austen, *Northanger Abbey*, chap. xiv.

music, architecture, and painting, came to be written, though ecclesiastical history was there even before Eusebius, in St. Luke and in the Old Testament.

We are apt to be misled if we do not realise this condition of history-writing. We read of war after war, but forget to notice the little sentence, "And the land had rest forty years," telling of a whole generation without experience of its horror. Just as nurses and doctors at times talk as if the whole world were sick, or organisers of charity are tempted to say with impatience, "Is everybody in difficulties?" or psychologists will make sweeping generalisations from morbid and nasty-minded people who have got themselves into a mess, so a reader of the daily paper might well imagine that the world was full of strikers, adulterers, and murderers—which is really far from being the case. We must beware of the argument from silence, yet specialisation is necessary to disentangle the abnormal from the normal, to find the extent of an exception and to estimate its proportion to the whole.

This popular error underlies many attacks on Christianity.[1] We may take two examples. The record of persecution by the Church is a bad one, especially against the Jews. Let us frankly acknowledge the fact without trying to find excuses, even if they are there. The cases of Galileo, of Giordano Bruno, and of the Inquisition, generally form part of the regular stock-in-trade of antichristian propaganda, and, indeed, it might easily add to its repertoire with a wider knowledge of the past. By no one has the ugly story been told more emphatically than by Lord Acton[2] and

[1] Cp. Montesquieu, *De l'Esprit des Lois*, chap. xxiv, 2. "C'est mal raisonner contre la religion, de rassembler dans un grand ouvrage une longue énumération des maux qu'elle a produit, si l'on ne fait de même celle des biens qu'elle a fait. Si je voulois raconter tous les maux qu'ont produits dans le monde les lois civiles, la monarchie, le gouvernement républicain, je dirois les choses effroyables." (It is bad reasoning against religion to collect together in a great work a long list of the evils it has caused, unless at the same time you make one of the good it has done. If I were to set about telling all the evils caused in the world by civil law, by monarchy, be republican government, I should have terrible things to tell.)

[2] In his *History of Freedom and Other Essays* (Macmillan, 1907).

Bishop Creighton.[1] But what men overlook is the enormous counter-area of tolerance. In their own instances it must be remembered that Galileo lived to be seventy-seven, and that his "imprisonment" merely involved his living in retirement with his friends or in his own villa ;[2] while Giordano Bruno, before the shameful business of his seven years' imprisonment and death, had lectured for sixteen years in most parts of Europe without let or hindrance.[3]

Again, much study is needed to disentangle political and religious motives in persecution. Without denying the responsibility of the Church or seeking to throw the blame on others, the real evil, it may well be argued, was the close alliance, or identification, of Church and State. If this was so, the question is, at least, another—one lying farther back in time, and concerned with an error made by Constantine without realising "of how much ill was cause, not his conversion" nor his supposed Donation, but the fatal legacy of the confusion of Cæsar and God.

Or, once more, as Mr. Bernard Shaw has recently made us feel,[4] it is quite possible for people to persecute with quite good intentions. Indeed, to anyone who realises the vital connection of thought and deed, who sees the devastating harm of error, it is very natural. Natural, but quite wrong—wrong in itself and ineffective because it does not convince. It is based on confusion of mind; it does not distinguish between thought which is always free and the expression of thought which it may be the duty of the State to forbid.[5]

[1] In, e.g., his Hulsean Lectures, *Persecution and Tolerance* (Longmans, 1895). I have quoted his main conclusion in Q.T., p. 199.

[2] Cp. the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, art. "Galileo"; quoted, Q.T., p. 198.

[3] Q.T., p. 189.

[4] In his play *Saint Joan*.

[5] So Dr. Johnson. "People confound liberty of thinking with liberty of talking; nay, with liberty of preaching. Every man has a physical right to think as he pleases; for it cannot be discovered how he thinks. He has not a moral right, for he ought to inform himself and think justly. . . . The magistrate has a right to enforce what he thinks; and he who is conscious of the truth has a right to differ." Boswell's *Life of Johnson*, May 7, 1773, quoted in full in Q.T., p. 197.

It is based on bad psychology. The results are the exact opposite to that desired. *Semen est sanguis Christianorum*, or of anyone else.

But a specialised study by a real historian such as Dr. Creighton leads him to the conclusion that persecution was contrary to the spirit of Christ, was alien from the spirit of Christianity, and "was always condemned by the Christian conscience."[1] The vaunted tolerance of Paganism was always precarious, as may be proved from history, since it was based on no principle but merely on contempt and indifference. As a fact, tolerance has been taught to the world by Christianity, even if it was first clearly preached by Christians when persecuted by their fellow-Christians: Jeremy Taylor wrote the *Liberty of Prophesying* in the year 1647. It is now part and parcel of the conception of Christian civilisation, and such conspicuous examples of intolerance as we have to-day are to be found in a mild form in secularist France, with violence in anti-clerical Mexico, with greater severity in Korea under non-Christian Japan, with bloody cruelty in Armenia under Mohammedan Turkey, and with systematic vindictiveness in Russia under anti-christian Bolshevism.

The same preliminary considerations are necessary before we can judge of the Church's attitude towards education, and in this question they will show that the charges are even more grotesquely unfounded. So far from the Church being the enemy of education, till of quite recent years practically all was carried on, or inspired, by the Church. I give, of course, a quite general meaning to the term and include all religious bodies. Any fair-minded history of education will show this, as it tells the story of the schools of Charles the Great, from which our universities and scholastic philosophy were evolved, down to the founding of the National and the British and Foreign Schools Societies,

[1] *Hulsean Lectures*, p. 2. Quoted, Q.T., p. 199.

and later.[1] Nay, an even better witness is given by historians prejudiced against Christianity, who are forced to confess that

> It would be unjust to bring a constructive charge against the Church of the Middle Age and to represent it as systematically hostile to instruction, (that) directly to the contrary, it is the clergy who in the midst of general barbarism preserved some vestige of the ancient culture.[2]

This leadership of the Church in education only ceased when the State stepped tardily in, with its access to the public purse, which made it able to do what the Church could never afford. And, after all, the State represents a large body of Christians, both in its teachers and voluntary workers as well as in its taxpayers, even if some Governments have enforced secular ideals in education.

But all this naturally makes no appeal to men with no sense of history, but only an acquaintance with a few isolated facts showing how the Church has at times opposed particular systems or hindered methods of reform. The real factor behind is that the Church has a certain conception of education which has often clashed with other ideals, and has been ignored by reformers of matter and method. In old days she waged war with the Pagan tradition, declaring, as Plato had done before, that its teaching was immoral and corrupting. In the same way she attacked the theatre, and it was long before she elaborated a better school either of teaching or Dramatic Art. Indeed, it is not altogether clear, even to-day, that it is good for boys to soak their minds in Horace and for masters to have to say, " We'll leave out the next ode," setting all their minds agog to find out the nastiness

[1] Cp. J. W. Adamson, *A Short History of Education* (Cambridge, 1919), pp. 5–13.

A. Harnack, *Monasticism*, Williams and Norgate's *Crown Theological Library*, p. 76. Quoted, Q.T., p. 202.

[2] G. Compayré, *History of Pedagogy*. Transl. W. H. Payne (Sonnenschein, 1879), p. 68. Quoted, Q.T., p. 202.

in it. It remains true of all classic literature that it has a taint which makes it questionable fare for young, uncritical minds. Anyhow, this is the source of most of the stock quotations from men like Gregory, who lived in days when "Pan and Priapus were very real." [1] He certainly was not opposed to education in itself.

For the Church holds that education must be of the whole man and must include the building up of his character as well as of his intellect; that it must be in touch with his whole life and not merely a matter of school hours and weekdays, but of home and altar too; that it does not end with a leaving certificate and with final examinations, but looks forward to the future life on earth as a citizen of the Kingdom of England and a member of the Church, and to the life of the world to come after the great test before the Judgment Seat of Christ is passed. And, really, compared with this, wrong spellings and false quantities are secondary matters.

Similarly with the opposition of Religion and Science, by which objectors mean Natural Science.[2] It was very real in

[1] J. W. Adamson, *op. cit.*, p. 2, for the whole quotation, and for that from Gregory see Q.T., p. 201.

The common complaint that "with all your Board Schools (such complainers generally still continue to speak of the public elementary schools under the County Councils by that title) I can't get an office-boy who can write a decent letter, and my wife can't get a cook," is based on the assumption that the province of the school is to teach what can only be learned in the office and the kitchen, and that the object of education is to save employers of labour trouble. It is interesting to note that a similar objection to the work of the Church in education was made by Voltaire. "La Chalotais declared that the Frères de la Doctrine Chrétienne had ruined everything by teaching reading and writing to folk who should only learn to draw and handle a plane and file, which they no longer desired to do. The good of society requires that the learning of the people should not extend beyond their business."

To which Voltaire replied: "I thank you for proscribing study amongst plowmen. I who cultivate the soil make a request for labourers, not for tonsured clerks." A. Tilley, *Modern France*, p. 376.

[2] Cp. H. Rashdall, *The Theory of Good and Evil* (Oxford, 1907), vol. ii, p. 439. "It is a great misfortune that in this country (it is otherwise in Germany) we have no word to express the idea of 'Science' which does not suggest the certainty and precision which we are accustomed to associate with the Physical Sciences alone."

the eighteenth, and still more in the nineteenth, century—a time of rapid advance in our knowledge of the natural world and its order. Certain stock objections against the Church are continually being made. These chiefly refer to the opposition to Darwin's work, the storm about which some of us can even now remember. These objections are still alive among the masses of the people in England, and are strong among the Fundamentalists in America.

The difficulty has chiefly arisen from a confusion in men's minds as to the provinces of the two—a subject to which we shall return later. Natural Science deliberately confines itself to the material order; that is its scope. Religion, or rather theology, is concerned with the knowledge of God's place in it. Where men talk of "Science" in this connection, they generally mean Metaphysics, or rather a particular set of materialistic philosophical views often induced by a study of Material Nature. Sometimes they mean the theological opinions of particular men of Science, which are not necessarily of any more value than the opinions on Natural Science held by theologians. Natural Science, of course, as such has nothing to say on the ultimate nature of reality. This academic commonplace, however, is a new and strange idea to the mass of less clearly thinking men.[1]

And historically the conflict has been acute in one period only, and was then largely due to the identification of Christianity with the history in the Book of Genesis. This, in turn, was due to a theory of inspiration held, no doubt, through all the Church's history, but only brought into prominence by the invention of printing, or rather of paper, which made Bibles cheap, and by the doctrines of the Reformation, which felt the need of a new final authority. As every Church historian knows, the attitude so common in the nineteenth century was not in the least that of Origen at Alexandria in the second,[2] or of Augustine at Carthage

[1] See below, Chapter VI.

[2] *Philocalia*, chap. i, 17. Quoted, Q.T., p. 60.

in the fourth, who interpreted Genesis freely according to the speculations of their time ; [1] while in the darker ages the Church did much to keep such Natural Science as there was sane and healthy by banning Astrology and Magic. It may even be claimed that by her teaching of theism she kept the way open for recognising the unity of creation and the universality of law.[2]

So, while it is true that particular objections can be met, what is needed is a more diffused acquaintance with historical facts. This will reveal a large body of scientific thought on the side of Christianity. It is easy to make lists of Christian men of Science, beginning with Pascal and Newton. It will show why others have been in opposition of recent years, though their names can be balanced by such as Romanes, Lister, or Pasteur. It will reduce to their due proportion eccentric cases such as the alleged opposition of the Church to the use of chloroform, which Chalmers did not think important enough to refute.[3] But even more, what is wanted is familiarity with historical method such as will enable men to judge of these facts for themselves, and realise that, though it is right to observe birds, *ex uno disce omnes* is a precept of limited application, and that one swallow does not make a summer, while rules are proved by exception.

[1] *Confessions*, Bk. X, 3 ff., and xii. 17–21, where he gives five different interpretations of the opening words of Genesis that were current in his time, including one that "the original formlessness is called heaven and earth because all things were implicitly contained in it, and were to be brought forth from it" (quod in ea jam essent ista confusa, nondum qualitatibus formisque distincta), and adding that "if the interpretation given be true in itself, is it any great evil if it does not exactly represent the author's meaning?" (quid mali est, si hoc sentiat, quod tu . . . ostendis verum esse, etiamsi non hoc sensit ille quem legis. . . .). The paraphrases are from the edition with notes by J. Gibb and W. Montgomery (Cambridge, 1908), pp. 382–3.

Cp. C. Gore, *Belief in God* (Murray, 1921), p. 10. "Augustine himself, as is well known, following St. Gregory of Nyssa, had propounded the view that God in the beginning created only germs or causes of the forms of life which were afterwards to be developed in gradual course" (*De Gen. ad Lit.*, v. 5 and 23, and St. Gregory of Nyssa *in Hexæm.*, P.G. XLIV, 72, etc.).

[2] See below, chap. v, p. 137.

[3] Cp. Q.T., p. 210.

II

Christianity is accused of being a reactionary force in opposition to progress. This accusation is often lightly made without much consideration of what progress means. "What has Christianity done?" men ask. "Don't you acknowledge that it is a failure?"

For in such taunts the facts of human life are ignored—such an obvious fact, for instance, as that there is a new generation every thirty years, and that it is not the same people who have been living for the last two thousand years. "Each man," said Amiel, "begins the world afresh, and not a single fault of the first man has been avoided by his successors of a thousand generations."[1] And we of the older generation do not find that those of the younger are so very ready to profit by our experience. Indeed, we do not altogether wish it were so. They must learn their lessons themselves. It is the learner that matters, not so much the things learned.

You might as well say that education is a failure because after all these years we are still teaching children to read, and that men at Oxford have not grown up in the least, but are still doing just the same silly things we used to do. Human nature does not change much. Progress is chiefly in material things and such as are able to be stored. Knowledge is stored in books. "Institutions," continues Amiel, "grow in wisdom and science without a name increases, but young men, though more civilised, are to-day just as rash and no less likely to go wrong than they were yesterday." Though there *is* progress, this is the first caution we must observe.

[1] *Journal Intime*, ii, 165. The whole quotation in Q.T., p. 86. Cp. Goethe, *Faust*, Act I:—

> "Was du ererbt, von deinem Vätern hast,
> Erwirb es, um es zu besitzen."
> (What from your fathers is inherited
> Must yet again be earned if you would have it.)

Again, new things are not necessarily better, nor old for that matter.

> Old things need not therefore be true,
> Ah! brother men, nor yet the new.[1]

To say "Isn't it time we tried something else?" is, unless you have reason to believe that the something else will succeed, simply irrational; it is merely "happy go lucky." There are times when conservatism is the most advanced position. It was so in the Middle Ages when nations had fallen back into barbarism; it is so to-day wherever the cruder ideas of rising multitudes are threatening to dominate thought. Progress implies the use of the past:—

> The souls of now two thousand years
> Have laid up here their toils and fears,
> And all the earnings of their pain,—
> Ah, yet consider it again![2]

There is in the assertion this truth, that corporate bodies tend to conservatism. Initiative comes from individuals. So Catholic Christianity, with its strong social stress, tends to be slow to move, and especially appears so in times of rapid change. But if the Church is open to this danger, the accusation has not been in the least true of more individualistic Nonconformity, which has generally been associated with political Liberalism. It is not Christianity which is reactionary, even if it be a bad thing to go back to the past.[3]

[1] A. H. Clough, *Poems* (Macmillan, 1892), p. 93.

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] Cp. W. R. Matthews, *Studies in Christian Philosophy*, Boyle Lectures, 1920 (Macmillan, 1921), p. 58. "The most obvious contrast between Christian civilisation and all others is that it is progressive," ff. The author quotes B. Bosanquet, *Civilisation of Christendom*, p. 84. "We can hardly realise the depth of the change by which this Christian doctrine initiated the belief in development, so characteristic of the modern world, unless we compare the timid social ideas of the wisest of the Greeks with the audacious metaphors which were the first that occurred to the Galilean peasant." The whole passage should be read.

So with the question of slavery. Let us acknowledge that it has been abolished late in the world's history, that the idea of freedom was reached by a very slow process of evolution, or, as people put it, "The Church took a jolly long time about it." But history shows us, who are so accustomed to rapid change, that things *do* move slowly as a rule. Moreover, it shows that, as a matter of fact, it *was* Christianity that abolished it, slow as its action may have been. It first gave the Christian slave a status; it respected him. The word "slave" hardly appears, they tell us, in the Catacombs.[1] It encouraged manumission; it spoke of the natural freedom of man.[2] In the new Christian

[1] F. Cabrol, *Dictionnaire de Liturgie et d'Archéologie Chrétienne*, art. "Esclaves," vol. v, col. 390. "Les épitaphes catacombales garde le silence sur la condition sociale des morts. Quelques inscriptions mentionnent un esclave ou un affranchi, mais elles sont tellement exceptionnelles qu'elles confirme la règle d'omission générale." (Epitaphs in the catacombs keep silence as to the social condition of the dead. A few inscriptions mention a slave or one emancipated, but they are so exceptional as to confirm the general rule.)

[2] Cp. Augustine, *De Civ. Dei*, xix, 15. "Nullus autem natura, in qua prius Deus hominem condidit, servus est hominis aut peccati." (No one, by that nature in which God at first made man, is either a servant of man or of sin.)

Such quotations might be multiplied, but it would be as great a mistake to attribute to them any great consequence as to deny them any consequence at all. Freedom from servitude was mainly won by economic forces, but economic forces also brought about negro slavery in a worse form than the ancient world has seen. Human nature was much the same in the Middle Ages as it is now. Christianity may have made little difference, but it was *all* the difference. Cp. G. G. Coulton, *The Mediæval Village* (Cambridge, 1924), *passim* and p. 142:—

"Here, again, let me clear the ground by trying to put my final conviction before the reader in one or two sentences. I judge the monk to have been, on the whole, a slightly better landlord than the layman. His conservatism inclined him to the harder side, since his whole economic position was fundamentally capitalistic; but his religion and his traditions of social amenity, which even at the worst kept him on a higher moral plane than the average lay lord, weighed rather more heavily in the milder scale. In the same rough and tentative way in which I reckon the modern and mediæval labourers' lives to differ by about 10 per cent., I should reckon the monastic landlord to have been 4 or 5 per cent. better than his brother the layman."

But, as Browning wrote, "The little more and how much it is!"

A similar criticism is made that, even if Christianity implies the duty of kindness to animals, Christians have been very slow in learning the lesson. We must acknowledge it, but it is interesting to note that what is probably the first instance of legislation for their protection was due to Constantine,

civilisation that arose on the debris of the old Pagan world its place was taken by feudal serfdom with its insistence on mutual duties. And finally, though the ideas of the French Revolution may have paved the way, it was, as a matter of fact, a directly Christian impulse that proved to have the force to effect its abolition. Equally is it a matter of fact that Paganism and Islam have not abolished it, and that Christianity is the great safeguard for human freedom in the world to-day.[1]

To say that there is still industrial slavery is to confuse the issue. No doubt there is much that is wrong in industrial life. No doubt there are rife many evils analogous to those of slavery, but the whole point of industrialism is that man is free to sell his labour and suffers from competition, that his employer is considered to have no further obligation towards him beyond that of fulfilling a contract. In other words, whatever State-conscripted labour may be, industrial servitude is not slavery.

Similarly with the accusation of narrowness. Undoubtedly Christians are narrow. They are, after all, only men, and

who ordered that only light rods or goads with short harmless points were to be used for horses used in public service, and that they were not to be overdriven. *Decree*, May 14, A.D. 316, P.L. VIII, col. 142. "Quoniam plerique nodosis et validissimis fustibus inter ipsa currendi primordia animalia publica cogunt, quidquid virium habent absumere, placet, ut omnino nullus in agitando fuste utatur, sed aut virga aut certe flagro cujus in cuspide infixus brevis aculeus pigrescentes artus innocuo titillo poterit admonere, non ut exigat tantum quantum vires valere non possunt. Qui contra hanc fecerit sanctionem, promotus regradationis humilitate plectetur, munifex pœnam deportationis excepiit."

[1] Cp. G. M. Trevelyan, *History of England* (Longmans, 1926), p. 599. "Originally promoted by the Society of Friends, who never did a greater service to humanity, the slave trade question was taken up by philanthropists like Sharp and Clarkson, by Wilberforce, the 'converted' man of fashion, and by Zachary Macaulay, whose eminently Scottish qualities put a stiffening into the fibre of English Evangelicalism. Many of the workers in the cause were either Quakers or Evangelicals, inspired by the practical religious zeal of so many of the Protestant laity of that period. But they had a formidable ally in the non-religious humanitarianism of the new age, in veterans like Fox and young men like Brougham, whose zeal for the slaves waxed in opposition, while the cares of office sprang up and choked Pitt's first generous zeal."

some kinds of narrowness are inevitable in human life. For there is the narrowness of immaturity in youth, and we are all born babes and grow. There is the narrowness of age as our faculties grow tired and decay. There are ups and downs in our life, and it is only seldom that we are at our best, the best that we feel is our true self, the best we should like to be judged by. There is narrowness that comes from circumstances. We have not all had the schooling we should have liked. Perhaps we were ill, or masters neglected us, to our irreparable loss. There are limitations of surroundings. We may have been born in a mean street, in a poor suburb, in the remoteness of provincial society, or in the isolation of country life. Narrow means, home duties, the need of earning, may have hemmed us in. We should have liked to travel, and to have seen cities and men, but could not. And then there is all the narrowness that comes from within, from laziness, from temper, from selfishness and pride, and we Christians confess that we are sinners. Moreover, there is narrowness that is necessary and valuable; we call it concentration. It is often the price paid for good work. Our other faculties become atrophied because we stick to our task. There is value even in the fanatic; he often gets things done where others fail.

But, for all that, Christianity gives a wider outlook. "After all, it is the eternities that count," said Lord Haldane, "in the long run, and the people who are in contact with the eternities,"[1] and Christianity gives the steadiness of purpose that makes men win through things temporal to things eternal, by training like that which men go through who wish to win a race. "So fight I," said St. Paul. It is staying power and an adequate motive that men require, lest they should "slink out of the race where the immortal garland is to be run for, not without dust and heat."[2]

[1] Speech at Manchester at the Third Annual Conference of the British Institute of Adult Education, September 21, 1924.

[2] Milton, *Areopagitica*. The whole quotation in Q.T., p. 12.

Christians may be narrow. They are, as we saw, only men and are very like other men, but they are just so much less narrow by their Christianity. The Church is the one school of culture available for all. It is the one institution ready to hand that brings to men literature, oratory, music, architecture, social life, the opportunity to "consort with those who are of the higher order in mental things," as well as scope for service that delivers from the narrowness of self, and the inner discipline which is the core of all breeding and education, and a philosophy which gives men an interest in all things and all men as the creatures of God.[1] It is a deeper insight that is wanted, and a wider and more sympathetic outlook to prevent us generalising from single instances of men, who very likely are narrow and commonplace.[2]

With these two cautions against exaggeration the answer to our accusers is not difficult. I think those people who compare the ancient Pagan world so favourably with modern Christendom cannot be very widely read in the classical literature which describes that world. The moment you pass beyond the finest passages that are selected for our reading, and sometimes even in them, you come across glimpses of moral depravity and of the horror of fear in which they lived continually.[3] It may be enough to quote Mr. Gladstone's answer to the question, "What has Christianity done?" and point out that it

[1] I have worked out this idea in my "Religion the Most Effective Instrument in Education," printed in my *Pastoral Theology and the Modern World* (Oxford, 1920), p. 165 ff.

[2] Again, the Christian, as being more sure of himself, can more safely live a wider life. Where the ordinary man had better, as he says, "keep himself to himself," the Christian can mix with sinners without danger in proportion as he hates sin, just as the man predisposed to phthisis had better take care where he goes while the healthy man need only take reasonable precautions. Cp. C. G. Montefiore, *Elements of the Teaching of Jesus* (Macmillan, 1910), p. 55. "Just because he himself was not a sinner, he did not keep himself to himself and avoid contact with those who sinned."

[3] For the horror and fear of Paganism see below, Chapter V. Here it is rather of its moral obliquity that I am speaking.

abolished (1) gladiatorial shows and other spectacles of horrid cruelty to man; (2) human sacrifices; (3) polygamy; (4) exposure of children; (5) slavery (in its old form and has nearly accomplished its work in the new); (6) cannibalism. Next, Christianity drove into the shade all unnatural lust, and, indeed, all irregular passions. But the former it effectually stamped as infamous. Next, Christianity established (1) generally speaking the moral and social equality of women; (2) the duty of relieving the poor, the sick and afflicted; (3) peace instead of war as the ordinary normal presumptive relation between nations.[1]

After all, it would be impossible to-day, out of India, to deify an Antinous, or for a Prime Minister to listen to the discourses of a brothel-keeper,[2] and our decent working men do not calmly advise their wives to expose their children if they are born girls.[3]

[1] For the whole letter see Q.T., p. 85. To the illustration there may be added the following from Lecky's *History of European Morals* (Longmans, 1869), vol. ii, p. 100:—

"The high conception that has been formed of human life, the protection of infancy, the elevation and final emancipation of the slave classes, the suppression of barbarous games, the creation of a vast and multifarious organisation of charity, and the education of the imagination by the Christian type, constitute together a movement of philanthropy which has never been paralleled or approached in the pagan world."

[2] Plutarch, *Pericles*. "Some indeed say that Pericles made his court to Aspasia only on account of her wisdom and political abilities. Nay, even Socrates himself sometimes visited her alone with his friends; and her acquaintance took their wives with them to hear her discourse, though the business that supported her was neither honourable nor decent, for she kept a number of courtesans in her house. . . . These particulars occurring to my memory as I write this life, I thought it would be a needless affectation of gravity, if not an offence against politeness, to pass over them in silence." But even Plutarch is hardly shocked.

Cp. W. R. Inge, in *The Legacy of Greece* (Oxford, 1922), p. 40. "The Athenians set up no Albert Memorials, but they tortured slave-girls in their law-courts, and sent their prisoners to work in the horrible galleries of the Laureion silver-mines."

[3] See the letter of Hilarion to his wife, June 17 1 B.C. Quoted, Q.T., p. 85. To the examples there illustrating the horror of African paganism may be added the following from Thibet: "The two favourite forms of capital punishment are, being sewn up in a wet Yak skin and put out in the sun until deat hends the torment, or being cast into the depths of a dry well, the top being firmly fastened over the head of the culprit."

Note.—These methods are an ingenious attempt to evade the Buddhist law, which forbids a true disciple to kill.—B. H. Streeter, *The Sadhu* (Macmillan, 1921), p. 30.

There is the witness of Christian civilisation on our side, in spite of the differences of Christian doctrine and of the mass of those who revolt from Christian teaching in faith and morals, which is progressive and has its golden age in the future, has a power of assimilating nations and races and organising them into a whole, has developed ideals of political freedom and equality, and has taught the world that "human personality as such is worthy of reverence and possesses rights." [1]

III

Then there is the accusation that Christianity has degenerated. It is attacked on the ground that it is always changing, and, it is added, changing for the worse.

People will grant that it has been a great power. They will acknowledge that its appearance heralded a change in the world, but, they say, "It was quickly corrupted. The simple teaching of the prophet of Nazareth was turned into dogmas which the Apostles would not have understood. The books of the Bible were arbitrarily selected from a whole host of others with equal claims to be read. The simple gospel of Jesus was spoiled by ecclesiasticism. Religion was turned into theology. Let us (a favourite trope) get rid of Christianity and try the teaching of Christ!"

Now there is, of course, a real sense in which students must take care to keep in touch with facts, whether they are studying Theology or Natural Science. In studying the movements of the stars or the composition of the earth, it is not enough to get up text-books, still less to learn the answers to examination questions. But no one, it has been pointed out, is so foolish as to say of Natural Science, "Let us get rid of astronomy and get back to the stars," or "Let us have done with geology and get back to the rocks." There *is*, of course, a danger of being merely academic, but

[1] W. R. Matthews, *Studies in Christian Philosophy*, Boyle Lectures, 1920 (Macmillan, 1921), p. 62.

the remedy is not to scrap the results of all previous thought.

People do not realise that, though "things are ancienter than the names whereby they are called," [1] names are still a great convenience. They do not take in the fact that, though experience comes first, science follows after; that is the invariable rule. Men will criticise and ask for explanations as long as they have intellects; to refuse to do so is obscurantism. There is a very real, even if lesser, value in theology. Intellect has a place in religion. There is a strange irony in the fact that rationalists, who overstress the value of human reason, bitterly attack theology and creeds, which are the facts of religion rationalised for presentation to the intellect.[2]

Moreover, the Church is a fact. It is a living organism composed of men with all their needs. It is always easy to criticise a thing in being. An ideal reconstructed in an imaginary far-away past, or a Utopia conceived in the distant future, are each fairly immune from attack. But things are only done by existing working bodies of men, and if men are to work together they must be agreed. There must be a programme, and the details of the bond of agreement are the articles of common creeds which we call dogmas.

When people realise this we can argue particular points. We can explain how we got our creeds, partly from the necessity of profession of faith on admission to the Church by baptism, partly under the cross-fire of criticism by Gnostics and Arians. We can show how the process was a long one, that if our baptismal creed was late in its final form it was early in its substance; how the theological creeds issuing in the so-called Nicene Creed were largely the outcome of a demand for exact thought on the facts of

[1] Hooker, *Ecclesiastical Polity*, Bk. VII, ii, 2. "With all names this is usual, that inasmuch as they are not given till the things whereunto they are given have been some time first observed, therefore generally things are ancienter than the names whereby they are called."

[2] Cp. my *Why Men Believe* (S.P.C.K., 1921), p. 42.

the gospels. We can tell them how the Canon was fixed—explaining, if necessary, that it was not by a miracle at the Council of Nicea,[1] but by a gradual process—partly by the practical needs of worship, partly in the face of the claims of rival and spurious works; that the whole was a critical process—some being rejected on grounds of their authorship, some on that of their contents. Some were unchallenged, some spurious, some disputed and accepted or rejected as the evidence seemed to warrant. Or we may trace the growth of the doctrine of the Trinity, pointing out that it is irrelevant to say that the Nicene Creed "would have created a recalcitrant emotion among the citizens of Pella," or that the Apostles would not have understood the Athanasian symbol.[2] Of course they would not—except, perhaps, St. Paul. The doctrine began with faith in Christ, as astronomy began with watching the stars. Under cross-fire of Gnostic polytheism and of Jewish Unitarianism, Christians had to explain what they believed and to separate false theories from the true, as astrology had to be separated from astronomy. Then, when the terms had been beaten out under the stress of practical challenge, men like Augustine realised the philosophical value of the Church's theology of the Trinity that it was but the supreme instance of the old question of the One and the Many.[3]

But all this will fall on deaf ears for the person who does not realise that the natural order is experience first and then science.

[1] A common belief popularised by a blunder of Haeckel's in his *Die Wälträtsel.* The passage will be found in Q.T., p. 156.

[2] So Huxley in *Science and Christian Tradition,* "Agnosticism" (Macmillan, 1889), p. 233. "My firm belief is that the Nazarenes of the year 40, headed by James, would have stopped their ears, and thought worthy of stoning, the man who propounded it (the doctrine of the Nicene and Athanasian Creeds) to them. . . . Is it (the true faith) contained in the so-called Apostles' Creed? I am pretty sure that even that would have created a recalcitrant commotion at Pella in the year 70 among the Nazarenes of Jerusalem who had fled from the soldiers of Titus."

[3] For all this section see Q.T., pp. 167–84.

IV

Finally, there is the accusation that Christianity is always changing. To this there is the easy immediate answer that we are also accused of ultra-conservatism, and that, while it is hard to be attacked on both sides, there is some comfort in knowing that our opponents cannot both be right. Our changeableness is contrasted with the "certainty of Science" by people who apparently believe that Natural Science never changes its theories. The confusion which in degree always accompanies freedom of thought is brought up as a charge against us. "You cannot tell what Christianity is. One says one thing and another another." This is a real difficulty. Any explanation lays itself open to the charge of "wriggling out of it." "The Old Testament has for centuries been accepted as it stands," they say. "The Church has always taught a physical ascension of Christ to a place." "Hell and Heaven have been universal beliefs." "How are we to know what is necessary to believe and what is not?"

The answer is not as difficult to-day as it was when Vincent of Lerins wrote,[1] but still the mass of people hardly grasp what is developmentand what is change into something else. No change is development unless the end was implied in the beginning, unless the final result was contained in the origin.[2] The wonderful forms of the modern chrysanthemum were contained implicitly in the simple daisy-like flower from which they were developed. We

[1] *Commonitoria*, xxiii. "Sed forsitan dicit aliquis: Nullusne ergo in ecclesia Christi profectus habebitur religionis? Habeatur plane et maximus. Nam quis ille est tam invidus hominibus, tam exosus deo, qui istud prohiberi conetur? Sed ita tam ut vere profectus sit ille fidei, non permutatio. Siquidem ad profectum pertinet ut in semetipsum unaquæque res amplificetur, ad permutationem vero, ut aliquid ex alio in aliud transvertatur." (But someone may say: Is there to be no progress of religion in the Church of Christ? Certainly there is, and great development. For who is so grudging to men, so hostile to God, as to try to forbid it? But it must be real progress of the faith, not a change. For it is of the essence of progress for a thing to be enlarged in itself, but of change for a thing to be turned into something else.)

[2] See below, Chapter V, pp. 141–4.

see "new flowers" advertised at shows, but they were there from the beginning, waiting to be brought to material form. Cross-fertilising brings in a new strain, though even that does not exclude development. But the danger in criticism or change is that of "emptying the baby out with the bath-water," of losing the essential and continuous while rejecting the accidental. A safe criterion is, "Does the new include the old? Is it alteration into another thing? Is it a going back to what was long ago rejected as inadequate?"

To men who understand what development is we can explain that the Old Testament is itself a development, that it stands midway between Paganism and Christianity. They can see its value by contrast of its religion with the religions of Syria, Babylonia, and Greece; its imperfection by comparing it with the Sermon on the Mount. They can view it as dynamic, not static. They can appreciate it for what it was becoming, for what it led to—for the fact that, as Origen said, it taught us to be dissatisfied with it itself. This view, we may point out, is embodied in our Church practice. We never chant the Psalms without the Christian corrective of the *Gloria Patri*. We never read the Old Testament as the first lesson without the second from the New to follow —to supplement and to correct it, if need be.

So with Our Lord's ascension. The change from our knowledge of astronomy has made the old view impossible. But what was the essential element of the doctrine? Surely that Christ had passed from this into the spiritual sphere of the world to come—that, as theologians had freely said, the right hand of God at which He sat down is wherever God works. "The hand of God," wrote Augustine, "is the power of God, Who works invisibly in the things which we see." [1] The modern view includes—nay extends—the older

[1] *De Civ. Dei*, xii, 24. "Manus Dei potentia Dei est qui etiam visibilia invisibiliter operatur." (The hand of God is the power of God, Who works invisibly in visible things.)

[*Continued on next page.*

teaching; it is a larger one. Where the interpretation of the Virgin Birth as merely figurative of purity, of the Resurrection of Christ as meaning that His influence was not dead, are lesser views, already considered and rejected as inadequate, the doctrine of the Ascension as involving a universal omnipresence of the Human Nature of Christ, no longer limited to one place as man, is a development into a fuller interpretation of the truth.

So, again, with the doctrine of the future life. We must use symbolism. We can only draw from the language and experience of this life. The alternative is that of ceasing to speak or think about the life to come. But we must remember that it is only symbolism. The point involved in the old doctrine of heaven and hell is, surely, the essential and absolute difference between good and evil. Dante probably believed in a literal material Inferno. There was in his day no particular reason why he should not, but his aim was to present sin as sin without the disguise of convention and circumstance. He would, surely, have been the first to acknowledge that no man is all one mass of sin, and of one sin only. He did not mean Paolo and Francesca had never done anything right, or had committed no other sin. It was this essential conviction that sin is sin, and right is right, that kept the doctrine of heaven and hell alive—often

Cp. Clem. Alex., *Stromateis*, vi. 16. "By the finger of God is understood the power of God by which the creation of heaven and earth is accomplished."

Cp. Pascal, *Pensées*, ed. Brunschvicg, 687. "*Figures*.—Quand la parole de Dieu, qui est véritable, est fausse littéralement, elle est vraie spirituellement. *Sede a dextris meis*, cela est faux littéralement; donc cela est vrai spirituellement.

"En ces expressions, il est parlé de Dieu à la manière des hommes; et cela ne signifie autre chose, sinon que l'intention que les hommes ont en faisant asseoir à leur droite, Dieu l'aura aussi; c'est donc une marque de l'intention de Dieu, non de sa manière d'exécuter."

(When the word of God, which is true, is false literally, then it is true spiritually. *Sit thou on my right hand.* That is false literally; therefore it is true spiritually.

In these expressions we speak of God as men; and that signifies nothing else than that whatever meaning men have in making people sit at their right hand, God has the same. It is a mark of God's meaning, not of His way of carrying out that meaning.)

in grotesque and shocking forms. And it is this same conviction that we find necessitates the continued use of much of the old language,[1] even when we define heaven as to be with God, since eternal life, St. John told us, is to know God, and to be apart from him is hell.[2]

Neither our faults nor our divisions are to be denied. It is the method of history to specialise and to emphasise them. If we are to cure disunion we must "lay to heart the great dangers we are in by our unhappy divisions." If we are to remedy what is wrong we must acknowledge that we have sinned of our most grievous fault. If we are to expand our doctrines we must be ready to discuss them, and the Church does not claim to be infallible. We must not lose our sharpness of critical insight.

But we must remember that there is a far greater area of good that is working, and a unity that is perhaps all the greater for holding together such diversity. We must not lose our breadth of view, or permanently forsake the ninety-and-nine sheep in the wilderness. We must remember what Coleridge called "that profound sentence of Leibnitz, that men's intellectual errors consist chiefly in denying. What they affirm with feeling is for the most part right."[3] For the body of affirmation of what we agree upon is the larger part, and constitutes the normal that counts.

[1] Cp. C. C. J. Webb, *Studies in the History of Natural Theology*, "Natural Theology of Plato" (Oxford, 1925), p. 109. "Our traditional representations of heaven and hell—themselves probably not without some historical connexion with Orphic representations—no educated Christian regards as more than figures by which we typify to the imagination the prevailing power of what we take for eternal principles of right and wrong."

[2] Cp. Thomas à Kempis, *De Imitatione Christi*, Lib. III, cap. 59. "Ubi tu, cœlum; atque ibi mors et infernus, ubi tu non es." (Where thou art there is heaven; and there is death and hell where thou art not.)

[3] Cp. Benjamin Whichcote, *Aphorisms*, 464. "Heaven is first a temper, then a place." Quoted by W. R. Inge, *The Platonic Tradition in English Religious Thought* (Longmans, 1926), p. 51.

Biographia Literaria, ed. Shawcross (Oxford, 1907), vol. i, p. 170. See below, p. 124.

CHAPTER III

THE TRUSTWORTHINESS OF THE RECORDS

"I reckon a lie in history to be as much a greater sin than a lie in common discourse, as the one is like to be more lasting and more generally known than the other."—BISHOP BURNET, *History of My Own Times*, Preface (Oxford, 1823), vol. i, p. 6.

THERE are many people who are quite ready to recognise the importance of Christianity. They are interested in the story of its evolution in the past, and are not unwilling to allow its value in the present; but they think that its importance has been overrated. They are unwilling to accept its own account of itself, and especially of its origin. "Are we to base our lives on things which happened nearly two thousand years ago?" they ask; "the records of which were written three hundred years after the events they describe—records of doubtful authority, written by who knows whom? Moreover," they continue, "these documents are full of stories of miracles, the evidence for which would not be enough to hang a man in a court of law. They tell stories which contradict one another continually. They claim to describe wonderful and unique occurrences, but there is no outside evidence for them. The single reference to Christ in Josephus is acknowledged to be interpolated." I am quoting what people say. "Tacitus knows nothing of Him. Moreover, we find close analogies to Christianity in Pagan beliefs of the time in Greek mythology, in the Eleusinian mysteries, in the customs of the Aztecs, as in the beliefs of prehistoric man and of savages of to-day all over the world. Don't you know," they ask, "that exact parallels to all the events of the life of Christ are found in the life of Buddha, of Krishna, of Serapis, of Mithra?" [1]

[1] For examples of such questions and assertions and the answers I gave to them see my *Question Time in Hyde Park*, Series III, pp. 127–184.

Now it would be quite easy to pick out the blunders and inaccuracies expressed or implied in these popular assertions; but it would be of little use. It would have little or no effect upon the objector; for the real trouble is that while people are very critical they have little knowledge of the methods of criticism, and naturally possess little of the critical sense that comes from applying them. They have no acquaintance with the science of palæography, and no idea how manuscripts are dated or their worth estimated. They even confuse the date of their first writing with that of the oldest surviving copy. They have no understanding of the methods of history, how documents and sources are criticised, how data are selected and grouped for study. Not unnaturally, when they hear of an "interpolated passage," they do not distinguish between one the whole of which is interpolated and one which has had interpolations thrust into it. They do not understand the nature of evidence, the methods of synthesis and construction, so are easily misled by analogies, noticing little similarities while they fail to realise immense areas of contrast.

Yet, obviously, such knowledge is the preliminary necessity for criticism.

I

Few terms are more loosely bandied about than "the Higher Criticism." There is a popular idea, very widely spread, that it implies an assumption of superiority. A similar popular idea has coined the word "highbrow." It is assumed that a higher critic must be rather conceited and slightly contemptuous, and, in addition, that his conclusions are always negative, that his criticism always destroys traditional opinions and never confirms them.[1]

[1] Cp. *The Higher Criticism.* Four papers by S. R. Driver, D.D., and A. F. Kirkpatrick, D.D. (Hodder & Stoughton, 1912). Preface, p. vi. "The word 'critic' means *able to distinguish*, and 'criticism' means *the power or art of distinguishing*. . . . When the text of an ancient writing has been settled,

For, to begin with, textual criticism from which Higher Criticism seeks to distinguish itself is a matter that has not entered into their view. "What did they want to revise the Bible for?" is, after all, a very natural question for a person who knows nothing whatever of manuscripts and readings, and can only think of one reason for revision—namely, that you are ashamed of what you said or wrote before. "How do we know that they didn't tamper with the text?" represents a very natural suspicion on the part of a person who has never realised that the collation of codices is an art, and that variations in the copying of a scribe are for the most part easily detected. A man with no knowledge of English literature, except perhaps of a play or two of Shakespeare read at school, does not realise that words often change their meanings, and that, for instance, "damnation" in the reign of James the First, when the Authorised Version was made, meant rather what we should express by "judgment" or "condemnation." People who are not scholars have, naturally, a difficulty in realising the advance scholarship has made in three hundred years. Accustomed as they are to printed books, new copies of which can easily be bought if the old ones wear out, they do not realise how few of necessity were early manuscripts, or how easily the end of a roll might get torn off, and are troubled by the fact that St. Mark's account of the Resurrection is not forthcoming. They do not see that the outside might well get worn away, and are suspicious because the second-century list of books, known as the Muratorian Canon, does not mention the first two gospels and begins with "the third book of the Gospels by Luke." They do not understand the liability to error on the part of a scribe either from carelessness or fatigue; nor, on the other hand, how such

as accurately as possible, by the canons of textual criticism, it becomes the province of the 'higher' criticism to determine its origin, date, and (if it be composite) literary structure, by 'distinguishing' between the *data* available for that purpose."

errors can usually be accounted for as repetitions, or omissions due to words or lines having similar endings or being like familiar phrases, and how there is a whole art and science of emendation. Or, rather, they suddenly begin to realise all this and, without knowing how variations are tested and checked, find themselves in a state of uncertainty about the whole of the Gospel records.

The first thing to do, then, is to learn what is good textual evidence. This depends primarily on the number and antiquity of the manuscripts. We want to know what is plentiful evidence and what is slender, how many copies we may reasonably expect to find. Then we want to know how men judge of their age. We want to realise how handwriting varies between scribe and scribe at the same date, and century after century, but how, for all that, students of ancient script can tell with a certainty, acknowledged within limits, the place and date of writing. We want to know what is a long gap between the time of first composition and the oldest surviving copy, and what is a short one. We want to know what other considerations will make a long gap no hindrance to accepting a document as trustworthy, how we can detect signs that it was copied from a much earlier one, or how evidence of bias or of carelessness can be found. We want to know whether the work was translated into any other language and when the translation was made, whether there are any copies of that other version or whether the book was quoted by anyone who lived before the date of our oldest copy. And for the settling of particular points and for finding out which copy probably best represents what the author actually wrote, we want to understand the well-known rules of criticism, such as " the more difficult reading is to be preferred," since a scribe would be more likely to simplify than to confuse, and that " the shorter reading is to be preferred," since a copyist might add, but is less likely deliberately to leave out, words, or that, although the oldest reading is presumably he best, it may be that

"the last form in which a variant appears is more probably the correct one," since the tendency is to get a thing right by revision. We want to know these rules as well as their limitations.[1]

Again, we want to realise what an immense number of various readings are found, and how little difference they make in the meaning of the whole—in the New Testament there are said to be 150,000—and, finally, how easily a variant due to a single individual scribe may be detected and set right.

The best way to bring this home to people is to begin with ordinary secular literature and see what is there considered enough. How many manuscripts are there generally of classical authors?

There are most of such authors as Euripides, Cicero, Ovid, and Vergil. "In these cases," writes Sir Frederic Kenyon, "the extant copies of their works, or portions of them, may be numbered by hundreds."[2] But we find there are about fifty manuscripts (none complete) of the plays of Æschylus, about a hundred of those of Sophocles, and only one of the *Greek Anthology* and of a considerable part of Tacitus's *Annals*.

The number of manuscripts of the New Testament, or of parts of it, is over three thousand.

When we come to examine the gap between the date of

[1] Cp. Eb. Nestle, in Hastings's *Dictionary of the Bible*, art. "Text of the New Testament," vol. iv, p. 736. "Rules drawn up for literary criticism in general have been applied to the New Testament in particular. We can only touch on some of them. First of all, that of Bengel: *Proclivi scriptioni præstat ardua*, which is commonly quoted in the shorter but less balanced form: *Difficilior lectio placet* or *difficilior lectio principatum tenet*. Under this rule falls that of Griesbach: *Brevior lectio præferenda est verbosiori*; also that which Wordsworth-White formulated (in the Oxford Latin N.T.): *Vera lectio ad finem victoriam reportat* (i.e. where a phrase occurs several times with variations, that reading is the true one which is attested at the later places): 'Sæpe enim scribæ quod primo loco pro mendo habent, secundo pro vero agnoscunt.' (*Note.*—Cf. further *Id verius quod prius*, called by Dean Burgon an axiom which holds every bit as true in textual criticism as in dogmatic truth.) But it is clear that these rules have a very limited application."

[2] *Handbook to the Textual Criticism of the New Testament* (Macmillan, 1910), p. 3. Quoted in Q.T., p. 159.

writing and the oldest manuscripts we possess, the contrast is no less striking. In the case of Vergil there is one nearly complete manuscript copied about three hundred years after he wrote, several small fragments of the same date, and two more copies written four hundred years after. But this is exceptional. The earliest manuscript of Sophocles that we possess

was written more than 1,400 years after the poet's death. Æschylus, Aristophanes, and Thucydides are in the same state; while with Euripides the interval is increased to 1,600 years. For Plato it may be put at 1,000 years, for Demosthenes as low as 1,200. The great Latin writers are somewhat better off. Horace is represented by several manuscripts written within 900 years of his death. There is an excellent copy of Terence after an interval of about 700 years, and portions of Livy only about 500 years after his date. For Lucretius, however, we have an interval of nearly 1,000 years, for Catullus about 600.[1]

Pliny's correspondence with Trajan exists only in a copy of a manuscript discovered in the fifteenth century, which has since been lost.

Of the New Testament there are manuscripts dating from 250 years after it was written, with fragments found on papyri in Egypt copied less than *two hundred* years after.

But this is not all. Copies of a work may be lost, but if we find it already quoted and translated we have evidence that it was read and known at an earlier date. "It is seldom," however, "that ancient translations of the classical authors into other languages exist, and still more seldom that they are of any value" for telling us what was originally written. "In the case of the New Testament, translations are both numerous and important."[2] It was translated into Syriac and Latin in the second century,[3] into Coptic

[1] *Handbook to the Textual Criticism of the New Testament* (Macmillan, 1910), p. 4. Q.T., p. 159–60.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 3. Quoted, Q.T., p. 159.

[3] Cp. C. R. Gregory, *The Canon and Text of the New Testament*, T. & T. Clark's International Theological Library (1907), p. 403 ff.

probably in the second or third,[1] into Armenian in the fifth,[2] and into Ethiopic between the fourth and the seventh; [3] while references, quotations, and commentaries from which the greater part, if not the whole, could be reconstructed, are found in works written at the same time as the earlier translations, and, in abundance, in the writers of the early third century.[4]

People ask whether the text of the Bible was not tampered with for doctrinal purposes.[5] It is practically impossible. Scholars would have detected the alterations, and have done so in the few cases that exist.

> We know [again writes Sir Frederic Kenyon] that various heretical sects had their own recensions of certain books of the Bible; but this danger is discountenanced by the enormous mass and variety of evidence in existence for the New Testament. There is no possibility that all the sources should be tainted; one or other of them would be sure to have escaped, and when once the alternatives are presented to the critic, there is generally little difficulty in detecting a doctrinal perversion.[6]

But it is not only among the uneducated that this reluctance to accept the results of criticism is found, which prompts people to ask, "What did they want to revise the Bible

[1] Forbes Robinson, in Hastings's *Dictionary of the Bible*, vol. i, art. "Egyptian Versions," p. 677.

[2] Cp. F. C. Conybeare, *ibid.*, art. "Armenian Versions," p. 152.

[3] Cp. R. H. Charles, *ibid.*, art. "Ethiopic Versions," p. 792.

[4] Origen (185–255) commented, and wrote homilies, on the gospels of St. Matthew and St. Luke, a commentary on St. John, homilies on Acts, a commentary on Romans, homilies on 1 Corinthians, homilies and a commentary on Galatians, commentaries on Ephesians, Philippians and Colossians, and 1 and 2 Thessalonians, a homily and commentary on Titus, a commentary on Philemon, and homilies on Hebrews, of which large parts have survived in the original Greek or in Latin translations. Cp. O. Bardenhewer, *Patrology*, transl. T. J. Shahan (Herder, 1908), pp. 143–5, or the *Dictionary of Christian Biography*, art. "Origen." A glance at an index of quotations at the end of any critical edition of the works of Tertullian will show the extent of his use of the New Testament in Africa about the same time.

[5] I have frequently been asked this question. Cp. Q.T., p. 295.

[6] *Handbook to the Textual Criticism of the New Testament*, p. 9. Quoted, Q.T., p. 307.

for?" The Revised Version is a great witness to the scholarship of the English Church, and (in the opinion of many) of its true taste in matters of literary style,[1] as the slowness with which it is being accepted is of the lack of diffusion of that scholarship and of the persistence of wrong canons of literary taste among the rank and file of her members.

The next stage of criticism that we call higher can be entered upon when the text has been settled. It is not so much concerned with the tests by which spurious writings are detected, though they are necessary. There *are* forged documents, and they must be got out of the way. There *are* books claiming to be written by authors who never wrote them, and we must be careful that we do not give them credit merely because of their titles. But this negative work of criticism is of less importance, even if it is necessary to clear the ground and at times to correct wrong traditions. The chief work of the Higher Criticism is constructive—to search in a book for indications of the date at which it was written, to detect allusions to local events or customs which will tell us where it came from, to look out for the little touches that often, without design, let us know who was its author, to find out by close analysis what we can learn of his methods of composition and how he set about his work. All this will make a book alive for us. We shall

[1] E.g. A. Nairne, "Versions of Holy Scripture," in the *Church Quarterly Review*, July 1914, p. 439. "Englishmen should be sincerely modest about their own advantages, but it is worth while to remember that there is nothing in any other language to be compared with the Revised Version. We are sceptical about those famous cadences (of the Authorised Version). Their magnificence is undoubted, but was there no monotony in them?"

I suspect that the frequent criticism, "They spoiled the English of the Authorised Version," is due in most cases to the natural inclination to accept a conventional opinion, and so avoid the effort required for real critical judgment, and I am sure that the objection to the critical principles which led to the adoption of Westcott and Hort's text is seldom the real reason for neglect of the Revised Version. The canon of literary taste that I refer to is that beauty lies rather in idea and form than in mere sound and rhythm. "On oublie," said M. de Saci, "que la véritable éloquence est dans les choses, et non dans les expressions." Quoted in Sainte-Beuve's *Port-Royal* (Hachette, 1860), Bk. II, chap. xvii, vol. ii, p. 327.

read it with all the greater interest when we feel that we know the man who is speaking.

The methods of the Higher Criticism may perhaps be learned as we go by the practical application of them in definite cases. This is probably a better way than to try to establish them by enunciation of general rules and principles. In teaching a language, literature should come before grammar. When we have learned to read and speak we find we already know most of the rules of accidence and syntax. It may be useful for some to argue by analogy. If a man's "father was a scholar and knew Greek," and he is familiar with the problems of the authorship of the Homeric poems, he will easily realise that the spiritual value of the Pentateuch or "five books of Moses" does not depend on their being by the hand of their traditional author, or even on the historical accuracy of the events they describe, any more than the literary value of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* depends on the existence of the blind poet. Children of scholars may well be brought up by the method Browning sets out in his poem,[1] but the plain man with an ordinary education can best learn by the actual working out of some problem of Biblical criticism.

Let us take two such. As an illustration of methods of composition, how can we get any idea how the Gospels were written? As an example as settling the authenticity of a document, how could we find out, if we knew nothing from other sources, who it was that wrote the Fourth Gospel?

To settle the date of the Gospels we have the last verses of the Acts as a *terminus ad quem*. For the Acts and the Third Gospel were clearly written by the same man, an author who writes in the first person in some of the later chapters of the work written last when he is describing events he actually saw and doings in which he took part. Presumably the Acts was written after the Gospel, since he speaks of the "former treatise" he had made for his friend Theophilus,

[1] "Development," *Works* (Smith, Elder, 1896), vol. ii, p. 766.

apart from the fact that people generally begin a story at the beginning. But he leaves off in a funny way, quite abruptly, indecisively, with St. Paul in prison and his case untried. We gather from St. Paul's letters that he was acquitted and set free, and a strong tradition tells us that later on he was again imprisoned and put to death. This was in the year 63. Why did not the author finish his story? The simplest explanation is that he could not, as it was not yet finished, in fact, when he wrote. That must, then, have been in about the year 61 or 62. But composition takes time, and if the Acts was only finished in the year 61, it must have been begun before, and the former treatise, the Gospel, must have been written still earlier, somewhere in the late fifties.[1]

But in the Gospel the author makes use of the Second Gospel—that which tradition attributes to St. Mark. Whole passages are common to the two with little variation between them, and St. Mark's, as the shorter, was presumably the original. Indeed, we may be certain that it was, since the author of the First Gospel also used it as the basis of his work. The Second Gospel, then, may be dated, say, in the early fifties[2]—about twenty years after the Crucifixion itself—though, of course, it must be based on tradition earlier

[1] A. Harnack, *The Date of the Acts and of the Synoptic Gospels*, transl. J. R. Wilkinson, Williams & Norgate's *Crown Theological Library* (1911), p. 99. "The concluding verses of the Acts of the Apostles, taken in conjunction with the absence of any reference in the book to the results of the trial of St. Paul and to his martyrdom, make it in the highest degree probable that the work was written at a time when St. Paul's trial at Rome had not yet come to an end."

Even if the Pauline authorship of the whole of the Pastoral Epistles is denied, they may be considered to give trustworthy information about St. Paul's last years.

Ibid., p. 116. "The Acts of the Apostles taken by itself requires of us that we set its composition before the destruction of Jerusalem and the death of St. Paul. We thus arrive at a fixed *terminus ad quem* for the dating of the Synoptic Gospels, at least for St. Mark and St. Luke; herein lies the chief significance of our calculation of the date of the Acts."

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 126. "Internal indications, therefore, place no impediment in the way of assigning St. Mark at the latest to the sixth decade of the first century, as is required by the date we have assigned to St. Luke. Cp. p. 133."

than the time of its actual writing down.[1] Besides the Second Gospel the authors of both the First and Third Gospels drew from another source, apparently a collection of sayings of Our Lord to which critics have given the name "Q.," the first letter of the German word *Quelle*, or Source. This was probably, though of course not certainly, earlier still.[2]

Then, too, the author of the Third Gospel tells certain stories about the life of Our Lord which seem to come from the early days of the Church in Jerusalem, in the thirties. Where did he get them from? He claims not only to know that many had taken in hand the writing of the story but that he had had opportunities of tracing all things accurately from the first. He seems to know things about the Court; did he get them from Joanna, the wife of Chuza, Herod's steward? He mentions her for no particular reason—but that would be very natural if she was one of his authorities. He seems, it has been remarked, at times to tell of things from a woman's point of view[3]—the birth narratives are clearly told from the point of view of the Mother of Jesus; did he get them from her or from some friend of hers? We cannot tell, but the story is redolent of the atmosphere of Palestine. As Professor Harnack says,—

A story of the birth of Our Lord that had grown up freely in

[1] B. H. Streeter, in his *The Four Gospels* (Macmillan, 1924), considers that St. Luke wrote a first draft of his Gospel as a complete work. If so, it must have been written at a still earlier date.

[2] B. H. Streeter, in *Studies in the Synoptic Problem*, by members of the University of Oxford (Clarendon Press, 1911), ed. W. Sanday, VI. "The Original Extent of Q.," p. 205. "The interval between the original writing of Q. and its use by Matthew and Luke was probably very considerable."

[3] F. G. Burkitt, *The Gospel History and its Transmission* (T. & T. Clark, 3rd edition, 1911), p. 215. "It is an old observation that the Nativity Story is told by St. Luke from the woman's point of view. But elsewhere also women play a prominent and independent part in the narrative. The Widow of Nain; the woman that was a sinner who wiped the feet of Jesus; Joanna, the wife of Chuza, and Susannah, who ministered unto Jesus of their substance; Martha, who served, and Mary, who listened; the daughter of Abraham who was loosed from the bond of Satan; the woman who bewailed and lamented Jesus on His way to the Cross—all these come into the Gospel story through St. Luke alone."

Gentile Christian soil about the year 50, or 80, or 100 A.D. would certainly have been of quite different character from the story of the First Gospel.[1]

Or again :—

> We may conclude that they [these stories] came to him [St. Luke] claiming the authority of St. Mary and therefore certainly from Palestine.[2]

And in a note he adds :—

> The circles whence they proceeded had a most profound veneration for St. Mary and placed her next her Son in a position of great importance. Such feelings do not arise of themselves : they must go back to the impression made by the personality of St. Mary herself.[3]

We may say, then, that the Acts were written about the year 62, the Third Gospel in the late fifties, the Second Gospel and "Q." in the early fifties, if not before, while the oral tradition of the authorities that the author relied on goes back to the thirties and forties, and in some cases to the years before the Crucifixion, or even, in the case of the present form of the *Magnificat*, to the days in Nazareth when St. Mary pondered on the song of Hannah and "on all these things in her heart." In other words, it is contemporary evidence.

The same data might be used as an illustration of the problem of authorship, to show how reasonable and in accordance with little references to persons and things is the traditional view that attributes both Gospel and Acts to St. Luke, but a nicer example of Higher Criticism in determining who wrote a book can be found in the study of the Fourth Gospel.

If we had never seen it before we should say at once, "*The man who wrote this was a Jew.*" He speaks from the

[1] A. Harnack, *op. cit.*, p. 142.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 154.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 155. The three passages are quoted from Q.T., p. 165.

atmosphere of Jewish opinion. He is familiar with Jewish observances. His very style is Hebraic. He sets his phrases in parallels. His writing is full of allusion to Old Testament literature. It is true that he speaks of " the Jews " as if in opposition to them, but this only shows that he is now a Christian first, and is writing when the breach between the Church and the Synagogue is an accomplished fact. It cannot conceal the fact that he is of their race.

Again, *he is a Jew of Palestine.* He has local knowledge of places not referred to elsewhere. He knows his Galilee, and is equally at home in Jerusalem. Now Jerusalem was destroyed by Titus in the year 70, and it would have been almost impossible for a stranger to reconstruct its details. We all know what blunders novelists make when they write of places they have not lived in, or of cities in times before their acquaintance with them began.

Further, *he was an eye-witness of the events he describes.* There is always a certain character in a first-hand report. It is marked with a vividness of detail and a sharpness of delineation denied to the work of a compiler. Little points are even introduced unnecessarily, merely because they are in the witness's memory. The author draws characters with a single stroke. He brings in details of time for no particular reason. He puts in details of number, as, for instance, the number of fish in the net, for which mystical writers have racked their ingenuity to find hidden meanings, but with little success. It was quite unnecessary. There was no significance in the number one hundred and fifty and three. He merely recorded it because he saw them counted. Details of place and circumstance are no less clearly given. A modern novelist could perhaps by his art invent such details. We know how Defoe did and Mr. Wells does. But we have no reason to believe that such an artist could have existed in the second century, and that, if he had, he would have exercised his art merely in one work. Defoe's accuracy has been challenged, and Mr. Wells has written some forty

stories. Least of all can we believe that a man writing with the intention to deceive could have written a book that gives such an impression of utter holiness and sincerity.

The author was an Apostle and the Apostle John. He was one in constant attendance on his Master. Now there were three who so stood specially near Him—St. Peter, St. James, and St. John. St. James is ruled out; he was martyred early by Herod. St. Peter is mentioned continually in the Fourth Gospel along with another whose name is never given. He is described simply as "the disciple whom Jesus loved." All the other disciples are mentioned by name; St. John does not appear except in the list of the twelve. Yet we know from the other Gospels that he was a close companion of Our Lord. The other disciples distinguish between John the Baptist and John the son of Zebedee. The author of the Fourth Gospel, who so carefully distinguished between the two Judases, as he does between the two Bethanies, simply speaks of the Baptist as "John." It never occurs to you to confuse yourself with another person because he has the same name.

All this, of course, is no new argument. I am simply repeating in short what Bishop Westcott worked out fully years ago, but many of us think that little had been added to the solution of the problem by later writers.[1] It may be conceded perhaps that St. John brought together words of Our Lord uttered at different times, that he even coloured them by his continual brooding meditation over them, even that the actual words may be those of a Greek-speaking scribe translating and modifying his language. But while

[1] *The Gospel According to St. John*, the Speakers' Commentary (Murray, 1880). Introduction.

E.g. H. M. Gwatkin, *The Knowledge of God*, Gifford Lectures, 1905 (T. & T. Clark), vol. ii, p. 49. "On the authorship of the Fourth Gospel in particular I cannot see that the arguments of Westcott and Lightfoot need any great modification. To the best of my judgment, they are still unanswered," ff.

C. Gore, *Belief in Christ* (Murray, 1922), p. 106. "I call this Gospel St. John's, and on the whole I believe it to give us at first hand the mature testimony of the son of Zebedee."

some critics assure us that the historical details are mainly true and the discourses obviously composed, others tell us that the discourses have all the marks of genuineness and that the history is clearly invented. It is difficult not to feel that much that is written to disprove the authenticity of the book is written because an *a priori* judgment has decided on other grounds that its main thesis, that Jesus was the Son of God, is untrue, and I, at least, for one cannot see that anything is gained, or the problem made any easier, by saying that the writer was not the Apostle John of whom we know something, but another man of the same name, living at the same time and through the same circumstances, of whom we know nothing.[1]

It was the great service that was done by the men of the little German town of Tübingen some seventy years ago that they began to study the New Testament critically. It is true their conclusions have almost all been set aside by more recent scholarship; it is true they were burdened with *a priori* theories about a division of the Gentile and Jewish Church which was only healed in the middle of the second century; it is true their exegesis was often wild and extravagant: but this they did—they insisted that the Bible must be studied like any other book, with the result that all the old tradition was questioned, examined, and tried, and found to be substantially true.

[1] Perhaps the most important of recent works on the subject, Canon B. H. Streeter's *The Four Gospels* (Macmillan, 1924), may be quoted, p. 433. "A critical study of the evidence afforded by the Gospel itself has led us to the conclusion that the author, while making no pretence of being an Apostle, did nevertheless claim to write with authority, that he was certainly familiar with Jerusalem, and probably with a cycle of tradition current there, and lastly, that he may have had some personal connexion with the Apostle John. Now we learn from Papias of the existence of a person who seems to fulfil all these conditions—the Elder John."

The passage in Papias occurs in a quotation in Eusebius's *Ecclesiastical History*, Bk. III, chap. xxxix, which I have quoted in Q.T., p. 162.

The theory that St. John the Apostle was put to death with St. James rests upon late evidence of a not very accurate writer of the ninth century. If it had been evidence, say, that St. James had not been put to death, it would have been regarded as valueless.

The same methods of Higher Criticism which have forced us to reconsider and change so many of our beliefs about the Old Testament have been working continually to re-establish the old position with regard to the New, and that not on the ground of tradition, but of scholarship. As Professor Harnack wrote :—

> There was a time—and the general public still lives in it—in which people thought that the oldest Christian literature must be regarded as a tissue of errors and forgeries. That time has gone by. It was merely an episode for Science, in which she learned much, and after which she has much to forget. The results of the study that followed go further still in the "reactionary direction" than what might be called the moderate position of to-day.[1]

II

But having got their data critically established, very few people know how to use them. Englishmen have as a rule a large fund of practical common sense. A jury generally arrives at a just decision in the ordinary, or even extra-ordinary, things of daily life, even if its individual members could not describe the process by which they came to it. But most of us are unable to contrast things of the present with things of the past, or to apply everyday judgments to matters of history. Hence the not infrequent assertion that the evidence for the miracles in the Gospels is "not sufficient to hang a man in the courts of law."

Of course, it is not! In the courts witnesses can be summoned and cross-questioned.[2] The methods are quite

[1] *Die Chronologie der altchristlichen Litteratur bis Eusebius*. Erster Band, s. viii (Leipzig, 1897). A translation of the whole passage, as well as his later opinion in his *Luke, the Physician*, written in 1906, can be found in Q.T., p. 164.

[2] M. Creighton's *Life and Letters* (Longmans, 1906), vol. ii, p. 105. Letter to the Rev. W. H. Carnegie, April 28, 1893. "People's ideas about the nature of evidence are very vague. One of my clergy told me he was at dinner with an eminent lawyer, who said: 'I go to church and bring up my children as Christians; but I am bound to say there is not so much evidence for it as would hang a man.' But the evidence necessary to hang a man is

different, but after all there *is* such a thing as historical evidence. Though the nature of the witnesses is not the same, the principles of decision are common to both. But in matters of history men often refuse to consider the evidence at all, or sweep it aside as "prejudiced." This is simply "begging the question." It is, to quote the logic books, "taking the conclusion as one of the premises of the argument." The classical example in apologetics is perhaps Hume's conclusion about miracles—that

> a miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined.[1]

Or, in plainer words, "There cannot be a violation of a law of Nature. A miracle is a violation of a law of Nature. Therefore there cannot be a miracle."

It is true that Hume qualified and contradicted his rather dogmatic statement, and said that no miracle could be proved probable enough to be the foundation of a system of religion (and, of course, our religion is founded on a great many other things besides miracles),[2] but his general teaching lingers on in men's minds in Matthew Arnold's form, "Miracles do not happen."[3] This is a very common presupposition. Men prejudge cases and ignore evidence. Take, for instance, the question of the miraculous birth of Our Lord. It is decided, as a rule, on both sides on *a priori* grounds. You will find that as a matter of fact in

far beyond that on which we act for any practical venture of our own. Did he have as much evidence of the character of his wife before he married her as would suffice to hang a man?"

[1] *Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding*, sect. x, "Of Miracles," *Works* (A. & C. Black, 1854), vol. iv, p. 30. Quoted in full in Q.T., p. 101.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 146. Quoted Q.T., p. 102.

[3] *Literature and Dogma*, Preface to the Popular Edition (Smith, Elder, 1900), p. xii. "Our popular religion at present conceives the birth, ministry, and death of Christ as altogether steeped in prodigy, brimful of miracle—*and miracles do not happen.*" (The italics are the author's.)

the great majority of cases (though not quite in all) people deny it because they do not believe that Christ was the incarnate Son of God, or accept it because they believe that He was. It is true that all the evidence there is, or indeed very well could be as far as sources are concerned, is on the side of the latter, but by itself it is admittedly insufficient to prove the fact. But if you believe, on other grounds, that Christ was not as other men, less evidence is necessary to make you believe that He was not born as other men. You may even justify your assumption that neither the miracle of the Incarnation nor of the Virgin Birth could have happened on other grounds, but to sweep away the evidence without examining it is not the method of the historian or of the critic.

For people do not realise that the force of evidence is cumulative—that, as Bishop Butler said, "Probable proofs, by being added, not only increase the evidence but multiply it." Or, rather, they fail to see that "the truth of our religion, like the truth of common matters, is to be judged by the evidence taken all together." As he pointed out, "this gives an advantage to those who attack," especially in conversation.

> For [he said] it is easy to show in a short and lively manner that such and such things are liable to objection, and that this or another thing is of little weight in itself; but it is impossible to show, in like manner, the united force of the whole argument in one view.[1]

[1] *Analogy*, ed. J. H. Bernard (Macmillan, 1900), Pt. II, chap. vii, § 44, vol. ii, p. 254. Quoted, Q.T., p. 28.

Cp. also *Charge to the Clergy of Durham*, vol. i, p. 290. "Then, again, the general evidence of religion is complex and various. It consists of a long series of things, one preparatory to and confirming another, from the very beginning of the world to the present time. And it is easy to see how impossible it must be, in a cursory conversation, to unite all this into one argument, and represent it as it ought; and could it be done, how utterly indisposed people would be to attend to it!"

Cp. J. H. Newman, *Oxford University Sermons*, Sermon V, "Personal Influence the Means of Propagating the Truth," 3rd edition (Rivingtons,

Thus among the simple laws of evidence there is that first that evidence must be strong in proportion as the event witnessed to is strange or important.[1] If a man tells you he has just seen a man in the street, you believe him at once, because men are there every day and as a matter of course. But if he tells you he has just seen the Prime Minister, you ask for more proof. Does he know him by sight? Did anyone else see him? How many? Were they all together? Or did they tell you about him one after the other? Did they all say the same things about him? Did they say them in just the same words? Because if they did you suspect a trick. When we find news in exactly the same phrases in different newspapers we say, "That comes from a press agency. It is only one man's report." If two boys send up the same answer in an examination you ask if they were sitting together, or perhaps it turns out that they merely used the same text-book or the same master's notes. If your informants differ, say, as to the shape of the Prime Minister's hat, or whether his carriage had two or three horses, you accept their evidence, provided that it fits in with a connected whole—nay, their disagreement shows that they are reporting independently. Further, if they are men whose character you know and trust, men not given to practical joking, if they have nothing to gain by what they tell you, still more if their story tells against them in any way, you are all the more ready to believe. If, then, you remember, though you had not paid attention to it at the

1872), p. 90. "Truth is vast and far-stretching, viewed as a system; and, viewed in its separate doctrines, it depends on the combination of a number of various, delicate, and scattered evidences; hence it can scarcely be exhibited in a given number of sentences."

[1] Or rather we must be more careful in examining the evidence. Cp. H. M. Gwatkin, *The Knowledge of God* (T. & T. Clark, 1907), vol. i, p. 191. "It is a common fallacy to suppose that extraordinary events require an extraordinary weight of evidence to prove them. No doubt we make a difference between a fact of weighty meaning and an unimportant story. But our inference is not, We want double evidence: it is a very different one, We must make doubly sure that we have sufficient evidence."

time, that you had read in the paper that he was coming that way; if afterwards you see the building rising, the town hall, or the school, he had come to lay the foundation-stone of; and if, in addition, you have examined all the possible alternatives—then you are as certain as you can be, even in a matter unusual or of import.[1]

Thus what we ask is :—

Who and how many were the witnesses ?
Were they trustworthy ?
Does their account fit in with the facts before and after ?

So in the evidence for the Resurrection of Christ the witnesses were ample. There is a list of them in the fifteenth chapter of St. Paul's First Epistle to the Corinthians, an epistle which everybody acknowledges to be his. Besides his fellow-apostles he says that when he wrote, in the year 58, some twenty-five years after the Crucifixion, there were still more than two hundred and fifty people who could be appealed to. The evidence of the apostles comes from several different groups of writings, connected indeed, but composed in very different times and places. There are slight discrepancies in the accounts, and they are condensed and not at first sight easy to fit into one another—facts which show their independence of one another, for forgers would have taken care that their witnesses agreed or else would have contradicted one another. They certainly would hardly have contributed details which fit into a scheme of events of which they were obviously unaware, and which only becomes apparent when all are read together.[2]

Moreover, the apostles, if simple men, were honest and

[1] Cp. J. Locke, *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Bk. IV, chap. xv, 4. "In the testimony of others is to be considered (1) the number, (2) the integrity, (3) the skill of the witnesses, (4) the design of the author, where it is testimony out of a book cited, (5) the consistency of the parts and circumstances of the relation, (6) contrary testimonies."

[2] Cp. F. Godet, *Lectures in Defence of the Christian Faith*, transl. W. H. Lyttelton (T. & T. Clark, 2nd edition, 1883), p. 16. "It is, on the other hand, very easy to combine the narratives of all these various appearances

fully realised the nature of witness. The word occurs again and again in the first chapters of the Acts. They based their claim to be apostles on the fact that they had seen the Risen Christ. They believed on Him before, it is true (though even this was not true of St. James and of St. Paul), but they were not expecting Him to rise; nay, they refused to believe the reports of the women whom they knew well—"their words seemed to them as idle tales." They had nothing to gain by their witness—nothing but persecution, banishment, and death. Their whole characters were altered: before, they ran away from the soldiers and met secretly for fear of the Jews; after, they defied the authorities, though it meant imprisonment and martyrdom.

And, as a matter of historical fact, they founded a Church, prepared for, as they saw afterwards, by the Old Testament, though it had created an entirely different conception of the Messiah and His Kingdom in the popular mind—a Church that it is difficult to explain on any counter-theory, whether of mistake, fraud, or delusion. A study of the reasons for belief in the Resurrection of Our Lord forms an excellent exercise to train the faculty of judgment on evidence.

But the whole strength of the evidence is not realised till the alternatives have been considered and the various objections—that it all happened so long ago, that Christ may not have been really dead, that the disciples were deceived by hallucinations or visions, or the theory of fraud—have been weighed. These in turn require previous familiarity with simple critical principles—such as that evidence grows no

distributed among the Gospels into a complete and consistent picture . . . we perceive that Jesus began by acts of which the object was to administer comfort and reassurance. . . . When the flock had been reconstituted in its completeness, He sent them back to Galilee, where He had already appointed to meet them. . . . Lastly He brings them back to Jerusalem—and in a final appearance He bids them adieu.

"On looking back upon the whole, we easily perceive how wonderfully the several fragments of the picture fit into each other. But the records themselves give not the slightest hint respecting this mutual interconnexion and this natural progress of the advancing steps of the story."

weaker by lapse of time, that by standing continual testing, if anything, it grows stronger;[1] in judgment of probability as to whether the painful return to life of a crucified martyr could have produced an impression of victorious triumph over death; in judgment of character to decide whether a band of men like the disciples could, without one single exception, have conspired with success to maintain a fraud (for one honest man would have destroyed the whole scheme), and to base a moral revolution on it; in knowledge of psychology as to whether there is in human experience of delusion and hallucination any parallel to the varied and peculiar character of the story of the Resurrection.

In other words, skill and training in the work of synthesis is required, an ability to see both sides of a question; for, as Protagoras said, "Of all things two views may be taken"[2] —a power of seeing all the issues as a whole to realise how they balance and modify one another, and to realise that truth lies in the harmony of opposed extremes and not in the *via media* of compromise.[3] But most people are not equal to the task, and fall back on agnosticism, saying, with Sir Roger de Coverley, that "much might be said on both sides."[4] Or else they adopt the "*Entweder-Oder*," the "Either-Or,"

[1] Cp. H. M. Gwatkin, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 192. "Root out once for all from your mind any lurking idea that historical evidence is made uncertain by lapse of time. There is a change when the document is no longer backed up by the living memory; but after that there is little further change. If writings are lost or mutilated, whatever remains, remains exactly what it was at first. It is utter fallacy to imagine, as many do, that history steadily becomes more uncertain, as we trace it backwards into what are metaphorically called the mists of antiquity."

[2] Diogenes Laertius, ix, 51. "*Πρῶτος ἔφη, δύο λόγους εἶναι περὶ παντὸς πράγματος, ἀντικειμένου ἀλλήλοις; οἷς καὶ συνηρώτα πρῶτος τοῦτο πράξας.*"

[3] Cp. Charles Simeon. Quoted in K. E. Kirk's *Principles of Moral Theology* (Longmans, 1920), p. 106. "The truth is not in the middle, and not in one extreme, but in both extremes."

[4] Addison, *Spectator*, 122. "My friend Sir Roger heard them both (Messrs. Tom Touchy and Will Wimble) upon a round trot; and after having paused some time told them, with the air of a man who would not give his judgment rashly, that 'much might be said on both sides.'"

attitude and demand clear-cut, dogmatic assertions of single issues—either the Bible is verbally inspired or it is a pack of lies, either creeds and dogmas or the religion of the Gospel, either Catholic or Protestant, either infallibility or no authority at all. They ask, "Which is best, a good heathen or a bad Christian?" "When a man is ill, should you pray for him or send for a doctor?" They seem to think that either a man is free to do anything he likes or he has no free-will at all—it is either omnipotence or determinism.[1]

I say nothing about the inability to judge that comes from mere passion or bad temper.

Again, as Bishop Butler says:—

> It seems to be of the greatest importance, and not duly attended to by everyone, that the proof of revelation is, not some direct and express things only, but a great variety of circumstantial things also; and that though each of these direct and circumstantial things is indeed to be considered separately, yet they are afterwards to be joined together; for that the proper force of the evidence consists in the result of those several things, considered in their respects to each other, and united into one view.[2]

III

Young students of logic are sometimes apt to be impatient when they come to the chapter on fallacies. "What is the use of studying these?" they ask; "surely no real person ever argued in this way." And then they leave their books and go out and find people in real life falling into them all in a way they could hardly have believed. One of the commonest, and perhaps the most excusable, is the argument from silence. The classic example in the history of New Testament criticism is to be found in Bishop Lightfoot's chapter on "The Silence of Eusebius," which so effectually

[1] Cp. "Either-Or," the *Church Times*, January 20, 1922, for actual examples of this attitude of mind.

[2] *Analogy*, Pt. II, chap. vii, § 28, ed. J. H. Bernard (Macmillan, 1900), vol. ii, p. 239.

met the assertion of the author of a book called *Supernatural Religion*,[1] that Eusebius, the historian, "knows nothing" of any early reference to books of the New Testament if he says nothing about them; the truth being that Eusebius only set himself to mention any early references to books disputed in his day, and to tell stories otherwise not well known about the authors of those which everyone accepted.[2] From this it was an easy step to assume that these books did not exist in early times.

It would be easy to find illustrations of this fallacy. If the First Epistle of St. Paul to the Corinthians had not been preserved we might have said that he "knew nothing" of the Eucharist, for he does not mention it elsewhere. Thucydides never mentions his contemporaries Sophocles, Euripides, Socrates, or Pheidias; yet it would be rash to cast doubts on their existence for this reason.[3] Plutarch, I believe, never mentions any of his contemporaries, yet it would be equally rash to deny that they lived; for neither is he mentioned by them, and the same argument would blot out his existence.[4] But there were brave men before Agamemnon and many people exist who are not in *Who's Who*.

Yet it is quite a common thing to hear people ask, "Is it not strange that there is no mention of Christ in contemporary writers?" Putting aside the initial fallacy of begging the question by sweeping away all the extraordinarily good evidence of contemporaries in the shape of the biogra-

[1] *Essays on the Work entitled Supernatural Religion* (Macmillan, 1889), reprinted from the *Contemporary Review*, January 1875), p. 22 ff.

[2] *Ecclesiastical History*, III, chap. iii. His actual words are: "But as history proceeds I will take care . . . to indicate what Church writers from time to time have made use of any of the disputed books and what has been said by them concerning the canonical and acknowledged Scriptures, and anything that they have said concerning those that do not belong to this class."

[3] Cp. T. R. Glover, *From Pericles to Philip* (Methuen, 1917), p. 81. Quoted, Q.T., p. 143.

[4] Cp. the same writer's *The Conflict of Religions in the Early Roman Empire* (Methuen, 1909), chap. iii, "Plutarch," p. 81. "Of the great Latin writers of the day he mentions none, nor is he mentioned by them."

phies, letters, and treatises contained in the New Testament, evidence which is only surpassed by that for events recorded in still existing contemporary inscriptions or monuments (that of the Catacombs barely goes back into the first century), and saying nothing for the moment of the inaccuracy of the implied assumption, since there are two references to Christ in Josephus, from the longer of which the later Christian additions can easily be separated,[1] Where, it may be asked, would you be likely to find them? Whom would you expect to mention Him? Not, surely, Seneca in his tragedies or his natural history, or Longinus in his lectures on style, or Quintilian in his treatise on oratory, or Petronius Arbiter in his satires, or Frontinus in his work on strategics and water supply, or Quintus Curtius in his history of Alexander the Great, or Columella in his books on agriculture![2] Where you might expect it—in works of historians such as Tacitus, Suetonius, Dion Cassius, in the paintings and inscriptions of the Catacombs at the end of the first and in the second century, we do find such references, coming at first incidentally and then with greater frequency, just as we should have expected.[3] But the chief blunder in such argument is the initial assumption that the "independent witness"—that is, the testimony of people who were so far removed from the

[1] *Antiquities*, XXVIII, iii, 3, and XX, ix, 1. Quoted, Q.T., 140, with references for opinions as to their genuineness in whole or in part, to which may be added Renan, *Vie de Jésus*, ed. 3me (Paris, 1853), p. ix. "Je crois le passage sur Jésus authentique. Il est parfaitement dans le goût de Josèphe, et si cet historien a fait mention de Jésus, c'est comme ça qu'il a dû en parler. On sent seulement qu'une main chrétienne a retouché le morceau, y a ajouté quelques mots sans lequels il eût été presque blasphématoire (s'il est permis de l'appeler homme), ou modifié quelques expressions." (I consider the passage about Jesus to be authentic. It is quite in the style of Josephus, and if the historian made any mention of Jesus it is just like that that he must have spoken. You feel merely that a Christian hand has retouched the fragment, has added a few words, without which it would have been almost blasphemous (if it is right to call him a man) or modified some expressions.)

[2] I have taken these names from F. W. Hall's *Companion to Classical Texts* (Oxford, 1913), pp. 262 ff., and from J. E. Sandy's *A Companion to Latin Studies* (Cambridge, 1910), pp. 669 ff.

[3] I have quoted passages from these authors in Q.T., pp. 141–2. A good discussion of the subject will be found in C. Bigg's *Origins of Christianity*.

occurrences in question as to be unmoved by them—is more valuable than that of those who saw them and so were convinced that they took place.

To take one more example. Analogies, Plato warns us, "are most slippery things." "He who would not be found tripping ought to be very careful in the matter of analogies." [1] Yet they have an extraordinary power of influencing men in their judgments. They present pictures to see. They suggest so much. They are the strength and foundation of poetry. But in every analogy there are three possible explanations of the likeness. A may be derived from B, or B may be derived from A. Or both A and B may be derived from the common source, C, and in each case the connection must be proved before we can make any deduction. Or rather there are four, for there is the explanation of mere coincidence, as when a train whistles a note that a singer has just sung. The force of an argument from an analogy often depends merely on the exclusion of contrary examples and the ignoring of differences.

As an argument an analogy must be real. Thus it is not uncommon to be told that "all the features of the Gospel story are found in the life of Buddha." "Yes, all and much more!" as Wellhausen said when someone declared that all that Jesus said was to be found also in the Talmud.[2] It is quite easy out of the mass of Buddhist literature and legend to select parallels. After all, we all have to be born, have a mother, grow up, meet old men and probably shepherds —at least in agricultural countries—and we all die. This is the method Sir Edwin Arnold followed in his *Light of Asia*, from which so many of us have drawn our ideas about Buddhism. It is the method of Bunsen in his *Jewish*

[1] *Sophist*, 231, transl. B. Jowett, vol. iii, p. 402. "τὸν δὲ ἀσφαλῆ δεῖ πάντων μάλιστα περὶ τὰς ὁμοιότητας ἀεὶ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν φυλακήν· ὀλισθηρότατον γὰρ τὸ γένος."

[2] *Israelitische und jüdaische Geschichte*, 3rd edition, p. 384. Note 1.—4th edition, p. 389. Note 2.—In the 6th edition this note has disappeared. Quoted in Q.T., p. 77.

Christian Messiah—a work from which the mass of popular anti-christian writing seems directly or indirectly to draw its data. Clearly here the connection is only in the mind of the writer who selects his examples. But, without going into the question of the possibility of Christian influence on Buddhist tradition, it is enough to say that while it is true that in the later legends of Buddha he was described as born miraculously, he was not born of a virgin but of a married woman; she was not betrothed to a carpenter but was the wife of a king; and Buddha entered her side in the form of an elephant! There is also no connection between the names Maya and Mary or Miriam, except that both begin with an M.[1]

Or take the story of Krishna, that is sometimes asserted to be analogous to that of Christ. Here we find the same lack of any real parallel. He was the eighth son of his father and mother. The king supposed to be like Herod was his uncle. He was hidden among shepherds, it is true; but most people are shepherds in a pastoral country, while Christ took refuge in a foreign land without being dressed as a girl, and grew up at Nazareth in a carpenter's shop. Krishna had many wives, who were burned with his body on the pyre, and as a youth amused himself by hiding the clothes of the shepherd girls while they were bathing to enjoy their embarrassment when they returned. Not a very close parallel, I think, to the Gospel story. Is it strange that Christians get a little indignant with persons who make these assertions broadcast, but have obviously never read even a translation of the Purânas?[2]

The connection must be traced. There is no evidence

[1] See Q.T., pp. 144–5. See also F. H. Smith, *The Sutta and the Gospel: An Inquiry into the Relationship between the Accounts of the Supernatural Births of Buddha and Christ. Church Quarterly Review*, July 1921.

[2] *Bhâgavata Purâna ou Histoire Poétique de Krichna*, traduit et publié par Eugène Burnouf (Paris, 1884), Bk. I, chaps. xv, xx, etc. The last verse of chap. lviii, "Krichna épouse Huit Princesses," is "Krichna eut encore des milliers d'autres épouses du même rang et non moins belles."

of borrowing by the Early Church forthcoming.[1] Apart from the entirely different character of the account of the Annunciation and the legend of Semele and Zeus that is so often quoted as a parallel—the story can be found in any dictionary of classical antiquity[2]—these stories were well known to the Early Christians and they detested them.[3] The better Pagans were ashamed of them. The Christian apologists held them up to scorn and ridicule.[4] Men like

[1] Cp. Harnack, *The Date of the Acts and the Synoptic Gospels*, transl. J. R. Williams, William & Norgate's *Crown Theological Library*, p. 156. "As for the parallels with ancient stories of Gods and heroes, it would be treating them too seriously to describe them as scanty and feeble, and no one hitherto had been able to raise them above the sphere of the purely accidental."

Cp. also W. R. Matthews, *Studies in Christian Philosophy* (Macmillan, 1921), p. 54. "The unique importance of the Christian idea of Incarnation is precisely that it is an idea developed within the bounds of ethical monotheism. This fact renders irrelevant the industrious collection of parallels in religions which have a totally different notion of the nature of Deity."

[2] See Q.T., p. 146, for the story of Dionysus, the son of Zeus and Semele, as told in Smith's *Classical Dictionary* (Murray, 1894), art. "Dionysus," pp. 293–4, without any attempt to twist it into a similarity to the life of Christ.

[3] Sir W. M. Ramsay, *The Teaching of St. Paul in Terms of the Present Day* (Hodder & Stoughton, 1914), xlvii. "The Relation of St. Paul to the Greek Mysteries," p. 303. "The passage, Colossians ii, 8–9, . . . shows that Paul in the last resort was an uncompromising enemy of the religious ideas and thoughts embodied in the Mysteries. While making allowance for good intentions, he has to condemn them finally, as absolutely wrong in their methods and views. The importance of this is in reference to the above-mentioned recent speculations about the influence exercised on Paul's views by the Mysteries. We have now his clear, explicit, and thorough condemnation of the attempt to introduce into Christianity any element, or idea, or rite, or method that was characteristic of those Pagan Mysteries, and a convincing statement of his reason for condemning them. The religion of Jesus is spiritual, the ritual of the Mysteries is external and non-spiritual.

"He that understands Paul can understand the pitying contempt which the Jew of Tarsus felt," etc.

[4] Cp. H. M. Gwatkin, *The Knowledge of God* (T. & T. Clark, 1907), vol. i, p. 278. "The tales that were told of the Gods were a scandal from the time of Xenophanes onward; and the customs of worship founded on them needed a good deal of allegory to get them into some sort of agreement with decency and common sense. Even so, they gave abundance of occasion for Cynics and Christians to blaspheme. Meanwhile the man in the street got his excuse for 'thinking that lust is godliness' (Clem. Alex., *Protr.*, lx, p. 53), and Clement of Alexandria had something to say for his position that the beasts of Egypt were better than the Gods of Greece (*ibid.*, xxxix, p. 33)."

Tertullian quoted them as arguments against the old beliefs.[1] They were not in the least likely to borrow them.

Analogies may come from a common source. Many people have pointed out the similarity between the Christian rites of Baptism and the Eucharist, and the illustrations and sacred meals of the Pagan Mysteries. Sir James Frazer has made us realise how widespread among primitive, or at least among savage, peoples is the idea of purification by water and communion with the God by eating or other outward means. This seems to be a universal human need. Man is naturally sacramental. If so, it is only what we should have expected—that his need should be met by Christ if He is, what we Christians believe Him to be, the Creator of Man, the Incarnate Word, without Whom "was not anything made that hath been made." The Christian Sacrament and the Pagan feast had, no doubt, a common origin in the spiritual needs of man; but historically no connection can be proved between them. The Early Christians noted the similarities and were astonished at them. They could only explain them as Justin Martyr did, as being imitations inspired by the devil.[2] Such men, again, were not in the least likely to copy them.

It is not too much to say that the study of comparative religion has rather emphasised the contrast between Christianity and other faiths, just as the Higher Criticism has thrown into clear light the difference between the genuine and the spurious gospels. It has made the lesser similarities show up the greater divergence. Where customs and beliefs are based on common fundamental needs, the form which they take shows only all the clearer the unique nature of the

[1] Cp. *Apology*, XIII, XIV.

[2] *Apology*, I, chap. lxvi. "The wicked devils have also imitated this in the mysteries of Mithra, commanding the same thing to be done. For you know, or can learn, that bread and a cup of water are employed with certain incantations in the mystic rites which accompany the initiation of a member."

Cp. an excellent article on "The Origins of the Sacraments," by N. P. Williams, in *Essays Catholic and Critical* (S.P.C.K., 1926), p. 369 ff.

Church. All that is wanted is to remember Bishop Butler's dictum once more—that "the truth of our religion, like the truth of common matters, is to be judged by the evidence taken all together."

IV

The fashion of to-day is to think of the "man in the street" and to make his opinions the touchstone of value. My experience of Christian apologetic and of the difficulties of men in believing the Catholic faith is drawn from him as he becomes vocal in holiday, or Sunday, mood in Hyde Park. But as far as I can see, his objections and difficulties are much the same as those of men elsewhere, of students and men in senior common rooms, though by them they are expressed as Faust expressed his vague undenominational Pantheism to Gretchen, "nur mit ein bischen andern Worten,"[1] in rather less diffuse and rather more grammatical language. And we have good precedents for thinking of this same "man in the street." Socrates was accused of vulgarising philosophy and quoting the opinions of cooks and craftsmen.[2] Aristotle's method in approaching ethical problems was to begin with a consideration of what was commonly said or thought about them, because "he held, and surely with reason, that from such popular notions there was much to be learned."[3] Addison was "ambitious to

[1] Goethe, *Faust*, scene in Martha's garden. "In slightly different words."

[2] *Symposium*, 222, transl. Jowett (Oxford, 1871), vol. i, p. 537. "His words are ridiculous when you first hear them . . . for his talk is of pack-asses, and smiths, and cobblers, and curriers, and he is always repeating the same things in the same words."

Gorgias, 491. "You are always talking of cobblers and fullers and cooks and doctors, as if this had to do with our argument."

[3] C. C. J. Webb, *A Century of Anglican Theology* (Blackwell, 1923). "Morality and Religion," p. 55. "It was the method of Aristotle in approaching ethical problems to begin with a consideration of what was commonly said and thought about them by, as we say nowadays, the man in the street. He held, as surely with reason, that from such popular notions there was much to be learned. As put by the man in the street himself, they very likely would not bear criticism: they might often contradict one another, yet they would

have it said" of him that he had "brought philosophy out of closets and libraries, schools and colleges, to dwell in clubs and assemblies, at tea-tables and coffee-houses";[1] and, with Lamb, we need not mention the name of "one who once put on a semblance of mortality,"[2] one of whom we read that "the common people heard him gladly." For it is the great things that appeal to all men alike, even to the "blanks of society" who are "unfurnished with ideas till the business of the day has supplied them,"[3] to the men with only two talents, or maybe but one. And the great things are the simplest. There is a value in itself in putting them clearly.

But also the great masses, the "dim common multitudes," matter, because we have need of them all. Under a democracy government is given into the hands of the people—of a people continually learning, it is true, but one still with much to learn. The people's taste is the basis of all national Art—whether that of music going back to folk-song, or painting springing from a widely shared sense of colour. It is an element in, if not the only source of, all High Art. Learning is maimed and knowledge unbalanced while any class lacks education; and the Catholic Church cannot spare one man outside her fold if she is to show herself all she may be.

But we are far from that goal. A closer knowledge reveals the appalling intellectual confusion in the mind of the ordinary man,[4] just as we saw a sharper observation reveals a moral

not be entertained without having in them some measure of truth; and it was worth while to take them as indications which might guide us in the right directions and save us from missing relevant considerations: although at the end we might find that in our own conclusions they would only survive in a modified form."

[1] Addison, *Spectator*, No. 10.

[2] Hazlitt, *Works* (Bell, 1902), *Sketches and Essays*. Winterslow Essay, II, "Of persons one would wish to have seen," p. 294. Quoted, Q.T., p. 81.

[3] I have lost the reference for this rather unkind phrase.

[4] Cp. below, p. 225, *The Uneducated Mind*. Reprinted from the *Nineteenth Century*, November 1923.

cleavage in the ideals of the masses. The greater number of men are really not competent to decide on these questions that we have been considering, though they are constrained by duty to act, and that often at once. Nor will they be till they are better trained in logic and more accustomed to think clearly. Our great need for theology is education. Education of the clergy, that they may teach with the authority of knowledge; and training in teaching, that they may diffuse academic theology into our offices and shops, into our manufacturing towns and country villages, through our pulpits and in our parks—that this teaching, falling into good, if at present rather barren, ground, may spring up and bear fruit, fifty- and eighty- and a hundred-fold.

CHAPTER IV

THE PERSON OF CHRIST

" Jésus Christ est l'objet de tout, et le centre où tout tend. Qui le connaît, connaît la raison de toutes choses." (Jesus Christ is the end of all, and the centre to which all tends. He who knows Him knows the meaning of all things.)—PASCAL, *Pensées* (ed. Brunschvicg), No. 556.

WE have been trying to find out what really matters in apologetics, and we saw that the first thing was obedience to conscience, that everything depends on choosing the right side when the ways part in simple moral issues. This is a matter in which all men are equal, since all know the difference between right and wrong. The next thing needed is, we saw, a historical sense, a power of judging rightly of the past from the evidence of records—a possession, unfortunately, only of the few. Thirdly, we found that a general need is that of logical training and power to think clearly, continuously, and exactly. This, too, is a possession of the few, but one which might well be had by more, if not by all. It is a question of extending elementary education among the masses; but, after all, these qualifications are preliminaries. The matters we have been considering all lead up to one greater. We have been working back from present experience to the past, from problems of to-day to the past of the Christianity which claims that it can answer their questions. They lead up to and focus themselves on that of the person of Jesus of Nazareth. They do but prepare us to answer His question, " Whom say ye that I am ? "

We cannot but feel the immensity of the Christian claim that He was the Son of God, the Divine Word incarnate, perfect God and Perfect Man. If it can be made good, it " solves all questions in the world and out of it," and gives

us the clue to all things; but if it really breaks down in one point it fails.

And it is declared that it does break down. Objections are made to it. It is said that His teaching is not original; that there is nothing new in it; that the Golden Rule is found in Hillel; that the Lord's Prayer could be made up out of quotations from the Talmud; that there is teaching equally good in the old Egyptian religions. It is declared that it is impossible to follow. "Business couldn't be carried on on the principles of the Sermon on the Mount. It was only intended as a temporary measure, an *Interims-ethik*, for a few years till the expected end of the world should come. As a matter of fact," men say, "it isn't carried out. You don't turn the other cheek if a man smites you on one; nor does a man pluck out one eye if the other has offended him. Christians take a great deal of thought for the morrow and are quite right in doing so. Besides," they go on, "His teaching is quite inadequate. It may have been all right for Palestine two thousand years ago, but it doesn't deal with present-day problems. He said nothing about strikes, or factory conditions, or the Stock Exchange, or the duties of employers of labour, or of the morality of Joint Stock Companies. Nay, it is worse than useless. It is reactionary and stereotypes bad conditions. Didn't He say, 'The poor ye shall always have with you'?" So they quote Scripture. "Didn't He preach contentment and resignation? Nor was His character perfect," they say. "He cursed the fig-tree. He was rude to His mother. His action in cleansing the temple would have landed Him in the police court to-day. He destroyed other people's property. He held up as a model the steward who cheated his master. He said men were to hate their fathers."

After this it is hardly surprising that objections are no less made to the Christian deductions from His life; that the doctrine of the Atonement is immoral—"Fancy punishing one man for what another had done! We shouldn't in real

life"; that the doctrine of salvation by faith is absurd—"Fancy saying that it doesn't matter what you do! A nice, easy doctrine! You have only got to say you believe and it is all right and 'He that believeth not shall be damned,' no matter how good a man he may be! And you expect us to believe that! Why, it's absurd!" This is the sort of thing that is being continually said.[1]

It is no difficult task to meet such superficial objections by answers which also lie patent on the surface. Some are due to ignorant exegesis. We need not spend much time in explaining that He was not rude to His mother, that γύνη was a perfectly respectful term, though in English we do not address people as "woman," and only costermongers say "Yes, lady."[2] The cleansing of the temple was not a case of assault, and even if the whip of knotted cords was used on the traders, and not merely on the beasts, public opinion seems to have approved of the act.[3] If a choice has to be made, and the story implies that it had, men are of more importance than swine.[4] Others, again, are based on over-

[1] For examples of such objections put to me in Hyde Park, and the answers I gave there, see my *Question Time in Hyde Park*, Series II, pp. 65–123.

[2] Cp. Westcott, *The Gospel According to St. John* (Murray, 1887), p. 36. "In the original there is not the least tinge of reproof or severity in the term. The address is that of courteous respect, even of tenderness." See xix, 26, comp. iv, 21, xx, 13, 15. "At the same time it emphasises the special relation which it expresses; as here the contrast between the divine Son and the human Mother."

[3] Cp. H. Rashdall, *Conscience and Christ* (Duckworth, 1916), p. 174. "I recently read an otherwise able unitarian sermon in which it was assumed that the 'scourge of small cords' was used on the owners as well as the beasts. Of this, of course, there is no suggestion in the text, and it is observable that the scourge is only mentioned in the Fourth Gospel. The Synoptists do not say exactly how the dealers were 'cast out'" (Matt. xxi, 12; Mark xi, 15; Luke xix, 45; John ii, 15).

[4] Cp. H. Latham, *Pastor Pastorum* (Deighton, Bell & Co., 1890), pp. 285–6. "Our Lord rescues the *man*, because to do good unto men he was sent, but for property he is not concerned. If the demon must be about some evil, but will be content with turning to the swine, to the swine he is at liberty to go; he is not sent to them, but neither is he interdicted. The plague on men is, as was observed above [p. 49], turned into a murrain among swine. The destruction of the swine was the act of the Divine government only in the same sense that the losses by the cattle plague are now."

literalism. As Origen pointed out long ago,[1] one eye cannot literally offend without the other, as, if we have two, we use both at the same time, and a man would not be likely to strike you on the right cheek, unless he were left-handed, but on the left. It obviously means more than that. Principles must be carried out in acts, but the examples given are paradoxical, lest we should think that by one extravagant act we had done all we need.[2] Others, again, are due to that lack of historical sense of which we spoke. The objectors do not realise what was, and what was not, possible then. To have discoursed on capitalism, unearned increments, surplus value, and State ownership of the means of production, would have been simply to confuse men's minds and to turn their attention away from the things He had

[1] *De Principiis*, Bk. IV, chap. i, transl. F. Crombie, *The Works of Origen*, the Ante-Nicene Christian Library (T. & T. Clark, 1878), vol. i, p. 320. After pointing out that there are commands in the Old Testament which it is impossible to take literally, such as the prohibition of eating a griffin and the command to sit at home the whole Sabbath, he continues: "And if we go to the Gospel and institute a similar examination, what would be more irrational than to take literally the injunction 'Salute no man by the way,' which simple persons think the Saviour enjoined on the Apostles? The command, moreover, that the right cheek should be smitten, is most incredible, since everyone who strikes, unless he happen to have some bodily defect, smites the *left* cheek with his *right* hand. And it is impossible to take literally the statement of the Gospel about the 'offending' of the right eye. For, to grant the possibility of one being 'offended' by the sense of sight, how, when there are two eyes that see, should the blame be laid on the right eye?"

[2] Augustine, Ep. cxxxvi and cxxxviii. Cp. B. J. Kidd, *A History of the Church* (Oxford, 1922), vol. iii, p. 25. "One of his [Volusian's] difficulties was the oft-debated question whether the precepts of the Sermon on the Mount did not make civil government impracticable. 'These precepts,' says Augustine, 'relate rather to the inward disposition of the heart than to the outward conduct.'" *Tract. in Johann*, cxiii, 4. Cp. W. Montgomery, *St. Augustine, Aspects of His Life and Thought* (Hodder & Stoughton, 1914), p. 197. "He points out that we have an authoritative interpretation in Our Lord's action. When the servant of the High Priest struck Him, we do not read that He offered the other cheek, but that He quietly rebuked the smiter. 'And hereby,' says Augustine, 'He showed rather what needed to be shown, namely, that those great precepts of His are to be fulfilled not by bodily ostentation but by the preparation of the heart For it is impossible for a man literally to hold out the other cheek, with rage in his heart the while.'"

For a consideration of the whole subject see C. Gore, *The Sermon on the Mount* (Murray, 1896), p. 86 ff.

come to tell. But such answers only play on the surface of the controversy. The objections are really below, and their causes are deeper-seated. They are due mainly to a defective psychology. Such men do not recognise what Christ is, or as what Christianity regards Him. Nor do they understand what man is or that faith is a relation of the whole man to such a Christ, that it is a complete loyalty to a person and not merely an intellectual adhesion to a doctrine. Such differences are profound.

I

Christ was more than a teacher. That is their fundamental mistake. They start with the idea that He was "a prophet, or as one of the prophets," and no more. But, even so, they do not make out their case. Some objections, as we have just seen, are due to mere misunderstanding. His alleged harshness to the Syro-Phœnician woman was not felt as harsh by her—at any rate, after her daughter was healed. As soon as we understand the methods of stewardship customary at the time we see that the "Unjust" Steward had a perfect right to remit the debts of the men he had overcharged on the estate his lord had farmed out to him.[1] The pity was that he had not treated them fairly before. Others are, surely, captious. The withering of the barren fig-tree was an acted parable which has impressed the imagination of men ever since. The fig-tree that in the sheltered spot had put out leaves ought to have had fruit too. It is quite gratuitous to say that He acted out of petulance and ill-

[1] Cp. H. Latham, *Pastor Pastorum* (Deighton, Bell & Co., 1890), p. 393, who quotes Dr A. Edersheim's *Life and Times of Jesus, the Messiah* (Longmans, 1883), p. 267. "Next comes the question, What was the business position of the steward? It agrees best both with the circumstances before us and with such extraneous information as we possess, to suppose that the functionary, called here steward, managed absolutely his master's property, and that he was paid by a poundage on the net receipts, or by some similar method, so that his interest and his master's would, generally speaking, coincide."

temper.[1] His words, "Who is my mother and my brethren?" surely do not imply any depreciation of family ties. It was just because He valued them—as witness His words from the Cross—that He extended them to "whosoever shall do the will of God."

Others are, I grant, more serious. It is argued, especially by Jews, that He was unjust to the Pharisees, that while He was tender to sinners He could not stand opposition, that He was compassionate to the outcast but intolerant of pride. "To the highest excellence of all," writes Mr. Claude Montefiore, "even Jesus could not attain."[2] Were

[1] H. B. Swete, *The Gospel According to St. Mark* (Macmillan, 1898), pp. 238–9. "The tree was prematurely in leaf; planted in some sheltered hollow, it was already in leaf before the Passover, when other trees of the sort were only beginning to bud; and it was reasonable to expect a corresponding precocity in regard to the figs. . . . Neither form can properly be called an imprecation or a curse. . . . The sentence on the fruitless fig-tree repeated in a tangible form the lesson of a parable spoken during the Lord's recent journeyings" (Luke xiii. 6 ff.).

[2] C. G. Montefiore, *Some Elements of the Religious Teaching of Jesus* (Macmillan, 1910), p. 53. "I do not think that he was always consistent. He urged his disciples to love their enemies, but so far as we can judge he showed little love to those who opposed him. He urged that the lost sheep should be actively sought out; but except in the way of sheer abuse and bitter vituperation he did nothing to win over to his own conception of religion the Pharisees and Rabbis who ventured to criticise and dislike him. To the highest excellence of all even Jesus could not attain. For it was far easier for him to care for the outcast than to care for his opponent, especially when the outcast was ready to acknowledge that he was sent and inspired by God and the opponent took the liberty of denying it."

The writer declares that the words "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do" are spurious and ignores the fact that Christ accepted the hospitality of Pharisees, but our real point of difference is that he regards Christ merely as a prophet and teacher, and rules out as later glosses all that makes Him out to be more. But in general he speaks much more sympathetically, in great contrast to some other Jewish writers, and elsewhere (p. 22) writes:—

"If he cries 'Woe upon Scribes and Pharisees,' we shall interpret this historically to mean that there were then living *some* very bad Scribes and *some* very bad Pharisees. The tendency of all preachers and social reformers, as well as of all prophets, to exaggerate, is indeed proverbial. The statement would hardly be worth making were it not, in the case of Jesus and his opponents, so constantly forgotten." See also p. 37: "The picture of the Pharisee in Luke's parable—a ludicrous caricature of the average Pharisee, a monstrous caricature of the Pharisaic ideal—may yet be true enough of one

such objections made by professed opponents they would perhaps have little weight, but coming from one so manifestly sympathetic, so unwilling to press the point, and so ready to find explanations, I own they have with me great force. But I think we may, as he indeed suggests, allow that denunciation of what some were guilty of was dwelt upon, perhaps, unduly by the evangelists and put in the foreground. Just as many think that Christ could not have actually said "all that came before me were thieves and robbers"—at any rate, without other words which explained His meaning—so we may allow for His disciples having selected what they would quote, or even having coloured His words.

This lays us open, I know, to the charge of shuffling. "It is very easy," men say, "when you come across a difficulty, to say that the disciples altered His words, while you insist on their accuracy when His sayings please you," but I think the charge is unfair and the action justified. We have no reason to deny that He said from the Cross "Father, forgive them," and the teaching "Love your enemies" is more characteristic than the words of rebuke and runs through all He taught. And, what, perhaps, is more to the point, Pharisees asked Him to dine. He had followers among the Pharisees. Nicodemus, who came to Him by night, was a Pharisee. This would hardly have been the case if His whole attitude towards them was one of antagonism. His reported teaching must be interpreted by what He did. His life and character must be considered as a whole.[1]

Thus when people object to what they call His impossible commands we need not fall back on a theory of *Interimsethik*—that He only meant them to be obeyed at most for a

particular perversion of the Pharisaic religion." But, after all, he was not at all a bad sort of man.

[1] For the whole subject see H. Rashdall's *Conscience and Christ* (Duckworth, 1916), Lecture IV,—"Objections to the Moral Teaching of Christ," p. 134, and Additional Note on "Some Detailed Objections to the Moral Teaching of Christ," p. 169. I do not agree with quite all his conclusions.

year or two till the end of the world should come.[1] We must give His words His own interpretation, that of His acts. Certain commands were obviously not meant to be literally obeyed. He told men to hate their fathers and mothers; He did not hate His own mother—literally.[2] He said to the rich young man, "Sell all thou hast"; it was obviously an exceptional case. It did not even imply a giving up of all property; He and His disciples had money. On one occasion He sent His disciples out without scrip or purse; ordinarily Judas was the treasurer to the Twelve. Though, as we saw, one eye cannot offend without the other, and no one, therefore, has literally to blind himself, a narrow life often has to be chosen for the greater end, as witness the whole army of martyrs not only in religion but also in Science and public service.[3] The test is in what He did. While forbidding murder, and the passion that leads to murder, He did not tell the centurion to leave the army, or disapprove of the advice of the Baptist to the soldiers because it stopped short of refusal to fight. He said, "Give to him that asketh," and never refused to serve men; but

[1] H. Rashdall's *Conscience and Christ* (Duckworth, 1916), Lecture IV, p. 61. "Why should we spend our time otherwise because we are going to die, or pass into some new stage of existence, in six months than we should do if we knew we had twenty years of life before us? 'To live this day as if my last'—has not this been at all times a familiar prayer among religious people and a commonplace of religious exhortation?"

P. 62. "Once more, if we want to discover whether it is an *Interimsethik* or not, we must examine the teaching itself, and say how it appeals to us."

[2] Some great causes may override even family duty, though the following appears exaggerated: "The discipline at Christ's Hospital was ultra-Spartan; all domestic ties were to be put aside. 'Boy!' I remember Bowyer saying to me once when I was crying the first day after the holidays, 'Boy! the school is your father! Boy! the school is your mother! Boy! the school is your brother! Boy! the school is your sister! the school is your first-cousin, and all the rest of your relations! Let us have no more crying!'" S. T. Coleridge, *Table Talk*, August 16, 1832.

[3] Cp. C. Gore, *The Sermon on the Mount* (Murray, 1896), p. 66. "What Our Lord tells us is that a safe life is better than a complete life." P. 68. "Freedom is only possible where there is rational control. Thus any sacrifice is worth making sooner than that the lower parts of our nature should lord it over the higher."

He did not, as a matter of fact, demoralise men by indiscriminate almsgiving.

But there are other commands which we, perhaps, are rather too ready to declare impossible literally. It may be that the words are better translated "Resent not evil," and apply to the sense of interior passion; for, obviously, evil done to others must be resisted with all our might.[1] It is the bearing of grudges, the brooding over injuries, which, as Bishop Butler takes upon himself "to assure us, as in a manner certain," are not so great as we imagine them to be,"[2] that are forbidden perhaps; but is it so clear that even the literal meaning may not also be meant, that turning the other cheek may not actually be the best way to avoid a fight? Is the spirit of vendetta a quite satisfactory basis of society? Isn't it, after all, the strong position, even if we are not always strong enough to take it, not to hit back? Wasn't Socrates, after all, right when to Polus' astonishment he said that he would rather neither be wronged nor do wrong, but that, if it must be one or the other, he would rather be wronged than do wrong? As he said, there are worse things than a blow on the cheek.[3] And to love your enemies? It is not easy certainly, but is it so impossible? Is it so impossible to distinguish between causes and men who espouse them? In the Great War, was it the men at the Front, who bore the brunt of the battle, that hated most? Has a policy of hate proved so successful since Peace was declared?[4]

[1] Cp. Augustine, *Ep.* xlv. Quoted, W. Mongomery, *op. cit.*, p. 244. "Hinc ergo dictum est, non resistamus malo, ne nos vindicta delectet—non ut correctionem hominum negligamus." (The precept 'Resist not evil' was given to prevent us taking pleasure in revenge—not to make us neglect the duty of reclaiming men from sin.)

[2] Sermon IX, *Upon Forgiveness of Injuries.* Quoted, Q.T., p. 262.

[3] *Gorgias*, 469. Quoted, Q.T., p. 82. Cp. 508. "I tell you, Callicles, that to be boxed on the ears wrongfully is not the worst evil that can befall a man, nor to have my face and purse cut open, but to smite and slay me and mine wrongfully is far more disgraceful and more evil; ay, and to despoil and slave and pillage, or in any way to wrong me and mine, is far more disgraceful and evil to the doer of the wrong than to me who am the sufferer."

[4] Cp. Q.T., p. 83.

But the point is not so particularly worth arguing. He did it. He prayed for them that despitefully used Him. Of "His tender love towards mankind He suffered death upon the Cross, that all mankind might follow the example of His great humility." So, at least, we Christians believe; and we believe that He is not merely an example, but that He is risen from the dead and able to help us to love our enemies, too.

"He was not original," they say. "After all, what He taught was not so very different from what others had taught. The Golden Rule is found in Hillel." Yes, and they might add, in many a writer besides.[1] But He never claimed that it was new. He expressly referred the lawyer back to the law.[2] The Sermon on the Mount introduces each new interpretation by the words, "Ye have heard that it hath been said by them of old time." He confessedly built His New Testament on the Old. But, apart from originality of selection—and anyone who has even dipped into the Talmud will realise what that means—He inspired men to do what he told them. The world has never lacked great teachers, but physicians have not always been able to heal themselves —while He not only carried out His own precepts, but raised up an army of men and women ready to suffer and die in carrying them out as He suffered and died.[3] There is as great originality in making old things new as in being a source from which things take their origin. Not only in resaying is the originality on His side, but—and this is the point—*He* Himself was new.[4]

[1] Cp. Q.T., 76.

[2] Luke x, 26; cp. Mark x, 18; Matt. xviii, 18.

[3] Cp. Pascal, *Pensées*, ed. Brunschvicg, 593. "Je ne crois que les histoires dont les témoins se feraient égorger." (I only believe the stories of which the witnesses get themselves killed.)

[4] Cp. the various passages quoted in Q.T., pp. 76–8, and C. G. Montefiore, *Liberal Judaism* (Macmillan, 1918), p. 93. "As a matter of fact, so far as the Rabbinic parallels are concerned they are usually a good deal later," and the same author's *Some Elements in the Religious Teaching of Jesus* (Macmillan, 1910), p. 85. "I am inclined to believe that both Jews and Christians have some-

In other words, it is the man we must consider—not merely His teaching. He was, we claim, more than a teacher; and, if we are right, and He was the Truth of God Incarnate, why, it is only natural that what He said by word of mouth was of a piece with whatever He had said before "at sundry times and in divers manners." God's truth is true wherever found.

So with the objection that His teaching is not adequate to the needs of to-day, that He has given us no clear lead in the many problems of industrialism, or on the duties of employers and employed, on the evils of betting, or on the curse of war; how could any teacher then do so? Either he must anticipate conditions of another age and become unintelligible to his own, or he must legislate for his own time and bind after-ages by an iron rule of precedent.[1] In

times been a little unfair as regards this question, the former in unduly depreciating the originality of Jesus, the latter in unduly exalting it. As against Jewish critics it is only right to remember that most of the parallels which the industry of scholars has culled from the Rabbinical literature were undoubtedly spoken, as well as written down, after Jesus and not before him, priority is therefore his. But a far more important point is that the teaching of Jesus must be regarded as a whole, both in what he says and in what he does not say Its originality is not only to be found in its separate sentences and teachings, but in its general character, its spirit, its atmosphere. Some would add that its originality is in that very note of authority of which we have to speak by and by."

Cp. I. Abrahams, *Studies in Pharisaism and the Gospels* (Cambridge, 1924), p. 198. "It is interesting to compare with the Lord's Prayer a real 'cento' consciously put together and with considerable skill in a publication issued in Berlin a few years back.

"'Our Father, Who art in heaven. Hallowed be Thine exalted Name in the world which Thou didst create according to Thy will. May Thy Kingdom and its lordship come speedily, and be acknowledged by all the world, that Thy Name may be praised in all eternity. May Thy will be done in Heaven as also in earth. Give tranquillity of spirit to those that fear Thee, yet in all things do what seemeth good to Thee. Let us enjoy the bread appointed to us. Forgive us, Our Father, for we have sinned; forgive also all who have done us injury; even as we also forgive all. And lead us not into temptation but keep us far from all evil. For Thine is the greatness and the power and the dominion, the victory and the majesty, yea all in Heaven and earth. Thine is the Kingdom and Thou art the Lord of all things for ever.'"

We are reminded of the Puritans at the Savoy Conference, who wished to have the Prayer-Book collects lengthened to "make them more affecting." But could even this have been compiled without the original?

[1] Cp. A. Harnack, *Das Wesen des Christentums* (Leipzig, 1900), Sechste Vorlesung, s. 62. "Hätte er Gesetze gegeben, die für Palästina noch so

certain permanent unchanging relationships this is possible. Christ declared the unchanging law of marriage; "from the beginning God made them male and female"; "those whom God hath joined together let not man put asunder," "whosoever putteth away his wife and marrieth another committeth adultery." These are things that do not change. But on other points He did not legislate. To have given a ruling to the man who wanted his brother to divide the inheritance, as F. W. Robertson pointed out,[1] would have been to have set a precedent. There would have been endless discussion, and a whole body of comment and case-law would have been built up. We can see how men have been bound by the Talmud and the Koran. Rather He laid emphasis on certain great principles, such as we considered in our first chapter—"Beware of covetousness," "A man's life consisteth not in the abundance of things which he possesseth," "Blessed are they which are persecuted for righteousness' sake," all things are a trust from God; hatred without a cause, lust in men's hearts, must be cured if wars are to cease and womanhood to be honoured; and these principles, He insisted, must be put into practice—"Turn the other cheek," "Go with him twain," "When ye fast," "When ye pray," "When thou doest thine alms." This is the condition of progress—to work from principles that apply to the simplest conditions of life and are not exhausted in the most complicated. Without them men drift hither and thither. As a matter of history, as we saw, it is Christian civilisation that has been progressive.[2]

heilsam gewesen wären—was wäre damit erreicht worden? Sie wären heute nützlich gewesen und morgen veraltet, und sie hätten das Evangelium belastet und verwirrt." (If he had given laws which were ever so profitable for Palestine what would have been gained by that? They would have been useful to-day and out of date to-morrow, and they would have injured and perverted the Gospel.)

Cp. H. M. Gwatkin, *The Knowledge of God* (T. & T. Clark, 1906), vol. i, p. 96. Quoted, Q.T., p. 96.

[1] *Sermons*, Second Series (Smith, Elder, 1865), p. 8. "Christ's Judgment concerning Inheritance."

[2] See above, pp. 53-60.

All this is perfectly natural on the Christian assumption that He was the Son of God Incarnate, Who is risen from the dead and still lives. His teaching, His place in the world, His influence, form a rational and coherent whole. The question is one that must not be begged. We may not say we will

> hold closely to the apparent facts . . . the documents that testify to his acts and teachings we shall treat as ordinary human documents. If the light of divinity shine through our recital, we will neither help nor hinder it;[1]

and then take care only to select such facts as speak of His humanity. Nor is it to be settled on grounds of historic evidence or verbal logic alone. It is a question of judgment of character, of power in judging values as well; and to come to a valid decision requires a wider and sounder psychology than is owned by the majority of those who criticise our belief.

II

It is a sounder psychology that is wanted, a better understanding of human nature. Men need to know what man is and how he thinks and acts. They have not asked themselves why, as a matter of fact, we do believe, not merely in God, but in anything—not merely in matters of religion, but in those of politics, of daily life, of Science.

Faith is popularly regarded as a purely intellectual matter. This is the rationalist's assumption. Men have learned so much in the last two hundred years about mathematics and machinery that they have come to think in terms of

[1] H. G. Wells, *Outline of History*, Bk. VI, xxx. "The Beginning, the Rise, and the Divisions of Christianity," Part XII, p. 356. He continues: "About Jesus we have to write not theology but history, and our concern is not with the spiritual and theological significance of His life, but with its effects upon the political and everyday life of men." As if the two could be separated by any but an incoherent mind!

propositions and mechanism.[1] Christian faith is regarded as assent to a proposition about Christ—namely, that He was the Son of God and that He died for us. Sometimes it is even regarded as a sort of faculty of unreason in reasoning, a power of believing in spite of evidence, or even as a saying that you believe when you do not!

But faith is an activity of the whole man. It is found in its fullest form when it is faith of a person in a person. Even faith in a policy generally implies trust in a person behind it. It involves a relationship to the object of our faith of all the sides of our being that can find a response to it. Even in its lesser forms, in intellectual matters, it is a going out beyond what we know, and becomes a guide to discovery; in feeling it is the trust and committal of ourselves to another, the necessary condition of working in concert; in action it is the making a venture beyond what we are sure of and have done before. It is a thing we are perfectly familiar with in daily life, an experience of committing ourselves to something other than ourselves.[2]

It is because they do not realise this that so many people object to Christian faith. It is not immoral because it does not mean merely saying that you believe. "He that believeth shall be saved and he that believeth not shall be damned" does not represent Our Lord's words.[3] He said rather: "He that is faithful (πιστεύσας) shall be saved and he that

[1] Cp. my *Pastoral Theology and the Modern World* (Oxford, 1920), pp. 101–2, and the references there. To which may be added J. Martineau, *A Study of Religion* (Oxford, 1900), p. 177, and A. Seth Pringle-Pattison, *The Idea of God*, Gifford Lectures, 1912 and 1913 (Oxford, 1917), p. 49 ff. "Modern philosophy was born along with modern science, or, to be more strictly correct, it followed close upon it, as a reflective analysis and generalisation of its methods and results. The extent to which the physics of Galileo is transfused into the systems of the founders of modern philosophy has become a historical commonplace."

[2] Cp. my *Why Men Believe* (S.P.C.K., 1921), where I have tried to work this out more fully.

[3] Cp. any elementary commentary, e.g. A. Plummer, "The Gospel According to St. Mark," in *The Cambridge Bible for Schools* (1914), p. 374. "The rendering 'shall be damned' is seriously misleading." The whole passage quoted in Q.T., p. 29.

is unfaithful (*ἀπιστήσας*) shall be condemned (*κατακριθήσεται*)." And that is true. Unfaithfulness brings its own condemnation. Besides, He added, "and is baptised"; membership of the Church demands very practical duties of the faithful. Even when simple people try to explain and rationalise their experiences their faith is, as a matter of fact, something far more than their rationalisation of it. The Salvation Army convert who talks about "accepting the scheme of salvation" may give a very crude explanation of the Atonement, but the next minute he will be talking about "giving your *heart* to God." Moreover, as Bishop Butler said, "Probability is the very guide of life." [1] We must have faith if we are to live. Certainty is only to be had in two spheres. We can have it in mathematics because we are dealing with abstractions that do not exist by themselves—you may have three apples or three oranges, but there is no such thing as "three" by itself—and because the conclusions are contained in the premises, the answer to the sum is already there to be worked out. We can have certainty, too, in things that we know directly, by intuition—namely, that we exist, that we have free wills, that we have a duty. These we know for certain, but all else demands faith.[2] Natural Science depends on faith in the order of the world; [3] society depends on faith in your fellow-men; discovery depends on faith, which is like courage in that it makes the mind ready to voyage "through strange seas of thought alone." [4] As Plato said, "We must take the best of human doctrines and, embarking on that as on a raft, risk the voyage of life." [5]

This does not mean that we are to be irrational. It is

[1] *Analogy*, Introduction. [2] See below, Chapter VII, p. 200.

[3] Cp. T. Huxley, in Darwin's *Life and Letters*, vol. ii, p. 200. Quoted, Q.T., p. 33.

[4] W. James, *The Will to Believe* (Longmans, 1903), p. 90. "Faith is the readiness to act in a cause the prosperous issue of which is not certified to us in advance. It is, in fact, the same moral quality which we call courage in practical affairs." Cp. *Why Men Believe*, p. 67.

[5] *Phædo*, xxxv, 85. Quoted, Q.T., 183.

our duty to rationalise our faith as far as we can. "As the right order of things requires that we believe the deep things of the Christian faith before we presume to discuss them by reason, so it seems to me," said St. Anselm, "a sign of negligence if, after we have been confirmed in the faith, we are not eager to understand what we believe." [1] It is our duty to examine, to test, to probe, to define. The unexamined life is no life for us any more than it was for Socrates. So modern psychology is emphasising the restless activity of the mind, pointing out how it deludes us as to our motives—always seeking for a reason to give for them, so that a "rationalisation" has almost come to mean a fallacy.[2] But, as we saw, experience comes first, whether of facts outside or of things lived within, while theory follows after; [3] and a false theory does not alter the facts it tries to explain. In old days people thought that the sun rose and set because Phœbus Apollo drove his chariot across the sky from east to west. We now know that he does not, but the sun con-

[1] *Cur Deus Homo*, i. 2. Quoted, Q.T., p. 33.

[2] E.g. R. H. Thouless, *An Introduction to the Psychology of Religion* (Cambridge, 1923), p. 81. "The whole tendency of modern psychology is to tell us that our beliefs are determined for us far more by our feelings, our wishes, and so forth, and much less by our intellects, than we are generally willing to admit. In other words, they are very largely affectively determined. It is true we may be able to give what we consider to be excellent intellectual reasons for our beliefs. These, however, may not be the real causes of our holding the beliefs. They may merely be reasons the mind subconsciously supplies to justify it in holding beliefs which are really held on different and quite irrational grounds. Such chains of reasoning are now generally called *rationalisations*."

Cp. Pascal, *Pensées*, ed. Brunschvicg, 276. "M. de Roannez disait, 'Les raisons me viennent après, mais d'abord la chose m'agrée ou me choque sans en avoir la raison, et cependant cela me choque par cette raison que je ne découvre qu'ensuite.' Mais je crois, non pas que cela choquait par des raisons qu'on trouve après, mais qu'on ne trouve ces raisons que parce que cela choque." (M. de Roannez said to me, 'Reasons come to me afterwards, but at first a thing pleases or shocks me without any reason, and, all the same, it shocks me for the reason that I find out afterwards.' But I believe that it does not shock him because of the reasons that are found afterwards, but that reasons are found because a thing shocks us." A note quotes La Rochefoucauld: "L'esprit est toujours la dupe du cœur." (The mind is always deceived by the heart.)

[3] Above, pp. 60–2.

tinues to rule the day, and the moon and stars to govern the night. They accounted for the rise of mercury in the tube by saying that Nature abhorred a vacuum. If when it was found that the abhorrence only rose to thirty-two inches they had destroyed their barometers, we should have had no weather forecasts to-day.

When this fact is grasped we can see how it applies in theology also. It is often said that Christianity stands or falls with the story of the second chapter of Genesis, that if it is not historically true, then man is not fallen, no atonement is necessary, and Christ need not have died. I only wish that sin could be got rid of so easily, but it cannot. It is there. Man is sinful. That is obvious ; you have only to walk through the streets of our cities to see it. You need not even visit the police courts or look at the picture papers. It is a matter of experience within, too. We are dissatisfied with ourselves. We are not what we should like to be. It is not mere weakness. We feel we were made for something better. It is a fall. Man is, as Pascal said, "un roi dépossédé"—a king dethroned.[1] He was made in the image of God. The world wanted an explanation of this ; it could not wait for modern Natural Science. Religion had to answer before modern psychology appeared. So it took the current Natural Science of the day with its stories of creation, spiritualised them and moralised them, and gave us the story—

> Of man's first disobedience, and the fruit
> Of that forbidden tree whose mortal taste
> Brought death into the world and all our woe.[2]

A story which, in all essentials, holds good to-day—and it is difficult to see how it could have been better told. Similarly with the doctrine of the Atonement. First came the experience of salvation. Men felt they were different, and that the difference came from the death of Christ in some way. That was enough at first, and still is for many.

[1] *Pensées*, 398, 434.

[2] Milton, *Paradise Lost*.

But the intellect of man could not stop there. It asked, "Am I deceived? Is it true? How can it be?" Then came various explanations. Men looked about for parallels, not realising what we saw about analogies being slippery things. They saw monarchs were appeased by sacrifice, and explained our changed relation to God by saying that He, too, was appeased by the death of Christ, not seeing that they were making Him capricious and vindictive like a man. They saw slaves were in bondage and were set free by ransom, and explained their own new-found freedom from the chain of their sins by saying that Christ had paid the price; but when pressed as to whom the price was paid, and why he agreed, they found that they were saying that God had entered into a bargain, and a fraudulent one too, with the Devil. When chivalry was at its height men spoke of Christ's death as the perfect homage. When law and order began to prevail as the nations were forming after the Middle Ages, men saw that the innocent might suffer in the courts and so set the guilty free, and asked us to accept a theory that let the innocent suffer while we got off. In the loveless age of the industrial revolution Wesley appealed to the love shown on the Cross; but evangelical theology could give no better explanation why the death was necessary. It is easy to criticise all these theories, still easier to ridicule them as they are ridiculed in anti-christian propaganda; but false explanations do not arise unless there is something to explain. It is far more scientific to ask what was behind all these phenomena.

A true theory can be given. Man is separated from God by his sin and needs to be made at one again. This union was brought about by the Word of God taking our human nature and sharing our life. This life was lived right up to the end on the Cross, and we can share it by being united with Him. We are saved from sin and not from punishment. He died *for* us and not *instead of* us. Union with Him is by incorporation with Him through the Sacraments.

It involves suffering by being crucified with Him. But the point that needs to be brought home to men in apologetics is that truth does not depend on our explanation of it. Experience comes before theology. Facts do not depend on their Science, but Science upon facts.

This is not to say that theory and rationalisation do not matter. Dogmas are necessary for common action, since common action is based upon agreement. Creed does influence character, and is all the more important because ideas last while emotions die away, and because they are continually working beneath our consciousness. But faith, as we saw, is an act of the whole man, a self-committal of his whole being. It is quite legitimate to base faith on other grounds than reasoning. It is right to believe at the bidding of the emotions, because a thing is beautiful, because the heart has "stood up and answered, 'I have felt,'"[1] though such a ground may be precarious and inadequate by itself. It is right to believe on pragmatic grounds, because a belief is found to work, because success has proved a method right, though a right insight as to why it was so will give confidence in repeating the venture. It is right to believe on the experience and authority of the mass of others, since they are more likely to be right and you to be wrong. But faith is most surely based not merely, on each several ground, by the whole evidence taken all together, but on evidences of all kinds corroborating and supporting one another.[2]

So in the Athanasian Creed stress is, no doubt, laid on right thinking as the author understood it. Perhaps he was ultra-scientific and too theological and rationalistic. But while guarding ourselves against ideas read into it which, even if maybe held by the author, are at any rate not stated—such as, for instance, the assumption that man cannot learn anything more after this life—what objection can we make to it? If its theology is true, if God is indeed a Trinity, if

[1] Tennyson, *In Memoriam*, cxxiv. Quoted in Q.T., p. 32.
[2] I have worked this out more fully in my *Why Men Believe* (S.P.C.K., 1921).

the doctrine represents facts about His Nature as far as human language can formulate them, if the Son did become incarnate and was in truth perfect God and perfect Man, if Jesus Christ is the true revelation of God, if right knowledge of God by the intellect is a part of that knowledge of God in the fuller sense which is eternal life—and that it is so needs to be insisted on in an age impatient of vigorous, sustained, and clear thought—then, surely, "he that wills to be saved must thus think of the Trinity," and it *is* necessary to eternal life "that he also believe rightly the Incarnation of Our Lord Jesus Christ." If he has not learned these truths in this life, surely he must realise it in another before he can enter fully with his whole mind, as well as his heart and his soul, into eternal life.[1]

III

Meanwhile some attitude towards Christ is necessary. The question, "What think ye of Christ?" presses and must be answered. In life every day and from minute to minute we have got to act, and in every action we have got to take up some line or other. Even if we can defer our theology, practical decisions cannot be deferred.[2] Even

[1] See Q.T., pp. 36, 109, 118, 233, 241. Apart from this it may, of course, be pointed out, without "explaining away" the creed, that in thinking of the future the stress is laid on *doing*—"they that have *done* evil into eternal fire," whatever Christ may have meant by that; and we mean no more and no less, while historical circumstances laid stress on the words "*fideliter firmiterque*," believing faithfully and firmly. When to profess Arianism was to desert your people and to go over to the Goths, to hold Trinitarian views required much the same courage that orthodoxy still demands to-day in Russia. As Plato said (*Republic*, 509): "Though knowledge and truth are very beautiful things, you will be right in looking upon good as something distinct from them and even more beautiful."

[2] Cp. E. Bevan, *Hellenism and Christianity*, ii, "Reason and Dogma" (Allen & Unwin, 1921), p. 239. "The movement of time compels us, whether we want to or not, to act. It is before the compulsion to act that all pure agnosticism breaks down." This surely is the idea in Pascal's famous "wager" advice, "Il faut parier,"—not that of a mathematical "nicely counted less or more." He continues, "Cela n'est pas volontaire, vous êtes embarqué."—*Pensées*, 233.

theology cannot be deferred indefinitely. We may suspend our judgment from day to day. We may say, "I must wait till I can think it out," "I'm not in a position to decide," "I've got other things to do." We may, and often must, suspend our judgment; but, sooner or later, we must make up our minds. Permanent agnosticism, to settle down to indecision, is to deny the intellect its exercise, to despair of its power. Christianity is a fact, and it has got to be explained. It is unscientific to say, "I can't be bothered." Christian belief offers us a solution. It says the explanation of its permanence and its power is that Christ now moves men's hearts because He is the Eternal Love incarnate, the Word who

> had breath, and wrought
> With human hands the creed of creeds;[1]

that He lived His life here on earth to the end, was crucified and rose again; that He has come again and is working everywhere in His Church. This, it says, is a solution adequate to the facts. It asserts, further, that its claim has been tested by experience; that it has been this belief, and not "reduced Christianity" or Unitarianism, that, as a matter of fact, has been the power in the world;[2] that it has been continually declared effete and dead, and has continually survived persecution and outlived criticism; that it has shown itself able to adapt itself to all ages, to interpret the genius of race after race; that of both ages and races it has called out the best and most characteristic that is in them.

That the fact of Christ needs an explanation is shown by the continual interest He evokes. Men who affect to hate Christianity revere Christ. Life after life appears. They are written by Christians and by those who deny His claim. Perhaps it is the long list of the latter—such as, for instance, are reviewed in Dr. Schweitzer's *Quest of the Historical*

[1] Tennyson, *In Memoriam*, xxxvi.
[2] For the success and failure of Unitarianism, see Q.T., pp. 40, 48.

Jesus—that is a greater witness to this felt need to account for Him than that of those who accept His claim. They cannot let Him alone.

By themselves each seems so inadequate. They will be found to group themselves into three schools. There are first those of Liberal Protestantism. They regard Him as merely Man, the last of a long list of prophets, the foremost of a noble band of teachers, one who had greater knowledge of God than had others, who came teaching the Fatherhood of God and the Brotherhood of Man. Their aim is to get behind Theology to the Bible, to get behind the Bible to the "Jesus of History." Their method is to cut out from the Gospels all that contradicts their theory as later additions, and by this means they succeed in finding in the Gospels what they set out to find. Professor Harnack is, perhaps, the most learned representative of this school.[1]

"No," however, reply the members of another school, the religious-historical. "The picture of Jesus in the Gospels is clearly that of a divine superhuman being. You cannot cut out all the words which make this claim. Such was the figure the authors clearly intended to depict; and as miracles do not happen, such a claim is an impossible one—it is clearly due to the growth of legend. The study

[1] Cp. G. Tyrrell, *Christianity at the Cross Roads* (Longmans, 1909), chap. vii. "The Christ of Liberal Protestantism," p. 42. "With eyes thus preoccupied they could only find the German in the Jew; a moralist in the visionary; a professor in a prophet; the nineteenth century in the first; the natural in the supernatural," p. 44. "The Christ that Harnack sees, looking back through nineteen centuries of Catholic darkness, is only the reflection of a Liberal Protestant face, seen at the bottom of a deep well."

Cp. C. G. Montefiore, *The Synoptic Gospels* (Macmillan, 1909), vol. ii, p. 593. "What Jews have died in thousands to protest against was not the teaching of Jesus but the teaching of the Church—the incarnation, the Trinity, the worship of the Man-God, the mediation of the Messiah, the worship of the Virgin, the doctrine of transubstantiation, and so on. And when the Liberal Protestant German theologians of to-day, who are practically Unitarians, though they do not call themselves by that name, write about Rabbinic Judaism with disdain and disapproval, they forget that what they directly depreciate and condemn they indirectly justify and exalt. . . . They have come round to us." The author, of course, writes as a Jew.

of comparative religions gives us endless parallels. The whole life of Christ is clouded with legend. Nay," some go on to say, "what do we know about Jesus of Nazareth? We can't even be sure that he ever existed. The whole story was borrowed from Buddhism, from India, from Egypt, from Greece. It is a nature myth. It is evolved from a mystery drama. He is a replica of Gilgamesh, of Isis, of Dionysus, of Krishna," and they write books on "The Christ Myth" or "Pagan Christs," or with the title, "Did Jesus Ever Live?" This school, which in its extreme forms, at least, is not very seriously considered by scholars, is of great importance in that its theories are taken up and popularised in England by the Rationalist Press Association, on the publications of which secularist speakers in the parks largely rely for their information, and its exegesis seems to be that adopted by the Bolshevist persecutors of Christianity in Russia. Its chief exponent in England is Mr. J. M. Robertson, and in Germany Professor A. Drews.[1]

[1] S. Reinach, *Orpheus: A General History of Religions*, transl. F. Simmonds (Heinemann, 1909), p. 226. "Is it even possible to extract even the elements of a biography of Jesus from the Gospels? It is contrary to every sound method to compose, as Renan did, a life of Jesus, eliminating the marvellous elements of the story. It is no more possible to make real history with myths than to make bread with the pollen of flowers. The historic Jesus is essentially intangible, by which I do not mean that He never existed, but simply that we cannot affirm anything about Him, lacking, as we do, all evidence incontestably derived from those who saw and heard Him."

Cp. E. Bevan, *Hellenism and Christianity* (Allen & Unwin, 1921), p. 256. "An extreme view along these lines is one which denies even the historical existence of Jesus—a view which, one must admit, has not managed to establish itself among the educated outside a little circle of amateurs and cranks, or to rise above the dignity of a Baconian theory of Shakespeare." For further examples and criticisms see Q.T., pp. 135–40.

The most absurd example of this school that I have come across is that of a writer in *The Freethinker*, January 31, 1926. "Who was Jesus Christ?" a question which he answers by saying that "about the year 3400 B.C. a huge comet came into the solar system," the local name of which "has been handed down to the descendants of the unfortunate people who witnessed the event.... Two large portions [of the earth] rolled themselves into balls. One of them ... still circles round the sun as the planet Mercury, ... the other is still circling round and we call it the moon.... Christ, the Moon, was near the earth for about three years.... Then ... the moon was knocked further from the earth, and this was the ascent of Christ into Heaven. The people thought that, as the

The third school, the Apocalyptist and Modernist, says: "You are both wrong. The hero of the Gospels was human—yes, but one who clearly believed Himself to be the Messiah, sent not to teach but to found a kingdom. His ethical teaching was of little account. He believed that the end of the world was at hand, so He merely gave commands for the interval till it came. His was a mere *Interimsethik*. It was the man that mattered. True, He was a failure and died confessing His failure, but it was a noble failure and inspired His followers to like deeds of heroism. As He transcended the old Jewish Apocalyptic teaching, so after ages transcended His ideas of the kingdom and gave them a still wider meaning. So He founded a kingdom by His death. He is a figure for all time, a source of grace through all the ages, inspiring them by His presence, making possible sacraments, calling out the heroic in us." "It is the Church that matters," add the Catholic Modernists of this school such as M. Loisy—"not the Jesus of the Gospels." The best-known and most learned of Protestant Apocalyptists is Dr. Schweitzer.[1]

moon had borne the brunt of the attack, Christ had died to save humanity." Thus his assertion is that "Christ is the Moon, so that while the Man-Christ is an untrue myth, the material-Christ is a reality." The article does not appear to be a practical joke to see what the editor would put in.

[1] A. Schweitzer, *The Quest of the Historical Jesus*, transl. W. Montgomery (A. & C. Black, 1910), p. 401 "It is a good thing that the true historical Jesus should overthrow the modern Jesus, should rise up against the modern spirit and send upon earth not peace but a sword. He was not a teacher, not a casuist; He was an imperious ruler. It was because He was so in His inmost being that He could think of Himself as the son of man. That was only the temporarily conditioned expression of the fact that He was an authoritative ruler."

Cp. the same author's *Das Abendmahl im Zusammenhang mit dem Leben Jesu*, Zweites Heft, "Das Messianitäts und Leidensgeheimniss. Eine Skizze des Lebens Jesu" (Mohr, Tübingen, 1901), pp. 98 and 109.

Cp. A. Headlam, *The Doctrine of the Church and Christian Reunion*, Bampton Lectures, 1920 (Murray, 1920), p. 27. "A second difficulty is that if you evacuate the teaching of Our Lord of all its most original and impressive characteristics, if you imagine that it did not exceed in intelligence the work of a third-rate Apocalyptist, it becomes exceedingly difficult to explain the message of the Gospel, the rise of Christianity and the Christian Church."

Dr. J. B. Pratt, in his *The Religious Consciousness* (New York, The Macmillan

Now it will be noticed that each of these schools refutes the others, and that by two to one. "Jesus was only Son of God in the sense that He had a knowledge of God like that of no one before Him," says Professor Harnack.[1] "No," says Professor Drews, "there were very mundane and very practical reasons which after all gave the impulse for the God Jesus to be transformed into an historical individual."[2] "Yes," says Dr. Schweitzer, "this Jesus is much greater than the man of to-day thought; He is truly a supernatural person."[3]

The Christ of the Gospels is a mythical figure, says Professor Drews. "In spite of all rhetoric He is, in the light of historical theology of to-day, at best only a figure swimming obscurely in the midst of tradition."[4] "No," says Professor Harnack, out of his immense store of critical study. "A story of the birth of Our Lord that had grown up freely in Gentile Christian soil about the year 50, or 80, or A.D. 100, would certainly have been of a quite different character

Company, 1920), p. 461, quotes M. Binet-Sanglé's *La Folie de Jésus* (Paris, Maloine, 1910), vol. ii, pp. 509–10. "Ce dégénéré était donc atteint de paranoia religieuse, de théomégalomanie. Il eut. surtout dans la première période de son délire, des hallucinations de nature religieuse: hallucinations visuelles hautes et lumineuses, exoauditives verbales, kinesthésiques verbales avec automatisme, aéroplaniques, les unes consolantes, les autres terrifiantes, celles-ci se groupant de façon à constituer le syndrome de la démonomanie externe. En tout ceci Jésus ne différait point des théomégalomanes observés avant et après lui, de ces agités qui troublèrent le monde jusqu'au dix-neuvième siècle et qui ne se rencontrent plus que dans les maisons de santé et dans les asiles."

He adds: "No comment here is needed. The reader will probably judge for himself that the learned alienist is himself not altogether free from paranoia."

[1] *Das Wesen des Christentums*, s. 81. "Recht verstanden ist die Gotteserkentniss der ganze Inhalt des Sohnesnamens. Aber ein Doppeltes ist hinzuzufügen: Jesus ist überzeugt, Gott so zu kennen, wie keiner vor ihm, und er weiss, das er den Beruf hat, allen anderen diese Gotteserkentniss—und damit die Gotteskindschaft—durch Wort und That mitzuteilen."

[2] *The Christ Myth*, transl. C. D. Burns (Fisher Unwin, from the third German edition, 1910), p. 272.

[3] *Das Abendmahl*, *id.*, s. 97. "Dieser Jesu ist viel grösser als der Modern gedachte: er ist wirklich eine überirdische Persöhnlichkeit."

[4] *Op. cit.*, p. 20. Preface to the first and second editions.

from the story of the First Gospel."[1] "Yes," says Dr. Schweitzer, "how can men who think seriously come to the conclusion that the ideas of Christianity do not go back to Jesus?"[2]

Jesus was a deluded fanatic, a failure but a noble one, says Dr. Schweitzer. "On the fourteenth of Nisan, in the afternoon, as men were eating the Passover, He cried aloud and died."[3] "No," says Professor Harnack, "He did not talk like an enthusiast and a fanatic—He spoke His message and looked at the world with a fresh and clear eye for the life, great and small, that surrounded Him."[4] "Yes," says Dr. Drews, "the Jesus of the Gospels is to be understood only as a God-made man."[5]

But that they correct one another by two to one is not all that we have to notice. Coleridge was right in remembering "always to bear in mind that profound saying of Leibnitz that men's intellectual errors consist chiefly in denying. What they affirm with feeling is for the most part right if it be real affirmation and not affirmation in form, negative in reality."[6] So, more valuable than the criticism of each

[1] *The Date of the Acts and of the Synoptic Gospels*, transl. J. R. Wilkins, Williams & Norgate's *Crown Theological Library* (1911), p. 142. Quoted, with other references, in Q.T., p. 165.

[2] *Christianity and the Religions of the World.* Selly Oak Central Council Publications. Transl. J. Powers (Allen & Unwin, 1923), p. 21.

[3] *Op. cit.*, s. 109. "Am 14 Nisan Nachmittags, da man abends das Passahlamm ass, schrie er laut auf und verschied."

With these words he ends his *Sketch of the Life of Jesus.* He then continues: "Die Urteile über diese realistische Darstellung des Lebens Jesu können sehr verschieden sein, je nach dem dogmatischen, historischen, oder literarischen Standort der Kritik. Nur den Zweck des Buches mögen sie wohl nicht antasten; der modernen Zeit und der modernen Dogmatik die Gestalt Jesu in ihrer überwältigenden heroischen Grösse vor die Seele zu führen."

[4] *Das Wesen des Christentums*, s. 23. "Er hat nicht gesprochen wie ein Schwärmer und Fanatiker, der nur *einen* rotglühenden Punkt sieht und dem die Welt und alles, was in ihr ist, deshalb verschwindet. Er hat seine Predigten gesprochen und in die Welt geschaut mit dem frischen und hellen Auge für das grosse und kleine Leben, das ihn umgab." A translation of the whole passage will be found in Q.T., p. 98.

[5] *Op. cit.*, p. 265.

[6] *Biographia Literaria*, chap. xii, ed. Shawcross (Oxford, 1907), p. 170. Leibnitz, *Œuvres*, ed. Erdman, ii, 701–2. Trois letttres à M. Remond de

school by the others, is that which each affirms. For the Liberal Protestant school has insisted, when we were in danger of forgetting it, that Jesus was very man, loving to children, tender to sinners, growing in wisdom and stature, teaching on the hill-sides of Galilee and in the Temple courts in Jerusalem.[1] The Religious Historical school insists that the central figure of the Gospels was Divine, God Incarnate on earth, Who fulfilled what all races, savage and civilised, have always yearned for, and often fashioned after their own imaginations;[2] while the Apocalyptic school has dwelt on the fact that He did as a matter of fact found a Church, and not merely give a teaching—that His spirit has worked in her, making effective her Sacraments and interpreting the needs of the ages as the world rolls on, giving each the Christ it needs.[3]

So, on the positive side, critical study corroborates the Christian claim—namely, that He was perfect God and perfect Man, Who rose from the dead to found a Church in which

Mont Mort. "J'ai trouvé que la plupart des sectes ont raison dans une bonne partie de ce qu'elles avancent, mais non pas tant en ce qu'elles nient."

[1] Cp. Harnack, *Das Wesen des Christentums*, s. 80. "Dies empfindende, betende, handelnde, ringende und leidende Ich ist ein Mensch, der sich auch seinen Gott gegenüber mit anderen Menschen zusammenschliesst." (This feeling, praying, working, struggling, and suffering soul is a man who makes himself one with other men before his God.)

[2] A. Drews, *The Witness to the Historicity of Jesus*, transl. J. McCabe (Watts & Co., for the Rationalist Press Association, 1912), p. 296. "That God Himself has exchanged the heavenly glory for the lowliness of earth; that Christ became 'the Son of God' and descended upon the earth; that God divested Himself of His divinity, took on human form, led a life of poverty with the poor, suffered, was crucified and buried, and rose again, and thus secured for men the power to rise again and obtain forgiveness of sins and a blessed life with the heavenly Father—that is the mystery of the figure of Christ, that is what the figure conveyed to the hearts of the faithful, and stirred them to an ecstatic reverence for their deepest revelation of God."

[3] A. Schweitzer, *The Quest of the Historical Jesus*, p. 401. "He comes to us as one unknown, without a name, as of old by the lake-side He came to those who knew Him not. He speaks to us the same word: 'Follow thou Me!' and sets us to the task which He has to fulfil for our time. He commands. And to those who obey Him, whether they be wise or simple, He will reveal Himself in the toils, the conflicts, the sufferings which they shall pass through in His fellowship, and, in an ineffable mystery, they shall learn in their own experience who He is."

He still lives among us. It points out, as I have tried to show elsewhere,[1] that He was so regarded by His Disciples, who, after all, knew Him better by intercourse than we can by mere report of His words; that their belief became more clear and explicit as it was put to the test of criticism, and established itself by the practical test of time; that He claimed to be so both by act and word—implicitly by what He did in claiming to heal the sick, to rule the forces of Nature, to recall the dead to life, in demanding allegiance from men, in promising to give them rest, in speaking of His future rôle as judge, and explicitly in His teaching, both in parable and discourse—and that, too, when the claim was challenged and its putter-forward met by the penalty of death; that the claim appeals not only to our critical and historic sense but no less to our moral judgment; that it explains the course of history both before and after His appearance; that it gives a conception of God greater than that of any other philosophy or religion, yet one capable of appealing to the youngest and the simplest, one that shows how He "grew likest God in being born"; that

> The acknowledgment of God in Christ,
> Accepted by thy reason, solves for thee
> All questions in the earth and out of it;[2]

that

> Jesus Christ is the end of all and the centre of all. Who knows Him knows the meaning of all things.[3]

IV

The need of to-day is a moral one. This is the last as well as the first need of Christian apologetic to-day. We

[1] In my *The Christian's Claim about Jesus of Nazareth* (S.P.C.K., 1916).

[2] R. Browning, *A Death in the Desert*, *Works* (Smith, Elder, 1896), vol. i, p. 590.

[3] Pascal, *Pensées*, ed. Brunschvicg, 556. See the motto at the beginning of this chapter.

should, as we saw, begin with the appeal to conscience. With the appeal to conscience we come to the final issue. Our great need is power to act upon our convictions. If we begin with intellectual and rational proof, in the last resort we have to act. Here is the real difficulty. When we are convinced, we have got to do difficult and unpleasant things. We've got to do things that we have always shrunk from and thought rather ridiculous. We've got not only to acknowledge that we were wrong, which in itself is always hard, but we've also got to go down on our knees and say our prayers, to go to stuffy churches and associate with stuffy people, as we have been considering them. We've got, perhaps, to take steps to be baptised, or ask to be confirmed—and most men have not the grit to do it. That is the difficulty—a moral one.

But, as a matter of fact, we do not generally begin with intellectual argument. The process is the other way.

> A man convinced against his will
> Is of the same opinion still.[1]

These were not the words Samuel Butler wrote, but they are generally so quoted because they are so true. We have got to pay attention rather to what appeals to the heart and conscience—holding our judgment in suspense, it may be for years, it may be till death, but never resting till we have thought the matter out. It is not scepticism that matters but acquiescence in agnosticism.

The method is a practical one. As in politics or economics, if we want to understand we don't only read books and listen to speeches and lectures—we go and take part in the work and mix with those actually dealing with government or

[1] So by Newman in his *Grammar of Assent*, chap. vi, § 1 (5). Samuel Butler originally wrote :—

> "He that complies against his will
> Is of the same opinion still."
> *Hudibras*, Pt. III, canto 2.

social work; so in religion it is by associating themselves with Christian life, by joining in worship, by identifying themselves with its interests, that men will learn what Christianity is—and we Christians have to see to it that we do not put people off by our actions or by our manner. It is partly by the study of theology—yes—that we can come to the knowledge of the truth, not so much by apologetics, perhaps, as by working out an adequate Christian philosophy; but it is still more by feeling, by becoming sensible to whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are honest, whatsoever things are of good report, and by testing the facts and seeking experience in "hours of mortal moral strife,"[1] which alone reveal God aright.

[1] Clough, *Qui Laborat, Orat*, Poems (Macmillan, 1892), p. 85.

PART II

CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

CHAPTER V

CREATION

"From that known relation which God hath unto us as unto children, and unto all good things as unto effects whereof Himself is the principal cause, these axioms and laws concerning our duty have arisen."—HOOKER, *Ecclesiastical Polity*, Bk. I, chap. viii, § 7.

"Ὅ τε γὰρ Θεὸς δοκεῖ τὸ αἴτιον πᾶσιν εἶναι καὶ ἀρχή τις."
(For it would seem that God is the cause and source of all.)
ARISTOTLE, *Metaphysics*, I, ii.

WE have been speaking of religion and Christian life. A great claim is involved in all that has been said. We saw that we are placed here in time, and the movement of time compels us to act. A number of practical alternatives face us, and we have to take one or another. When the two ways part, we have to choose one; when the company of men divides, we have to range ourselves on this side or that. The issues are often those of great moral contrasts. The appeal is directly to the conscience, and in all that we have stressed Christianity is on the unpopular, but right, side.

So the apologetic we have dwelt upon has been the popular apologetic that aims at removing difficulties which matter practically. They arise in the consideration of the history of Christianity, from uncertainty as to its credentials—above all, from all that hinders us in coming to a right decision as to what we think of Christ. But the intellectual test is not, as a rule, the one men judge by. Even those arguments we have used are more appeals to history, to moral judgment, or to personal interest. Pure argument affects men little. The difficulties are practical; the reasons given are afterthoughts, rationalisations to justify actions when they have been done. "Reasoning," wrote Swift, "will never make a man correct an ill opinion which by reason he never

acquired."[1] But men will, and should, philosophise. All in degree, some with intense conviction, hold with Socrates that the unexamined life is no life to live;[2] and, if they do, we must have a philosophy for them and answers to their questions. Though each Christian, who must act, need not be able to give a reason for his acts, the Church as a whole must have a theology. Some among her members, on behalf of the others, must be able to give an answer to the problems of the world that are raised by the study of Natural Science, to the problems of man that are raised by the complications of civilisation and the experiences of political life, and to the problems of ethics, whether dealing with the springs of conduct or the practical casuistry of daily duty. An intellectual and speculative challenge is raised, and apologetics must meet this also. Therefore we need to consider the questions of Creation, Design, Conscience, and God. The usual order is to begin with these "proofs of Theism" which logically come first. We are following the order of experience, and though these come second for us, still they come.

Moreover, whether in the form of Pastoral Theology or Apologetic, Christianity, so far from being the opium, is the philosophy of the masses. "It is only," writes Dr. Rashdall, "in proportion as they become part of a system of religious teaching, and the possession of an organised religious community, that the ideas of philosophers really come home to the multitudes of men."[3] "If," wrote Coleridge, "the history of phrases in hourly currency among our peasants were traced, a person not previously aware of

[1] *Letter to a Young Clergyman.* Bohn's Standard Library (Bell, 1909), vol. iii, p. 215. The whole passage runs: "It is from such seminaries as these that the world is provided with the several tribes and denominations of freethinkers, who, in my judgment, are not to be reformed by arguments offered to prove the truth of the Christian religion, because reasoning will never make a man correct an ill opinion which by reason he never acquired."

[2] *Apology*, xxviii. 38. "Ὁ δὲ ἀνεξέταστος βίος οὐ βιωτὸς ἀνθρώπῳ."

[3] *Philosophy and Religion* (Duckworth, 1909), p. 148. Quoted, Q.T., p. 243.

the fact would be surprised at finding so large a number which three or four centuries ago were the exclusive properties of the universities and the schools; and at the commencement of the Reformation had been transferred from the school to the pulpit, and thus gradually passed to common life." [1] For these ideas are associated with practice by the Church, and the language of acts is better understood by the people than the mere language of words. Besides, used for men as they are, they appeal to the emotions and to the will as well as to the mind. Christian ideas entering into common speech are "taught by cottage dames" to young minds, even if they do float at random and children hear what sages would have died to learn.

> I speak of Plato and the Stagyrite
> And others many more.[2]

"Tertullian had good reason for his assertion," again wrote Coleridge, "that the simplest Christian (if indeed he be a Christian) knows more than the most accomplished irreligious philosopher." [3] Moreover, the Church has the means for the diffusion of this philosophy in her organisation, in her preaching, and in her worship. "That which men

[1] *Biographia Literaria*, ed. Shawcross (Oxford, 1907), vol. ii, chap. xvii, p. 40. Quoted, Q.T., p. 243.

[2] Dante, *Purgatorio*, iii, 43.

> "Io dico d'Aristotile e di Plato,
> E di molti altri."

[3] *Apology*, chap. xlvi. "Deum quilibet opifex Christianus et invenit et ostendit et exinde totum, quod in deo quæritur, re quoque assignat; licet Plato affirmet factitatorem universitatis neque inveniri facilem et inventum enarrari in omnes difficilem." (Every Christian labourer findeth out God and showeth Him, and hence really ascribeth to God all that in God is looked for, notwithstanding that Plato affirmeth that the Maker of the world is both hard to be found out, and, when found out, hard to be declared to all.) I have lost the reference to Coleridge, but, as Montaigne says (*Essays*, i, 25), "That which a man rightly knows and understands he is the full disposer of at his own full liberty, without any regard to the author from whom he took it, or fumbling over the leaves of his book."

by their utmost illumination have been able to learn," wrote Pascal, "this religion taught its infants." [1]

And philosophy addressed to the plain man has power. That is part of the secret of Socrates, of whom it was "said that he brought philosophy down from heaven to inhabit among men"; [2] of Aristotle, who declared that "the test of truth in matters of practice is to be found in the facts of life," [3] and that theories should be tested by comparison with them. A philosophy for the people must be lucid or they will not understand it. It must be broad based on a wide area of experience if it is to be practically intelligible.

But the mass of men are not trained in philosophy even to the extent of their natural powers; they are not accustomed to clear thought; they are not used to accurate generalisation; and Christianity assumes, or implies, certain principles as necessary for both life and understanding. What are some of these?

I

We may begin with the idea of the universality of law. We are so familiar with it—we who live in a society based on the assumption of it and speak a language whose phrases and vocabulary have been long moulded by it—that we do not

[1] *Pensées*, ed. Brunschvicg, 444. "Ce que les hommes, par leur plus grandes lumières, avaient pu connaître, cette religion l'enseignait à ses enfants."

[2] Addison, *Spectator*, No. 10.

[3] *Eth. Nic.*, X, viii, 12. The whole passage runs: "But the test of truth in matters of practice is to be found in the facts of life; for it is in them that the supreme authority lies. The theories that we have advanced should, therefore, be tested by comparison with the facts of life; and, if they agree with the facts, they should be accepted, but if they disagree they should be accounted as mere theories." (*Τὸ δ'ἀληθὲς ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς ἐκ τῶν ἔργων καὶ τοῦ βίου κρίνεται· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ τὸ κύριον. Σκοπεῖν δὴ τὰ προειρημένα χρὴ ἐπὶ τὰ ἔργα καὶ τὸν βίον ἐπιφέροντας, καὶ συνᾳδόντων μὲν τοῖς ἔργοις ἀποδεκτέον, διαφωνούντων δὲ λόγους ὑποληπτέον.*)

Cp. a fine passage in Walter Bagehot's "Letters on the French Coup d'État of 1851," *Literary Studies* (Dent's Everyman's Library), vol. ii, Letter iv, p. 305, of which I have quoted part in my *Why Men Believe* (S.P.C.K., 1921), p. 53.

realise the horror of savage life, of that of primitive man, or even that of the old Egyptian, Babylonian, Greek, or Roman civilisation. But it is realised by historians. "We have never been thoroughly frightened," writes Mr. Bevan. "The ancient world was frightened; there is the great difference." [1] It is known to economists. "Dryden had a dream," wrote Walter Bagehot, "of an early age 'when wild in woods the noble savage ran,' but 'when lone in woods the cringing savage crept' would have been more like all we know of that early, base, painful period." [2] Missionaries know it at first hand. "Europeans," writes Dr. Schweitzer, "will never be able to understand how terrible is the life of the poor creatures who pass their days in continual fear of the fetishes which can be used against them." [3] He has "seen the misery at close quarters." Mary Slessor—whose first victory for Christianity was that a perfectly innocent man was not killed but only "loaded with chains, placed in the women's yard, starved and then flogged, and his body cruelly cut in order to exorcise the powers of sorcery that were in him," whom she found "a bruised and bleeding heap of flesh lying unconscious by the post to which he was fastened," while the native women sat by "indifferent to his plight"—had "no patience," we read, "with the people who expounded the theory of the innocence of man outside the pale of civilisation. She

[1] Edwyn Bevan, *Hellenism and Christianity* (Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1921), p. 81.

[2] *Physics and Politics* (Kegan Paul, 1872), p. 55. He continues: "Not only had they no comfort, no convenience, not the very beginning of an epicurean life, but their mind within was as painful to them as the world without. It was full of fear. So far as the vestiges inform us, they were afraid of everything; they were afraid of animals, of certain attacks by near tribes, and of possible inroads from far tribes. But, above all things, they were frightened of the world; the spectacle of nature filled them with awe and dread. They fancied there were powers behind it which must be pleased, soothed, flattered, and this very often in a number of hideous ways."

[3] A. Schweitzer, *On the Edge of the Primeval Forest* (Black, 1922), p. 50. Quoted, Q.T., p. 308.

would tell them to go and live for a month in a West African harem." [1]

Philosophic doctrines of pluralism have their difficulties, even if they seem to be suggested by the variety and discord of the world as we know it; but the practical drawbacks of polytheism touch us more deeply. Between the lines of its poetry and behind the art of the ancient Pagan world we catch glimpses of very ugly things, which students bring out into the light of the common day in which they walked for the men of those times. "The dominant religious emotion was fear. Neither the gods loved men nor men the gods. They believed they existed, but must have often wished that they did not. Their whole time was passed in appeasing them. They were never sure that they were not suffering from the anger or jealousy of some god." [2] Mr. Bernard Shaw has, incidentally, given us a dramatic impression of this unreasoning fear in his *Cæsar and Cleopatra*. Nor is

[1] W. P. Livingstone, *Mary Slessor of Calabar* (Hodder & Stoughton, 1916), p. 69. Quoted, Q.T., p. 85.

Cp. F. B. Jevons, *Introduction to the Study of Religion* (Methuen, 1896), p. 110. "That the lowest savages are a perpetual prey to irrational terror, and believe sickness and death to be unnatural and to be the work in all cases of evil spirits, is a matter of common knowledge."

Cp. W. McDougall, *Social Psychology* (Methuen, 1908), p. 308. "Enough is now known of the primitive age of Ancient Greece and Rome to show that the great civilisations of these States took their rise among peoples bound hand and foot by religious custom and law as rigidly as any savages, and to show that the dominant religious emotion was fear," and he quotes this passage from Fustel de Coulange's *La Cité antique*, pp. 186–96, who has "drawn a vivid picture of the dominance of this religion of fear in Ancient Greece and Rome," showing how, "Ni les dieux n'aimaient l'homme, ni l'homme n'aimait ses dieux. Il croyait à leur existence, mais il aurait parfois voulu qu'ils n'existassent pas. . . . Il était occupé toute sa vie à les appaiser. . . . En effet, cette religion si compliquée était un source de terreurs pour les anciens," etc.

[2] Cp. T. R. Glover, *The Conflict of Religions in the Early Roman Empire*, 6th edition (Methuen, 1917), p. 109. "In Plutarch's day superstition was the real enemy to be crushed"; and p. 147: "To be rid of the whole dæmon-world, to have left the dæmons behind with their 'hatred of men,' their astrology, their immorality and cruelty, their sacrifices, and the terror of 'possession' and theolepsy and enchantment, was happiness in itself. 'We are above fate,' said Tatian, 'and, instead of dæmons that deceive, we have learnt one master who deceiveth not."

it so different in India to-day; missionaries, who know the country, seldom tell us all they know.

Think of what it means to be free from this fear!—for that we live under a universal reign of law has been impressed on us by Natural Science, whose first postulate is that for its particular study this must be assumed. Its conception of law has profoundly impressed our imagination, ranging as it does through the stars to the farthest confines of space, mightily holding all things together and ruling in all down to the minutest subdivisions of matter. But the conception was first practically taught to the world by Christianity. "This principle of Science—the unity of Nature—was taken over from the Christian doctrine of the unity of God." [1] Christianity inherited it from Judaism. It is significant that in the Jewish Book of Genesis the stars are not mysterious powers that "govern our conditions," but mere things created by God, which declare His glory and tell His handiwork. The Early Church showed a persistent and undying hostility to magic, bound up as it was with popular polytheism or Gnostic speculation, though even that was bound up with the idea that the demons also were subject to law and that

Die Hölle selbst hat ihre Rechte.[2]

Even if it be argued that the old polytheism, with its jangle of contradictory laws re-entered the Church in an attenuated form in saint-worship, the Church showed her power to reject it for the unity of God's rule at the Reformation, or to subject it to that rule at the Counter-Reformation.[3] So,

[1] H. M. Gwatkin, *The Knowledge of God* (T. & T. Clark, 1906), vol. ii, p. 273. Quoted in full, Q.T., p. 208.

[2] Goethe, *Faust*, scene iii.

"In Hell itself, then, laws are reckoned."

[3] A. Harnack, *Das Wesen des Christentums* (Leipzig, 1900), Zwölfte Vorlesung, "Die christliche Religion im griechischen Katholizismus," s. 136. "Er (der griechische Katholizismus) hat in dem grossen Gebiete, welches er einnimmt, in den Ländern des östlichen Mittelmeers und hinauf bis ans Eismeer, dem

too, in an age expecting miracle the Church argued that miracles themselves were worked by law, or, as Augustine said, that they were "not contrary to Nature but contrary to what we know in Nature, that against the highest law of Nature . . . God does nothing, because He does nothing against Himself": [1] a theory worked out explicitly in the Middle Ages by Aquinas, arguing that all Nature is the artistic product of Divine workmanship.[2]

Hooker, again—writing in an age of law when questions of government and jurisprudence, soon to be fought out in the Civil War, were already dominating men's minds—began his *Ecclesiastical Polity* with an examination of the nature of law. "All things," he says, "do work after a sort according to law—the being of God is a kind of law unto His working: God is, therefore, a law both to Himself and to all other things besides." [3] In this way the Church prepared the way for the later development of Natural Science that took its great leap forward in the seventeenth century, making it easy for men to assimilate, though it seemed to go dead contrary to traditional teaching, to the idea of miracle. As Comte showed, "the monotheistic belief of the

Heidentum und dem Polytheismus überhaupt ein Ende gemacht. Der entscheidende Sieg hat sich vom 3 bis zum 6 Jahrhundert vollzogen und so vollzogen, dass die Götter Griechenlands wirklich untergegangen sind, sang—und klanglos untergegangen. . . . Dass sie einen beträchtlichen Teil ihrer Kraft vorher den kirchlichen Heiligen abgegeben haben, mag hier nur angedeutet sein. . . . Der Sieg über den Hellenismus ist eine Grossthat der östlichen Kirche, von der sie noch immer zehrt." (See also p. 143.) (Greek Catholicism . . . in the great domain which it embraces, the countries of the eastern part of the Mediterranean, and northwards to the Arctic Ocean, made an end of heathenism and polytheism. The decisive victory was achieved from the third to the sixth century, and so effectually achieved that the gods of Greece really perished—perished unwept for and unsung. . . . I may just point out that before dying they transferred a considerable portion of their power to the saints of the Church. . . . The victory over Hellenism is an achievement of the Eastern Church on which it still subsists.)

[1] *De Civitate Dei*, Bk. XXI, chap. viii, and *Contra Faustum*, xxvi, § 3. Quoted, Q.T., p. 99.

[2] *Summa*, Pt. I, Quæst. cv, art. 6, and *Summa contra Gentiles* Bk. III, chap. xcix. Also quoted, Q.T., p. 99.

[3] Bk. I, chap. ii, § 2.

Christian Middle Ages, in destroying Polytheism, removed the chief obstacle in the way of all scientific explanation of the universe." [1] "It is plain matter of history," writes Professor Gwatkin, "that modern Science is the nursling of Christianity." [2]

The assimilation of modern Natural Science by the Church, and the necessary restatement of theology, has not, as a matter of fact, proved so difficult. Evolution had been anticipated in principle, and often almost in word, by such Fathers as Origen, Gregory of Nyssa, and Augustine, who showed great freedom in the interpretation of the creation narratives in Genesis.[3] The Church herself of recent years has readjusted her position—on the whole, very quickly. The difficulty has rather been that the student of Natural Science

[1] Cp. J. Chevalier, *Descartes* (Plon, Paris, 1923), p. 101. "En effet comme l'a bien montré Comte (*Cours de Philosophie positive*, 53e et 54e leçons), la croyance monothéiste du moyen âge chrétien, en renversant la polythéisme, écarta l'obstacle principal qui s'opposait à toute explication scientifique de l'univers, en même temps que l'organisation catholique, en se substituant à l'individualisme des cités grecques, préparait, par l'unité de la croyance, la grande œuvre collective d'édification de la science, conçue tout à la fois comme un moyen de connaissance et comme un moyen d'action."

[2] *The Knowledge of God* (T. & T. Clark, 1906), vol. ii, p. 273. Quoted, Q.T., p. 208. It is true that the influence of modern Natural Science has greatly modified our view of the nature of miracle. In days when miracles were expected, comparatively little stress was laid on them and still less criticism applied to them. With the increasing sense of the universal reign of law a change came. Deists attacked them as interferences with the order of Nature. Christian theists appealed to them as witnessing to the power of God over His creation. To-day they are less regarded as proofs. We should not argue from miracles to the claim of Christ, but should rather start with the claim involved in His person and argue that miracles are its natural consequence. Moreover, the belief that they have been less frequent than we had supposed in the world's history is in accordance with the judgment of a profounder psychology. For we realise that among men it is the sign of the highest minds to work normally by rule and to leave others free to work, and only to work by exceptional acts when an occasion makes it necessary.

Cp. J. R. Illingworth, *Divine Immanence* (Murray, 1898), p. 110. Quoted, Q.T., p. 103.

[3] Cp. C. Gore, *Belief in God* (Murray, 1921), p. 10. "Augustine himself, as is well known, following St. Gregory of Nyssa, had propounded the view that God in the beginning created only germs or causes of the forms of life, which were afterwards to be developed in gradual course." (*De Gen. ad Lit.* v, 5 and 23.)

has been so fully occupied in making and describing new discoveries, and the ordinary man so impressed by their extent and their wonders, that they have had little time or inclination to think of what lies behind them. They have not realised the simple truth of metaphysics, the science that should follow immediately on the heels of physics —namely, that description is not explanation. You may describe how a thing happened, but you have not explained why it happened. To trace out causes and enumerate effects does not tell you what is the relation of cause to effect. To catalogue and observe results, to sort up the conditions that went before, tells you nothing of the nature of causation, or of why the effects followed that did. The fact that we have noticed that the sun has risen every morning may be a good reason for believing that it will to-morrow and for planning what you will do when it does ; but it is no proof that it will.[1]

Again, students are well aware that a law is a generalised observation, but the ordinary man is not. He does not realise that our " Laws of Nature " exist only in our own minds. He has not read the apologetic of the eighteenth century and asked with Bishop Butler, " What are the laws by which matter acts upon matter, but certain effects ; which some, having observed to be frequently repeated, have reduced to general rules ? "[2] Nor has he realised with twentieth-century psychologists that what is called explanation " is only description in terms more general and more abstract than those of simple description."[3] And, even if he had had the alternatives of nominalism and realism put

[1] H. M. Gwatkin, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 48. " The fact that it has followed (the phenomenon ' a ') a thousand times is not logical proof that it will follow again ; only we believe it will. If M. is a duke, this is not logical proof that he will not pick my pocket, only I believe he will not."

[2] *Sermon* xv, " On the Ignorance of Man."

Cp. H. M. Gwatkin, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 24. " The ' law ' of the physical world is not a self-acting force : it is only a theory of our own to describe sequences imperfectly known." See also p. 46.

[3] W. McDougall, *An Outline of Psychology* (Methuen, 1923), p. 11.

before him, his mind has not been such as will ask whether laws can exist really unless they exist in the mind and will of God, or whether " the being of God " is not " a kind of law to His working " and His " eternal decree is that we term an eternal law." [1]

II

The idea of evolution is part of our common stock of thought to-day. It was popularised by the work of Darwin. It has been impressed on our minds by the rapid progress of the world under the industrial system and the extension of capitalism. But these factors have, after all, only made familiar to the mass of men what was involved in a principle very old in philosophy though not generally grasped by those who have thus accepted the idea of Evolution. The principle I mean is that which Aristotle emphasised in the *Politics*—that ἡ φύσις τέλος ἐστι, the nature of a thing is seen in its final issue.[2]

He said it of the city, but it is true generally. The wonderful forms of the prize chrysanthemum as we see them in the Horticultural Society's shows were evolved from a little simple daisy-like plant, but they were all there from the beginning potentially.[3] The oak was in the acorn; the telephone and telegraph were implicit in the discovery of electricity when amber was first rubbed; the modern orchestra was involved in the music of the twanged bow-string, or, if the Greeks were right, when Apollo first discovered and touched the remains of the dead tortoise.[4]

[1] Hooker, *Ecclesiastical Polity*, Bk. I, chap. ii, § 2.

[2] Bk. I, § 2. " The nature is the end. For what each thing is when fully developed we call its nature, whether we are speaking of a man, a horse, or a family."

[3] Cp. C. Singer, in *The Legacy of Greece* (Oxford, 1922), p. 178. " ' A plant,' he [Theophrastus] says, ' has power of germination in all its parts, for it has life in them all, wherefore we should regard them not for what they are but for what they are becoming.' "

[4] Cp. J. R. Illingworth, *Personality Human and Divine*, Bampton Lectures, 1894 (Macmillan), p. 110. H. Rashdall, *Theory of Good and Evil* (Oxford,

This perhaps, even if not at once thought of, presents little difficulty to the ordinary man; but what he cannot get out of his head is the idea that somehow a lowly or simple origin discredits the final result. That the idea of God has been evolved from the vague and crude beliefs of primitive men seems to him to make it a false one still. Because the religion of tribes in the childhood of the world was sacramental, he regards Christian Sacraments as survivals of superstition instead of asking whether Christ did not meet a universal need of man which is strongest in the highest. Even if the wildest Freudian theories could be proved and religion be shown to owe its origin to father-fixations and Œdipus-complexes, the point is not whether they are abnormal but whether the religion itself is true.[1] As Dr. Inge says, "It tells us nothing about Newton to know that he once had a tail."[2]

So if all our sentiments can be analysed as combinations of primary instincts of flight, repulsion, curiosity, pugnacity, self-abasement, of those of reproduction, acquisition, or construction; if all our action is the outcome of primary emotions of fear, disgust, wonder, anger, negative or positive

1907), Bk. III, chap. iv, § 1, vol. ii, p. 356. *Conscience and Christ* (Duckworth, 1916), p. 10. *Philosophy and Religion* (Duckworth, 1909), pp. 19 and 64. Sir Thomas Browne, *Religio Medici*. All quoted in my *Lectures in Hyde Park*, "Why we Believe in God" (S.P.C.K., 1925), p. 87.

[1] Cp. R. H. Thouless, *Introduction to the Psychology of Religion* (Cambridge, 1923), p. 138. "It is possible that the Freudians who insist that it [the sexual instinct] is a factor of such importance are in the position of botanists who, having dug round the roots of an oak-tree, have discovered the remains of the acorn from which it grew, and insist that in this and this alone lies all the significance of the oak; and that the other scientists who spend their lives in the investigation of the structure of the tree itself, the artists who rejoice in its beauty, and the carpenters who use its wood, are all alike living in a fool's paradise, because they have not realised that the oak is a decayed acorn and nothing more."

[2] *Science, Religion, and Reality* (The Sheldon Press, 1925), p. 350. The whole passage runs: "The fact that gill-slits and a tail exist in the human embryo tells us something about the remote past of humanity, but nothing about its present or future. It tells us nothing about Newton to know that he once had a tail. Religion in the higher sense, which alone seriously concerns us, is a phenomenon of civilised humanity. We do not care much how it began; we want to understand it as it is or may be."

self-feeling, of the tender emotion, of sex, herd, or acquisitive desires—it really does not matter.[1] If Science begins with the instinct of curiosity we are not going to shut down our telephones and leave off listening in. Because man could once only count up to three we are not going to burn our books of mathematics. If the herd instinct only led men to congregate in tribes from fear we are not going to avoid all intercourse with our fellow-men, destroy modern society, and retire to the Nitrian desert. Even if our ideas of beauty *did* begin from sexual impulse they have got far beyond it now. If our ideas of morals *did* arise from the survival of those who had them and so proved the fittest to survive, the question is, Are they sound to-day? Because the parental instinct is strong in dogs and cats we do not propose to expose our children and dismiss "the cruelty man." When put like this, of course, anyone can understand Aristotle's dictum that the nature is the end; unfortunately the majority do not have it put to them. They assume that religion and morals are explained, as they would say, and explained away if their Evolution is traced back to their simple beginnings, and the steps of their appearing as they are now are described: unless, indeed, they have the good fortune to be brought up as Christians and so to be delivered beforehand from these fallacies.

Further, Evolution makes us realise that the higher is already implied in what is considered lower; or, rather, we should say that what is fully developed later was there from the beginning. It is a question not of higher and lower, but of implicit and explicit, of latent and worked out, of simple and elaborate. Every result must have an adequate cause. Spirit cannot come from matter; the animate cannot be the product of the inanimate. If life comes from

[1] W. McDougall, *Social Psychology* (Methuen, 18th edition, 1923), p. 264. "It should, however, be remembered that the humble nature of the remote origins of anything we justly admire or revere in nowise detracts from its intrinsic worth or dignity, and that the ascertainment of those origins need not, and should not, diminish by one jot our admiration or reverence."

matter, that only means that matter is alive.[1] Consciousness cannot be developed from unconsciousness. *Ex nihilo nihil fit:* nothing can come of nothing. "Even the atheist," writes Dr. Gwatkin, "will hardly suppose that in the beginning there was nothing at all, so that nothing created something."[2] There must be a first cause which has in itself all that is evolved later—a personal, feeling, thinking, willing God.

One other mistake the doctrine of evolution anticipates. Many people think the world is continually growing worse. Horace said:

> Ætas parentum, peior avis, tulit
> Nos nequiores, mox daturos
> Progeniem vitiosiorem,[3]

and Dr. Johnson declared that subordination was sadly broken down in his age.[4] In more popular forms to-day it generally takes the form of complaints about servants. Of course there is development of evil as well as of good. There is evolution of corruption and falsehood. A wrong principle develops in evil results. But the idea that the force of the world is gradually being spent, that the clock

[1] Cp. H. M. Gwatkin, *The Knowledge of God* (T. & T. Clark, 1907), vol. i, p. 16. "Collateral products and psychophysical parallelism are words to conjure with; but no conjuring can get conscience out of matter."

P. 18. "Life is life, with all its mystery; and that mystery is in no way diminished by any particular theory of its origin. If it did arise from matter, the right conclusion would not be that life is less wonderful, but that matter is more wonderful than we supposed."

[2] *Ibid.*, vol. i, p. 82. Cp. Edwyn Bevan, *Hellenism and Christianity* (Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1921), p. 258. "Extreme materialism affirmed that Mind was really only a form of Matter; this is now generally perceived to have been nonsense."

[3] *Odes*, Bk. III, vi, transl. Philip Francis, 1747.

> "More vicious than their fathers' age
> Our sires begot the present race,
> Of manners impious, bold and base;
> And yet, with crimes to us unknown,
> Our sons shall mark the coming age their own."

[4] Boswell's *Life*, April 10, 1778.

is running down, that each age is a weaker edition of the age before, is one that Evolution also preserves us from. This, too, was anticipated by Christianity. The ancient world put its Golden Age in the past; Christianity has always declared that man was formed from the dust and has looked forward to the New Jerusalem. Paganism believed that the gods once lived on earth with men, but that now even Pan was dead; the Church announced that God, Who in sundry times and in divers manners had revealed Himself, spoke in the latter days by His Son, Who will come to judge the quick and the dead. Heresy explained each revelation of God as an emanation weaker than the last; the Nicene faith, as Mr. Bosanquet has pointed out, irrevocably settled the question of Evolution when it said that the Son proceeding from the Father was of one substance with Him. It settled the question of pessimism at the same time. Christian dogma, he writes, "denies the rule of progress to be that the first is the best, the second a little less perfect, and the third more imperfect still." [1]

These dogmas are not merely interesting as speculations; they have practical consequences as well. All lower things (as we call them) are potentially the higher. Every natural instinct, every passion that lies at the ground of our nature, is capable of sublimation. Evil lies not in the instincts and passions themselves, but in the will that refuses to sublimate

[1] *A History of Æsthetic* (Sonnenschein, 1892), p. 132. "We should note, to begin with, that in the fourth century, some two generations after the death of Plotinus, the great step from emanation to evolution was irrevocably made by Christian dogma in the settlement of the Homoousian dispute. Whether the idea is, or is not, in the sense of the Synoptic Gospels, it certainly marks the final and essential abandonment of heathenism, and the climax to which Platonism and Neo-Platonism had gradually been approximating. There can be developed, it affirms, out of the one supreme principle of the world, a progressive and active content, which does not lose anything, nor become secondary, by the fact of this development. However verbal or pedantic this may appear to us to-day, it is, if contrasted with the ideas of the greatest Greeks, excepting, perhaps, Aristotle, a necessary protest against a pessimistic limitation. It denies the rule of progress to be that the first is best, the second a little less perfect, and the third more imperfect still."

them and lead their evolution into the higher channels that show their true natures. Evil is not a thing; it is a misuse of things in themselves good, a corruption and disintegration of them. We can best understand this, perhaps, if we think of disease. Disease cannot exist by itself; it must have a body with some health in it to prey upon. Disease absolute and complete is death. The worst patient has some health or he could not be diseased. So you cannot think of absolute evil. "Vice at its worse," said Plotinus, "is still human, being mixed with something opposite to itself."[1] "A thing in which there is no good," said Augustine, "cannot exist."[2] If on the gates of hell it can be written

> Dinanzi a me non fur cose create,
> Se non eterne, ed io eterno duro,[3]

God is present within them in whom all things consist. They will not prevail against His Church, and there is no need to write

> Lasciate ogni speranza, voi ch' entrate.[4]

So, too, Nature is good and not, *pace* Mr. Squeers and his like, "a rum 'un,"[5] but we want always to remember that

[1] *Enneads*, I, viii, 13. Quoted as a "fine saying" by W. R. Inge, *Christian Mysticism* (Methuen, 1899), p. 96.

[2] *De Civ. Dei*, xix, 13. "Sicut ergo est quædam vita sine dolore, dolor autem sine aliqua vita esse non potest. . . . Quapropter est natura, in qua nullum est vel etiam in qua nullum esse malum potest; esse autem natura, in qua nullum bonum sit, non potest. Proinde nec ipsius diaboli natura, in quantum natura est, malum est; sed perversitas eum malam facit." (So, therefore, there is a certain life without sickness, but sickness without any life cannot exist. . . . Wherefore there is a nature in which there neither is nor can be any evil, but there can be none in which there is no good. So not even the nature of the devil in so far as it is nature is evil, but misuse makes it so.)

Cp. also *Confessions*, Bk. VII, chap. xii. *Enchir. ad Laurent.*, xiv. Quoted, Q.T., p. 301.

[3] "Before me things create were none, save things
Eternal, and eternal I endure."

[4] "All hope abandon, ye who enter here."

[5] C. Dickens, *Nicholas Nickleby*, chap. xlv. "It only shows what Natur' is, sir," said Mr. Squeers. "She's a rum 'un, is Natur'."

the nature of a thing is that which it is at its highest. The most characteristic form shows its nature—not the average, still less the aberration or its degenerate features. Human nature is shown completely in man as he should and will be. It is in that which distinguishes him from animals more than in that which he has in common with them.

So when men ask, "Shouldn't we follow Nature more?" we must tell them to get quite clear what they mean. There are certain words which Hooker described as "bugs wordes because what they mean you do not indeed as you ought apprehend."[1] To use a word first in one sense and then without any warning to use it in another—what logicians call equivocation—is only too common. And when we are talking of human nature, the fault is serious; for man, having a will of his own, is fallen, and human nature, as we know it, is corrupt, and something very different from human nature as it is in itself. Practically we recognise this. If we want to appeal to a man's better feelings we say, "Be a man"; as Mr. Chesterton has said somewhere, no one, even if it could understand him, would think of trying to soften the heart of the reptile by saying, "Be a crocodile." But sometimes the popular use of the term is opposite, and then the case is serious. It is only too common to hear men excuse—well, perhaps it is always good to find excuses for others—to hear them *justify* carnal sin on the ground that it is "natural." Certain things we share with the beasts, but what makes man man is that which he has but they have not—namely, power of reflection and self-control. For a beast to live as a beast is natural; for a man it is unnatural and beastly.[2]

[1] *Works*, vol. i, p. 222, note. "There are certaine wordes, as Nature, Reason, Will, and such like, which wheresoever you find named, you suspect them presently as bugs wordes, because what they mean you do not indeed as you ought apprehend. You have heard that man's Nature is corrupt, his Reason blind, his Will perverse. Whereupon under colour of condemning corrupt Nature, you condemn Nature, and so in the rest."

[2] Cp. Augustine, *De Civ. Dei*, xii, 1. "Omne autem vitium naturæ nocet ac per hoc contra naturam est." (Every fault injures nature and is therefore contrary to nature.)

So, again, all games and sports are natural. It is quite a healthy thing to enjoy

> The wild joys of living, the leaping from rock up to rock,
> The strong rending of boughs from the fir-tree, the cool silver shock
> Of the plunge in a pool's living water.[1]

It is of human nature to love sport. The delight of the bather, as you

> Here into pure green depth drop down from lofty ledges,[2]

the excitement of the chase, the rest in the sultry heat of noonday, the victory over the mountain peak, the following up "till the fields ring again and again," the "strife without anger and art without malice" of the football field, and the "days of fresh air in the rain and the sun," the meal by the roadside, the rush through the air down the long white road, the rhythmic motion of bodies swaying to the throb of music, the song by the camp-fire, and the rest at night when the tired body gets its will—all these are natural and good; but the moment they are put in the first place they change. The cult of games in schools with its subversion of all rational standards, the Philistinism of the society that thinks and talks of nothing but golf or hunting, the mental barrenness of preoccupation with cricket scores, the restlessness of the globe-trotter, the selfish habits of the "road-hog," the vulgarity to which the humorous song can descend, the craze dancing may become, the coarseness induced by over-eating and sleeping—are all unnatural in that they are from the purpose of Man's creation, and show what happens when the lesser is made an end in itself to the exclusion of the greater.

So, once more, if we realise that things are not evil in

[1] Browning, *Saul*, ix, *Works* (Smith, Elder, 1895), vol. i, p. 275.
[2] Clough, *The Bothie of Tober-na-vuolich*, iii, *Poems* (Macmillan, 1892), p. 217.

themselves, we shall have killed beforehand all false ideas of asceticism and puritanism. It is not always true that "a corruptible body weigheth down the soul."[1] As soon as it is realised that things are not evil in themselves a worth is given to the world now seen to be sacramental. Art can be valued for Art's sake, though it becomes a greater thing when no longer isolated from society, learning, and religion. Sport is sanctified and seen to be good in itself, and can be valued without any utilitarian thought of a future Waterloo, though Bacon may still be right when he says that "tennis is a game of no use in itself, but of great use in respect it maketh a quick eye and a body ready to put itself into all postures."[2] Indeed, the Christian gains a singular freedom to let himself go and enjoy all the good things of God's world, because he recognises that they are His, and, with his habit of self-control, feels safe from the fear of misusing, or being mastered by, them.

Everything is capable of sublimation, or, as we should have said in the old-fashioned Church language, of sanctification. It is not natural to live as the beasts. All things are good in themselves unless we choose them at the expense of higher things; these are the practical consequences of belief in law and in Evolution. The philosophic basis of these three practical consequences may not be easy to grasp by the ordinary man. But they are assumed by the Christian creed, which declares that God made the world and saw that it was good. This idea was, in the childhood of the world, admirably diffused by the Jewish stories of Genesis. The Church took it over, adding her doctrine of creation by the Word immanent in all things, who was incarnate in Christ, by Whom all things were made. She ruled out all theories of creation by emanations or inferior divinities, speculations which among the second-century Gnostics led to asceticism because the world was considered evil in itself; or to licence

[1] Wisdom, ix, 15.

[2] *Advancement of Learning*, *Works* (Routledge, 1905), p. 97

because it was held that earthly things had nothing to do with God and that matter could not contaminate spirit. She ruled out Pantheism, which said that Nature, good and evil, was God, by teaching that evil lay not in things but in the will, in the use man made of things God had created. God was distinguished from His creation. In this the Christian Church gained a signal victory over a philosophy that always tended to obscure the difference of good and evil. "The idea of creation," declares Professor Harnack, "triumphed in spite of all, and with it Christianity fought her way to a real victory." [1]

III

One other point remains to be considered. The power of forming abstract ideas is one that develops comparatively late, but it makes all the difference to the adolescent as he acquires it. It opens out his world, and gives him an insight into things he had not realised before. It enables him to imagine things other than he sees, and, more important still, it enables him to work with figures and symbols which deal with facts that imagination fails to picture.

So the human race has made great advances whenever it has realised that it is not necessary to picture all you deal with. When men learned to count, and abstracted the notion of number from collections of things, they laid the foundations of mathematics with all its wonderful after-results in astronomy, navigation, mechanics, and commerce. With the invention of money, trade took the place of barter, and accumulation of capital, with all its enormous advantages for the people, was made possible. With the substitution of written figures for coins, banking transactions on a scale that was necessary for the rapidly enlarging world were

[1] *Das Wesen des Christentums* (Leipzig, 1900), s. 143. "Der Schöpfungsgedanke hat doch triumphiert, und damit hat die Christlichkeit einen wirklichen Sieg erfochten."

established. It all depended on men working with symbols representing quantities that could not be accumulated or shifted about, quantities that could not be conceived as they were. The wonderful growth of modern Natural Science involves working with quantities unimaginably small as well as inconceivably big.

But what men have long known practically is still a difficulty to them in speculation. They still think it is irrational to believe a thing that you can't understand. "How can a man believe what he can't conceive?" they ask. "You can't form any idea of the world beginning. What was God doing before He created the world?" With Mr. Ephraim Jackson they declare that "the cosmogony or creation of the world has puzzled the philosophers of all ages";[1] and it is no answer to them to point out that you can't form any idea of the world not beginning either, of space being limited or unlimited.[2] Such considerations drive most merely into agnosticism. But they will understand it when put practically rather than speculatively. They will acknowledge that you believe in men though you understand no one fully. They will see from practical experience, even if they are not mathematicians accustomed to work with π and ι and ∞, that we constantly work with images and symbols, and are justified in so doing.

This is assumed and so taught implicitly in the Christian doctrine of a future life. Confessedly we cannot picture it. There is nothing in our thought that has not been first in experience, and our experience is limited to this life and to

[1] Goldsmith, *Vicar of Wakefield*, chaps. xiv and xxv.

[2] Cp. Bacon, *Novum Organum*, I, xlviii, *Works* (Routledge, 1905), p. 266. "The human understanding is unquiet; it cannot stop or rest, and still presses onward, but in vain. Therefore it is that we cannot conceive of any end or limit to the world, but always as of necessity it occurs to us that there is something beyond. Neither, again, can it be conceived how eternity has flowed down to the present day. . . . The like subtlety arises touching the infinite divisibility of lines, from the same inability of thought to stop."

Cp. Lucretius, *De Rerum Natura*, i, 958.

"Omne quod est igitur nulla regione viarum finitumst," ff.

its conditions.[1] So we have to describe it by symbols, which even at their best when drawn, as by Dante, from sound and from light, are inadequate, and when shaped in concrete forms of jewels and harps and cities are easily criticised. But if the thought of the life to come is to be kept in our minds it must so be pictured. If it is continually to prompt our actions subconsciously and make us do all *sub specie æternitatis*, we must from time to time bring it deliberately into our consciousness. It is wise and right, therefore, to sing of Jerusalem the Golden, with its unknown social joys, lest the thought of it fade out of our mind, and so in our actions we lose the sense of "worth while," which Mill saw was the great stimulus to effort gained by the theist.[2] People are sometimes surprised at finding how little the thought of a future life enters into their minds. Questionnaires have revealed the fact that a very small percentage think about it at all.[3] Good people are often troubled at finding out the fact, and, viewed from the purely logical point of view, the arguments which are there affect the mass of men very little when set forth. So they often think they do not believe as they should and are distressed. But by the practical test clearly they believe. They begin things of which they will never in this life see the end; they work for institutions just because they will continue after they have left the world; they suffer loss rather than offend against principles; they count the temporal as of no weight against the eternal; they utterly refuse to say, "Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow

[1] "Nihil est in intellectu nisi prius fuerit in sensu," to which Leibnitz (*Nouveaux Essais*, Bk. II, chap. i) added, "excipe, nisi ipse intellectus" (except the mind itself).

[2] *Three Essays on Religion*, "Theism" (Longmans, 1874), p. 250. "But the benefit [of the belief in immortality] consists less in the presence of any specific hope than in the enlargement of the general scale of the feelings; the loftier aspirations being no longer in the same degree checked and kept down by a sense of the insignificance of human life—by the disastrous feeling of 'not worth while.'"

[3] Cp. F. C. S. Schiller, *Humanism* (Macmillan, 1903). "The Desire for Immortality" and "Ethics and Immortality," pp. 228–65. Cp. my *Why Men Believe* (S.P.C.K., 1921), p. 68.

we die." Judged by this practical test many a secularist believes in the world to come; many an agnostic finds he does believe in a future life that he finds inconceivable.

IV

We are now in a position to consider the ætiological or first-cause argument for belief in God—to consider it apologetically, that is—for we have cleared up some of the preliminary obstacles which prevent ordinary men finding any force in it. We have examined some of the great principles that it involves. We may argue for the necessity of a first or originating cause, for Aristotle's prime mover, from the observed universality of the reign of law, with effect continually leading back to cause before it till we arrive at a source.[1]

We can argue that this cause is one, from the interaction of causes in the world; that "we cannot have a thorough knowledge of any part without knowing the whole";[2] that to know the "flower in the crannied wall" is to "know what God and man is";[3] that "by long circuit of deduction it may be that even all truth out of any truth may be concluded."[4]

We can point out that the idea of creation is not upset by theories of evolution, since they only decide *how* God created the world, and if our description was wrong it does

[1] As I have tried to do in my *Lectures in Hyde Park*, i. "Why we believe in God" (S.P.C.K., 1925), Lecture I.

[2] Butler, Sermon xv, 6, "On the Ignorance of Man," *Works* (Macmillan, 1920), vol. i, p. 192. "And, since there appears such a subordination and reference of the several parts [of the universe] to each other, as to constitute it properly one administration or government, we cannot have a thorough knowledge of any part without knowing the whole."

[3] Tennyson. Cp. Pascal, *Pensées*, ed. Brunschvicg, No. 72. "Les parties du monde ont toutes un tel rapport et un tel enchaînement l'une avec l'autre que je crois impossible de connaître l'une sans l'autre et sans le tout." (The different parts of the world are so related and linked to one another that I hold it impossible to know one without the other and without the whole.)

[4] Hooker, *Ecclesiastical Polity*, Bk. II, chap. i, § 2.

not alter the fact that He made it, since description is not explanation. It may even be argued that it brings Him much nearer if He is continually working in its processes. We can assert with confidence that even if the best things in the world, art, society, heroism, philosophy, religion, are based upon primary instincts it does not matter. They are just as good and true, for God had them in His mind when He began.

Finally, we can repeat with confidence that the argument has great practical value in showing God as self-existent, one, almighty, creator of heaven and earth, but that it goes no farther. It only shows Him as force, and needs other considerations to build up a fuller and more adequate idea of His nature.

These we will go on to consider.

CHAPTER VI

ORDER AND DESIGN

"I had rather beleeve all the Fables in the *Legend*, and the *Talmud*, and the *Alcoran*, then that this universall Frame, is without a Minde."—BACON, *Essayes*, xvi, "Of Atheisme."

THE argument that we must believe in God because of the evidence of order and design that we see in the world round us is closely connected with all that we have been saying about the necessity of a first cause. Indeed, that is generally called the cosmological argument, to the puzzlement of beginners in apologetics, as they, knowing that κόσμος means "order" in Greek, are naturally more inclined to give that title to the argument from the orderly disposition of things round them; and, knowing that the Greek for "cause" is αἴτιος, understand better when the other is called the ætiological. But, as we have seen, the two cannot be separated. We have already anticipated much that belongs to this lecture, and the rigid use of labels is apt to make us keep apart things which cannot really be isolated.

Briefly, the arguments from order and design, the cosmological and teleological arguments, are that the evidence that part fits part in the world argues the existence of mind in the Creator, and that adaptation of means to ends argues purpose and will in the maker and upholder of the world, just as a watch argues a watchmaker, and one who had a purpose in making it, that of telling the time.

But I think our chief feeling in reading only a small part of what has been written on the subject is one of surprise that what has been put so convincingly, and with such a wealth of illustration, in all ages from the days of Socrates

or the times of Cicero, by mediæval thinkers, and ever since to modern times, produces so little real effect on men—nay, fails to excite any particular interest. We somehow feel rather tired of it, and it is met with even greater indifference by those to whom it is addressed. The popular idea, or excuse for not considering it, is that it is discredited by the advance of Natural Science. "That's Paley's old argument," they say, "and Paley is out of date—a 'back number'"; or, if slightly better read, they declare that "Kant disposed of that argument long ago." But it is not only impatience that tosses it aside; many feel, even if they have not thought it out, that it involves a difficult conception of God working away to set things right in the world that He has made a mess of in creating. For they do not think of it as man's perverseness that He is reconciling; they feel that the idea, as put to them, implies a God dealing with difficult and intractable matter which somehow defies Him, with which He has to make the best of a bad job—a dualism which, if they come to see it, they are right in rejecting. Even if they do not see the difficulty, they feel the age-long trouble of Nature, "red in tooth and claw." They find glib arguments about evidences of design inadequate to still their disquietude at the disorder and suffering in the world.

Let us frankly admit that it is inadequate—by itself; it needs restating. Many of the old illustrations of design have been shown to be inaccurate by modern biology. It would probably be better to turn the argument round and, instead of trying to prove a God planning the world from evidences of purpose, to lay stress on the impossibility of attributing the order of things we know to chance. When Kant is quoted as saying that the argument only proves a manipulator of existing material and not a creator, we may remind the objector that he also spoke of it as "deserving to be mentioned with all respect," and as one that it would be "hopeless to attempt to rob of the authority it has always

enjoyed." [1] We may point out that what he taught us to see is that Natural Science is inadequate to the task of proving the existence of God; for that he fell back on the authority of the practical reason, and laid stress on the moral law within as giving a witness greater than that of the starry heavens above. We may point out that the argument must be taken with others, and that its particular lack—namely, that of power to show a creator—was anticipated by what we considered in our last chapter. We may explain that their dualistic idea of God working with the intractable matter is a false one; we saw that He must not be thought of as outside the world as the Deists of the eighteenth century pictured Him, but as immanent also, working out in His creation what was in His will from the beginning. We may remind them, too, that there is more to follow, that there are other elements in human nature to which God reveals Himself, and by which we can find Him out; that they provide the major grounds of conviction, for which reason we leave them to the end. In other words, before the argument can tell, man must be educated and trained in other arts than that of mere reasoning. There are certain moral, emotional, and intellectual pre-requisites to feeling its weight. There must be, first, a readiness to give consideration to higher things, a setting of the will to seek the things that are above. There must, secondly, be hopefulness of character, the attitude towards life that gives depth of feeling and energy to grapple with difficulties. And, thirdly, there must be a sure moral judgment in estimating values such as will lead to firm convictions as to what really matters in the world. As in so many other cases, the issue is not decided on the immediate field of battle, and the victory is won elsewhere.

[1] *Critique of Pure Reason*, "Transcendental Dialectic," Bk. II, chap. iv; translation in *Selections from the Literature of Theism*. A. Caldecott and H. R. Mackintosh (T. & T. Clark, 1904), pp. 213, 217. Quoted, Q.T., pp. 47, 48.

I

The first requisite is a readiness to turn the attention to higher things. People say: "Science is straightforward and intelligible; I can't understand all this theology." In a sense this is very true; the study of Natural Science does give very definite results. The order of physical nature is uniform—at any rate, that is the assumption of Physics—and it is true at least over the greater area of its order. You can experiment with things as you cannot with human beings; you can get great, if not absolute, certainty in your results; moreover, you can store up the records of your results and they accumulate. The field of observation seems inexhaustible both in the infinitely great and in the infinitely small. The wonderful advance, too, in Natural Science during the last three hundred years has made it loom very large in our outlook. Besides, there is always a satisfaction in dealing with tangible objects. As Dr. Johnson said, "Every man thinks meanly of himself for not having been a soldier," [1] except, possibly, those who have been in the Army. Every student has, I suppose, felt "out of it" when watching sports on a summer afternoon. The dissatisfaction of Faust in his study when he felt that all theory was grey [2] is experienced in degree by us all, and that not seldom.

[1] Boswell's *Life*, April 10, 1778. Cp. Plato, *Republic*, Bk. VI, 494. "Then the multitude cannot be philosophical."—"It cannot."
"And consequently the professors of philosophy are sure to be condemned by it."—"They are."
So of Trimalchio we are told, when he ordered his tomb (not in S. Praxed's church but in a vineyard), that "this inscription his tombstone was put on":
"He began life as a poor man, died a millionaire, and never listened to a lecture on philosophy." Quoted, A. Gwynn, *Roman Education* (Oxford, 1926), p. 142. W. D. Lowe, *Petronii Cœna Trimalchionis*, 71 (Deighton Bell, 1905), p. 150.
"G. Pompeius Trimalchius hic requiescit—pius, fortis, fidelis ex parvo crevit, sestertium reliquit trecenties, nec unquam philosophum audivit, vale: et tu."

[2] Goethe, *Faust*, Act II, scene vii.

"Grau, theurer Freund, is alle Theorie,
Und grün des Lebens goldner Baum."
(My worthy friend, grey are all theories,
And green alone life's golden tree.)

But, for all that, Faust came to grief, and brought grief to others. It was Mephistopheles, masquerading as Faust, who uttered those often-quoted words. It was an important event in the world's history, as Plato tells us in the *Phædo*, when Socrates, who "as a young man had a passionate desire for the wisdom which is called Physical Science," one day "listened to a man who said he was reading from a book of Anaxagoras, which affirmed that it is mind which orders and is the cause of all things," and thenceforward devoted himself to philosophy.[1] It was important because, though he did not stand alone, his conversion was typical of the trend of Greek thought which had so great an influence in the after-world. "It should not be necessary," writes Dr. Inge, "to remind Hellenists that 'Know thyself' passed for the supreme word of wisdom in the classical period, or that Heraclitus revealed his method in the words 'I searched myself.'"[2] Even those who regret the change, and with Bacon are inclined to identify philosophy with Natural Science, and to hold that the works of Plato and Aristotle survived as rubbish floats on the surface of a river while all that is of weight sinks to the bottom, and to regard their works as the "talk of idle old men to ignorant youths"[3]—even they recognise its seriousness.

This period (the fourth century B.C.) [writes Mr. Singer] saw the rise of a movement that had the most profound influence on every department of thought. We see the advent into the

[1] Chap. xlv, 96. Cp. Cicero, *Tusc. Disput.*, v, 4. "Socrates autem primus philosophiam devocavit e cœlo, et in urbibus collocavit et in domus etiam introduxit, et coegit de vita et moribus rebusque bonis et malis quærere." (Socrates was the first to call down philosophy from heaven and established it in cities, and brought it into the homes of men, forcing it to search into life and manners and right and wrong.)

[2] *The Legacy of Greece*, "Religion" (Oxford, 1922), p. 29.

[3] Diogenes Laertius, in *Platon*, chap. xviii. Quoted by Bacon. *Novum Organum*, lxxi. *Works*, ed. J. M. Robertson (Routledge, 1904), p. 276. "Their works were in the course of time obscured by those slighter persons who had more which suits and pleases the capacity and tastes of the vulgar; time, like a river, bringing down to us things which are light and puffed up, but letting weighty matters sink."

Greek world of a great intellectual movement as a result of which the department of philosophy which dealt with Nature receded before Ethics. Of that intellectual revolution—perhaps the greatest the world has seen—Athens was the site and Socrates (470–399) the protagonist.[1]

But there was a greater. Among the fragments of the writings which the great French mathematician jotted down in preparation for his never-written book on religion is one which begins—

> I had spent much time in the study of abstract sciences, and the little companionship that can be had in them sickened me of them. When I began to study man, I saw that these abstract sciences are not the proper concern of men, and that I was going more astray from my true nature in following them than were others in ignoring them.

But, he adds, not even here in the study of man is "the knowledge which men should have."[2] His editor, M. Brunschvicg, compares his conversion to that of Socrates, but adds that the change from Physics to Moral Science "ramena presque immédiatement Pascal au christianisme."[3] A greater change in values was wrought in the world five hundred years after Socrates made his change by one who began His teaching with a sermon setting forth the laws of conduct, and almost at once led His hearers on to the question, "Whom say ye that I am?" For, as Dr. Johnson said, "The knowledge of external nature, and the sciences which that knowledge requires or includes, are not the great or the frequent business of the human mind."[4]

[1] *The Legacy of Greece*, "Biology before Aristotle" (Oxford, 1922), p. 175.

[2] *Pensées*, ed. Brunschvicg, No. 144. "J'avais passé longtemps dans l'étude des sciences abstraites; et le peu de communication qu'on en peut avoir m'en avait dégoûté. Quand j'ai commencé l'étude de l'homme, j'ai vu que ces sciences abstraites ne sont pas propres à l'homme, et que je m'égarais plus de ma condition en y pénétrant que les autres en les ignorant."

[3] "Led Pascal back almost at once to Christianity."

[4] *Lives of the Poets*, "Milton." Quoted, Q.T., p. 208.

What if [preached Bishop Butler] we were acquainted with the whole creation in the same way and as thoroughly as we are with any single object in it? What would all this natural knowledge amount to? It must be a low curiosity, indeed, which such superficial knowledge could satisfy. On the contrary, would it not serve to convince us of our ignorance still; and to raise our desire of knowing the nature of things themselves, the Author, the Cause, and the End of them?[1]

It is not that the Natural Sciences are to be despised, but that there are other sciences still greater. Indeed, the wonderful and enormous advance of the former in recent years is a thing to be profoundly thankful for—but only if due proportion is kept, and the others are thereby raised still higher.

The danger lies in men confining their attention to these lower sciences, and to the lower aspects in them, to their material or utilitarian side.

Some people [wrote Walter Bagehot] are unfortunately born scientific. They take much interest in the objects of nature. They feel a curiosity about shells, snails, horses, butterflies. They are delighted at an ichthyosaurus, and excited at a polyp; they are learned in minerals, vegetables, animals; they have skill in fishes, and attain renown in pebbles; in the highest cases they know the great causes of grand phenomena, can indicate the courses of the stars or the current of the waves; but in every case their minds are directed not to the actions of man, but to the scenery amidst which he lives; not to the inhabitants of the world, but to the world itself; not to that which most resembles themselves, but to that which is most unlike.[2]

Let us not forget that there are these higher cases; but even in them we must not allow Natural Science to arrogate

[1] Sermon XV, 5, "On the Ignorance of Man," *Works* (Macmillan, 1900), p. 191. Cp. 16, p. 199: "Socrates was not the first who endeavoured to draw men off from labouring after, and laying stress upon, other knowledge, in comparison of that which related to morals."

[2] *Literary Studies*, "Mr. Macaulay," Dent's Everyman's Library, vol. ii p. 198.

to itself the name of Science. It would be difficult to exaggerate the harm done, both in serious writing and in popular thought, by this confusion of one kind of science, and that the lower kind, with Science as a whole. It is as bad in the realm of thought as it is in the realm of action "propter vitam vivendi perdere causas." [1]

Fitzgerald, the translator and populariser of the philosophy of Omar Khayyám, left behind him his commonplace book, which he called *Polonius*—containing precepts that he wished, I suppose, to "character in his memory," though he could not fit them into his poem. Among them is the following :—

> Dives had a great swamp bequeathed to him. He drained and planted, and stocked it with fish ponds and game preserves, and enclosed it carefully, so that he might have his pleasure there alone.
>
> One day he was showing it to an aged friend, who admired it much, but said it wanted one thing hugely.
>
> Dives asked, "What?"
>
> "Know you not," replied his friend, "that when God Almighty planted Eden it was for the sake of putting man therein?" [2]

And one more :—

> When Walter Scott lay dying, he called for his son-in-law, and while the Tweed murmured through the woods, and a September sun lit up the towers, whose growth he had watched so eagerly, said to him: "Be a good man; only that can comfort you when you come to lie here."
>
> "Be a good man." To that threadbare truism shrunk all that gorgeous tapestry of written and real Romance! [3]

The great mass of men might go perhaps with Socrates and with Dives' friend, but equally, it is to be feared, would

[1] "For life to lose life's aim."
[2] *Works* (Quaritch, 1887), vol. i, p. 372.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 337.

go with Fitzgerald and against Pascal [1]—not to mention One greater. Yet they would be wrong. That goodness is supreme is not a shrunken, threadbare truism.

There is a further danger we must beware of. The popular mind is apt to make the same mistake that popular theology often makes. Theologians have often thought that their science could settle questions of Natural Science, and it is no less common to find people thinking that Natural Science can settle questions of Theology. They confuse Natural Science with Naturalism—a theory of Metaphysics. But Natural Science merely studies the phenomena of Nature; it tells us nothing of origins and purposes; it is concerned with immediate, not ultimate, matters. Laplace had "no need of the hypothesis" [2] of God because he had no need of any hypothesis at all: that was the concern of Metaphysics and Theology. Lalande is said to have swept the heavens with a telescope and found no God,[3] because, though telescopes may reveal His works, it is a different science that "conjectures of the worker by His work." The shoemaker must stick to his last. We must avoid what Aristotle calls a μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος. We must keep clear of the "fallacy of explaining the facts of one science in terms of the concepts of another." [4] As Bacon wrote,

To say that the hairs of the eyelids are for a quickset and fence about the sight . . . or that the solidness of the earth is for the

[1] Cp. *Pensées*, No. 793. "Tous les corps ensemble, et tous les esprits ensemble, et toutes leurs productions, ne valent pas le moindre mouvement de charité. Cela est d'un ordre infiniment plus élevé." (All bodies together, and all minds together, and all that they produce, are not worth so much as the least motion of Love. That is of an order infinitely higher.)

[2] Hoyt's *New Cyclopedia of Classical Quotations* (Funk & Wagnalls Co., 1922). "Sire, je n'avais besoin de cet hypothèse." (Laplace to Napoleon, who asked why God was not mentioned in his *Traité de la Méchanique Céleste*.) (No reference is given.)

[3] I have not been able to trace the source of this story, and do not know whether he really made the foolish remark attributed to him.

[4] W. Brown, in *Science, Religion, and Reality*, "Religion and Psychology" (Sheldon Press, 1925), p. 311.

station and mansion of living creatures and the like, is well enquired and collected in Metaphysic; but in Physic they are impertinent.[1]

Yet it is quite common still to hear people argue that the microscope shows no soul, and that therefore it does not exist; to find people who interpret everything in the life and experience of men by its lowest material factors, who

drag all things from heaven and from the unseen to earth . . . and are obstinate in maintaining that the things only which can be touched or handled have being or essence, because they define body and being as one, and if anyone says that what is not a body exists, they altogether despise him and will hear of nothing but body.[2]

Theatetus and Socrates had "often met with such men" and thought them "terrible fellows," "very stubborn and repulsive mortals—outer barbarians."[3]

To distinguish Natural Science from Metaphysics or Religion does not mean that they have nothing to do with one another. The essence of co-operation is that each should do his job, but do it with consideration of the whole. The more thoroughly a man does his own bit, the more possible it is for others to supply what he leaves to them. Besides, it would be impossible to keep them apart, because it is the same man who has to do with both. They meet in the one man whose whole being is involved in whatever he does. The man who studies Natural Science has to exercise faith, if only in the uniformity of Nature which he studies. If Huxley exaggerated in saying that this was "the sole trustworthy foundation of all action,"[4] it is at least a very

[1] *Of the Advancement of Learning, Works* (Routledge, 1905), p. 96. Cp. *De Aug. Sci.*, III, iv, p. 471.

[2] Plato, *Sophist*, 246.

[3] *Theatetus*, 155–6.

"Σκληρούς γε λέγεις καὶ ἀντιτύπους ἀνθρώπους.
Εἰσὶ γὰρ, ὦ παῖ, μάλ' ἐῦ ἄμουσοι."

[4] In Darwin's *Life and Letters*, vol. ii, p. 200. Quoted, Q.T., p. 33.

necessary condition. The student starts with the assumption that the world is intelligible, or else he would not try to find out about it. He believes it will give an answer to his questions, and the same answer whenever the same question is put or he certainly would not put them. He is convinced that there is a rational principle in it all—that it is all reasonable. He assumes mind will answer to mind.

This is the modern form of the old argument from design. Where in former days men dwelt on the impossibility of shaking letters out of a bag so as to make a line of *Hamlet*, we now lay stress on the fact that *Hamlet* is readable, and worth reading because Shakespeare wrote it. We, no doubt, read our own interpretation into his plays. We sometimes misinterpret them. We never exhaust his meaning, but he and his meaning are there. So the order of the world is not merely read into the things we see by our own minds; we may do that, but it is there to be found out. The ultimate reality is, at least, mind—as Plato taught. If we cannot claim that we have proved this, it is, at any rate, the most rational assumption that the world means something, and something that can be found out. Else the things in it would be, as Charles Martel reminded Dante in Paradise, "non arti, ma ruine"—not an artist's work, but ruins.[1]

The ultimate reality is *at least* mind; the universal force that we saw reason to believe in is not blind but rational. It needs only a step to see that it is other things as well. In the beauty of Nature we feel, in words that Wordsworth has found for us, a presence and a power that disturbs us with the joy of elevated thoughts and a sense sublime of universal beauty. From contemplation of works of Art we may,

[1] *Paradiso*, viii, 106.

"Se ciò non fosse, il ciel che tu cammine
Producerebbe sì li suoi effetti,
Che non sarebbero arti, ma ruine."
(Were it not thus, these heavens, thou dost visit
Would so affect their work, that it would not be
Art, but destruction.)

with Plato, "go from fair forms to fair practices, and from fair practices to fair notions—on to the notion of absolute beauty behind all the beautiful things of the world." [1] Or, in contemplating good actions, in reviewing the deeds of heroes or the self-sacrifice of saints, we come to realise the unchanging principles of goodness that lie behind all codes of ethics and all moral strivings of men, and may assert that it is at least a "live option," [2] a reasonable line to take—since, as Pascal said, "Il faut parier," [3] "We must take the risk"—to assume that an Eternal Goodness is there to be found as well as an Eternal Truth and Eternal Beauty.[4]

All this is already involved in the Christian assumption, made by simple men who cannot follow a chain of philosophical reasoning, that "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God."

We recognise, then, a hierarchy of sciences—some lower, some higher, but all necessary. It should be an easy step to advance from the lower to the higher, bringing up all the valuable lessons in method learned in them to the more important studies. How much history and sociology have learned, and how much pastoral theology might learn,[5] from scientific method learned in the school of Natural Science, is clear to anyone who looks around him. No less easy should be the passage from the higher to the lower, bringing down to it the human and the Divine considerations that can inspire it and redeem it from vulgar or materialistic applications.

[1] *Symposium*, 210. Cp. my *Why Men Believe*, p. 32.

[2] Cp. W. R. Matthews, *Studies in Christian Philosophy* (Macmillan, 1921), p. 72. Quoting William James, *The Will to Believe* (Longmans, 1923), p. 2. "As electricians speak of live and dead wires, let us speak of any hypothesis as *live* or *dead* . . . let us call the decision between two hypotheses an *option*—a living option is one in which both hypotheses are live ones."

[3] *Pensées*, ed. Brunschvicg, No. 233. This, surely, was what Pascal meant when he wrote these much criticised words. See above, p. 118.

[4] I have tried to work out this idea more fully in my *Why Men Believe* (S.P.C.K., 1921), pp. 33–6.

[5] This is the theme of my *Introduction to the Study of Pastoral Theology* (Oxford, 1912).

II

Our second requisite was hopefulness of character—the attitude towards life that gives depth of feeling and energy to grapple with difficulties. We want that temper which gives a sane outlook on the world; that is proof against the pessimism that saps all effort; that prevents the cynicism that sees only the evil in the world, and can only sneer at it even if it does not actually find a pleasure in it. Again, it is a moral rather than an intellectual qualification that is needed. Good temper makes us see things as they are, even if sometimes it suffuses them with a slight rosy tint; but suspicion, anger, *accidie*, petulance, and querulousness infallibly blind us to the truth.

The right temper gives us an insight into the past. It is true we always only see what we are prepared to see. We "receive but what we give," [1] and our eyes see things with "hues of their own, fresh borrowed from the heart"; [2] but we can't see them at all unless they are there to be seen by what we bring to them. The right man sees an unceasing purpose running through the ages and so finds a meaning in history. It becomes a thing worth studying, coherent, interesting, leading somewhere. It has a plot. He finds, as he believes in spite of discouragement, that progress is a real thing. If there is not so much progress in men, since, as we saw, each generation begins afresh and has to learn its lessons over again, there is progress in movements, in accumulation of knowledge, of comforts, of wealth—of wealth not only in things material, in accumulation of buildings, pictures, gardens, but also in storing up of things intellectual, of music, of literature, of thought. No doubt the facile assumption that progress is the law of Nature, a

[1] Coleridge, *Dejection: An Ode.*

> "Oh Lady, we receive but what we give,
> And in our life alone does Nature live;
> Ours is her wedding garment, ours her shroud."

[2] Keble, *The Christian Year*, "The Twenty-fourth Sunday after Trinity."

conviction of recent growth, has, as Dr. Inge has pointed out,[1] of recent years received a severe shock. The increase of knowledge does not necessarily make men better; still less does the piling up of wealth certainly spell advance. The nineteenth-century hope of social salvation by mechanics' institutes has died out.[2] The war gave a rude shock to those who held that Natural Science and natural resources could by themselves redeem the world. It is now generally recognised that Naturalism opens out a quite hopeless view of the world, if only because, according to its tenets, the whole is doomed to final extinction; that, as Mr. Bertrand Russell says,

> No fire, no heroism, no intensity of thought and feeling, can preserve an individual beyond the grave; that all the labours of the ages, all the devotion, all the inspiration, all the noonday brightness of human genius, are destined to extinction in the vast death of the solar system, and that the whole temple of man's achievement must inevitably be buried beneath the debris of a universe in ruins.[3]

But the influence of Darwin has been to call men's attention to ends. This, as his son recognised, was a remarkable feature in his work in the middle of the nineteenth century, with its mechanical view of the universe. "One of the greatest services rendered by my father," he wrote, "to the study of Natural History is the revival of Teleology. The evolutionist studies the purposes or meaning of organs with the zeal of the older Teleology, but with a far wider and more coherent purpose."[4]

[1] *Outspoken Essays*, second series (Longmans, 1922), "The Idea of Progress," pp. 158 ff.

[2] Cp. J. H. Morgan, *John Viscount Morley* (Murray, 1924), p. 37. Quoting a letter written by Lord Morley in 1919: "As for progress, what signs of it are there now? And all we Victorians believed in it from the Utilitarians onwards."

[3] *A Free Man's Worship*. Quoted by Dr. Inge, p. 168.

[4] *Life and Letters of Charles Darwin*, vol. ii, p. 235. Cp. Dr. Asa Gray's statement, *ibid.*, p. 189. "Let us recognise Darwin's great service to Natural

The tendency of modern biology is being corroborated by the psychology of to-day, which is recognising more and more the universality of what it calls "purposive striving." "Purposive action is the most fundamental category of psychology," [1] writes Professor McDougall in the second chapter of his *Outline of Psychology*; and on the last page he concludes with the words, "Purposive action cannot profitably or plausibly be regarded as a special case of mechanical process." [2] This, though not the same as free-will, seems to lead up to it. This is a subject we shall return to later; at present the real advance we may note is the growing insistence of psychologists that mind is not the outcome of matter.

This spirit that is gaining ground in biology and in psychology finds vent also in practical things, since theory and temperament affect action. The fatalism of Islam has always meant the destruction of civilisation where it obtains; the pessimism of Buddhism has always exercised an enervating influence on the peoples who have accepted it. Men who believe in progress, though sometimes tiresome and aggressive, are, taking them all round, much nicer and more useful people than the Mrs. Gummidges, who are for ever "thinking of the old 'un." [3]

Progress is not a natural law of the world. Dr. Inge has made us see that clearly. But he refers to progress "not as an ideal but as an indisputable fact, not as a task for humanity but as a law of nature." [4] As an ideal and a task

Science in bringing it back to Teleology: so that instead of Morphology versus Teleology we have Morphology wedded to Teleology."

Cp. A. Headlam, *The Miracles of the New Testament* (Murray, 1915), p. 137. "Apart from other ideas, the idea of Evolution, which has more and more given a better grasp of the nature of things, has profoundly changed our conception of God's work. We no longer look upon it as something static; we see in it a power and growth, we recognise development not only in human life, but in the whole universe."

[1] (Methuen, 1923), p. 51. He continues: "Behaviour is always purposive action, or a train or sequence of purposive actions."

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 450.

[3] C. Dickens, *David Copperfield*, chap. iii.

[4] *Op. cit.*, p. 158.

for men it is implied in the Christian virtue of hope, and the result of that virtue is writ large in the history of Christian civilisation. "The most obvious contrast between Christian civilisation and all others," writes Dr. Matthews, is

> that it is progressive. . . . Compared with all other civilisations, Christendom has possessed a freedom of adaptation and a forward impulse which is without parallel.[1]

It remains a fact that the Christian nations have been progressive ones, and, it may be argued, in proportion as they have been true to their profession.

This belief in progress has always been a commonplace of Christianity. It is a platitude of the pulpit that the Pagan nations put their Golden Age in the past, while the Bible begins with the Fall and ends with the New Jerusalem. Hope has always been reckoned by the Church with faith and love as one of the three great Christian virtues, and to-day we are always singing about our determination to build "Jerusalem in England's green and pleasant land" with fervour and enthusiasm.

III

But your breezy optimist has his limitations. It is not merely intellectually that he fails to convince us, for it does not need the genius of Voltaire to write a *Candide* to convince us that this is not the best of all possible worlds. His confident assertion that "God's in His heaven, all's right with the world"[2] strikes us, except in rare moments of exhilaration, as simply untrue. His glib quotation is quite unable to convince a groaning and suffering world, bowed

[1] *Studies in Christian Philosophy* (Macmillan, 1921), p. 58. See also pp. 148–53.

[2] Browning, *Pippa Passes*. It may be pointed out that this was only the hopefulness of the heroine of the poem. Things in the world round her were very emphatically not all right, though her faith made them better.

down and discouraged by its misery. Hence the problem of pain rises continually in apologetics. The actual experience of men prevents arguments about design being very telling. It is true it sometimes works the other way and makes men believe. Many men lost their faith in the war, but, then, many found it. "Christianity is played out. No more Christianity for me" was the comment made to me by a young soldier fresh from the Front in the autumn of 1917 as we stood in London looking at the place where the night before a bomb had killed a dozen men; and in about ten minutes he was saying: "You know, this war will make a lot of difference. It gives you something to think about. There'll be a lot more after the war that will be religious." [1] "The problem of evil," it has been said, "may furnish a theoretical difficulty for belief in God, and offer a standing problem to theism; but the fact of evil, at least in the sense of imperfection, is the starting-point of religion." [2] Experience often gives the "depth in philosophy that bringeth men's minds about to religion." [3] But it is not argument that does it. A change of values is required: they have to alter their idea of what matters. What is wanted is not so much conviction as conversion.

For the objection to religion based on the spectacle of suffering is built on the fundamentally false assumption that pain is the great evil. The assumption is very natural to those who put material things at the centre of their lives. This limits their outlook; they live just in the present; they only think of the problem when it presses on them and they are in the stress of trouble. Moreover, their natural inclination is strengthened by the Benthamite tradition that the aim of life is the greatest happiness of the greatest number. This was the underlying assumption of the utili-

[1] I published a full account of his conversation with me in the *Church Times* for October 12, 1917, under the title "Second Thoughts."

[2] W. R. Matthews, *op. cit.*, p. 128.

[3] Bacon, *Essays*, xvi, "Of Atheism."

tarianism of the nineteenth century—a feature common to the arguments of Hume and Mill was a "curious inability of both to see beyond a purely hedonistic ideal." [1] Even if it is now discredited as a philosophy, its after-effects are still widely diffused. In popular form it appears in the way in which people assume without hesitation that the first thing in life is to "have a good time." The boring *malade imaginaire*, who thinks his health is the one interesting thing in the world, has always been with us. The entirely false assumption that chastity is injurious to health leads thousands into sin, because they fail to realise that, even if it were not glaringly untrue, health matters less than honour—honour both their own and that of others. The false assumption allies itself with religion. It inspires the less pleasing side of what takes place at Lourdes ; it constitutes a grave danger in faith-healing missions ; it actually becomes a substitute for religion in Christian Science, the condemnation of which lies not so much in the callousness and selfishness it is said to induce in its votaries, not in the money-making acuteness of its organisers, not even in the fact that its foundress, Mrs. Eddy, was already the wife of another man ; [2] but in the fact at bottom that it makes sickness and suffering the great evil to be cured.

This assumption is in flat opposition to all higher philosophy—not only to the asceticism which, falsely perhaps, sees an actual good in suffering as such, but to stoicism, with its

[1] A. Seth Pringle-Pattison, *The Idea of God* (Oxford, 1917), p. 405.

[2] Sibyl Wilbur, *The Life of Mary Baker Eddy* (The Christian Science Publishing Company, 1907), p. 139. "In 1873 Mrs. Patterson secured a decree of divorce from him [Dr. Patterson] in the courts of Salem, Massachusetts. . . . [Mrs. Tilton's] practical mind made one suggestion as the *amende honorable* for the husband, that he should settle some sum, however meager, on Mary and not leave her destitute. To this the doctor agreed, and a sum was fixed upon to be paid twice a year. This was continued for a few years, until Mrs. Patterson refused any longer to accept it."

P. 175. "Mrs. Glover as she was now called by her own request."

P. 232. "In the midst of the struggle of personalities Mrs. Glover quietly married Asa Gilbert Eddy, and the war temporarily ceased. The marriage took place on New Year's Day, 1877."

teaching of indifference; to Buddhism, with its doctrine of stilling of desire; to the teaching of Platonism, which declared that it is better to be wronged than to wrong; to all Jewish experience, which gradually transformed the popular faith based upon it, that ordered honour to father and mother "that thy days may be long in the land,"—till it could say with Job, "Though He slay me, yet will I trust in Him," [1] with the Psalmist, "Before I was troubled I went wrong," [2] with the prophet, "It pleased the Lord to bruise him." [3] The question is, "Which matters most, worth or happiness?" So there are arguments as to the purpose of pain. It may be pointed out that it is often actually a good; for it is prophylactic. An aching tooth tells us to go to the dentist in time; a headache warns us to have our eyes seen to or to go slower in our work. Were it not for pain we should suddenly fade out of existence unprepared. Then, too, it is educational; we learn by suffering. "Where pain ends, gain ends too." [4] "The men of sorrows are the men of influence in every walk of life. Even more than knowledge, pain is power." [5] Also it is retributive. It satisfies our sense of justice that punishment should follow crime. However it may be with others, and we should spare them, when we have ourselves sinned we feel we ought to bear the consequences. Penance, it is felt, purifies from stain. Dr. Johnson did quite naturally when he stood for an hour in the rain at Uttoxeter market to atone for what he had done in his youth.[6]

[1] Job xiii, 15. Authorised Version.

[2] Ps. cxix, 67. Prayer Book Version.

[3] Isaiah liii, 10.

[4] Browning, *A Death in the Desert*, *Works* (Smith, Elder, 1896), vol. i, p. 586.

[5] J. R. Illingworth, "The Problem of Pain," in *Lux Mundi* (Murray, 12th edition, 1891), p. 86.

[6] Boswell's *Life*, "Autumn of 1784." "Once, indeed," said he, "I was disobedient; I refused to attend my father to Uttoxeter market. Pride was the source of that refusal, and the remembrance of it was painful. A few years ago I desired to atone for this fault. I went to Uttoxeter in very bad weather,

Besides, pain has a mystic value. "Our sweetest songs are those which tell of saddest thought." [1] It would seem to be necessary to the highest excellence.

> Wer nie sein Brodt mit Thränen ass,
> . . . . .
> Der kennt euch nicht, ihr himmlischen Mächte.[2]

"Mercy no more could be" [3] under a scheme of universal contentment; discords rush in, "that harmony might be prized." [4] Nay, it is often chosen as the higher way, implying an intenser life. "The highest happiness," said Romola to little Lillo, "often brings so much pain with it that we can only tell it from pain by its being what we should choose before everything else because our souls see that it is good." [5] Pain can, at least, unite us to God if we accept it as from Him.

To all this we may add a warning as to the imperfection of our knowledge. Of course, that we simply do not know is never a reason for believing; but, if on other grounds we see reason for belief, we may reasonably argue that our ignorance should make us cautious in rejecting. We may, further, point out that the terrible picture of the mass of suffering is really based on the "fallacy of composition," that if fifty people suffer no one suffers more than his fiftieth share. We may insist, too, that, while we must always be kind to dumb animals, as a matter of fact they probably feel very little, that they do not "look before and after,"

and stood for a considerable time, bareheaded in the rain, on the spot where my father's stall used to stand. In contrition I stood, and I hope the penance was expiatory."

[1] Shelley, *Ode to a Skylark.*

[2] Goethe, *Wilhelm Meister*, "Harfenspieler."

> "Who never ate with tears his bread,
> . . . . .
> He knows ye not, ye heavenly powers."

[3] Blake, *Songs of Experience*, "The Human Abstract."

[4] Browning, *Abt Vogler*, xi; *Works*, vol. i, p. 580.

[5] George Eliot, *Romola*, Epilogue.

that it "is a happy world after all";[1] that if pain where we know it best, in ourselves, seems to have a purpose, it is not unreasonable to assume that it also has one with them.[2] But all these arguments do very little. The reminder that we only see part has no effect unless on other grounds we believe there is a bigger purpose in the world. We feel that suffering on a large scale *is* worse than when only endured by a few. We only believe animals can profit by it if we already hold that pain has a purpose in men; that is, if we see a use in it, if we see, to return to our first contention, that there are other things that matter more.

So this position is taken up by Christianity with its doctrine of the Cross and its "worship of sorrow." It puts the Cross in the middle of its creed and in the forefront of its worship. It declares that pain is not in itself an evil. It contemplates the possibility that pain may find its place in Heaven. We may well doubt if we have been right in declaring that God is above suffering, whether it may not be an inheritance from the old abstract ideas of Greek philosophy to regard Him as "without passions."[3] At any rate, the Church believes that He has put himself into such a position by His Incarnation in Jesus Christ as to be patient of suffering even unto death. It teaches that Atonement is wrought by being crucified with Christ, that we are united to Him by following on the "royal way of the Holy Cross."[4]

Even if the Christian answer to the problem is not

[1] Paley, *Natural Theology*, chap. xxvi, "Of the Goodness of the Deity." Quoted, Q.T., p. 43.

[2] Cp. C. C. J. Webb, *Problems of the Relation of God and Man* (Nisbet, 1911), p. 286. "Our position, then, is that the problem of pain presses least where we know it best from within; most where we least know what it is from within."

[3] A. Seth Pringle-Pattison, *The Idea of God* (Oxford, 1917), p. 407 ff. The passage is too long to quote.

[4] Thomas à Kempis, *The Imitation of Christ*, Bk. II, chap. xii. "Quomodo tu aliam viam quæris, quam hanc regiam viam, quæ est via sancti crucis?" (How dost thou seek any other way than this royal way, which is the way of the Holy Cross?)

complete, the atheist has no answer at all. The horror of it all is there unrelieved. He looks out on a world with no reason in it, no justice, no love—doomed to final extinction, with all its ills, but also with man, who knew truth and justice,

> Blown about the desert dust,
> Or sealed within the iron hills.[1]

At least such a view can hardly claim to be more reasonable.[2]

IV

These are the preliminary considerations necessary to the argument from order and design if we are to feel its full force. Readiness to give attention to higher things, hopefulness of character, and a proper sense of values to put pain in its right place—without these it may convince but will not tell.

With these established the old argument still holds. It reappears continually in new forms. Teleology has been emphasised by Evolution working, as it does, to ends. The only difference is that now we regard the watch as alive and the watchmaker as continually working out his purpose in it.

The unity of creation is emphasised by the sense of the universality of law. If this is being carried farther, if the division of organic and inorganic is being done away, if the separation of elements is breaking down, if all is being reduced to varied manifestations of one force, if time, matter, and space can be shown to be essentially the same (if that means anything), it only emphasises the universal presence of life and mind in what before was set in opposition to them.

[1] Tennyson, *In Memoriam*, lvi.

[2] I have worked all this out more fully in my *Lectures in Hyde Park*, Series II (S.P.C.K., 1927), lecture 6, "The Problem of Pain," pp. 40–63.

The argument from the bag of letters as to the impossibility of our present order having come by chance is still valid; though nowadays we lay more stress on the reasonableness of Nature that responds to our inquiry, on the revelation of beauty in the world and in art, and on the fact that goodness exists.

The old objections to its inadequacy still hold—in the form objected by Newman if not in the cruder criticism of Mill. But they lie rather in the fact that it cannot do more than it can; no more can be got from a study of external nature. It needs to be supplemented from human experience, from what men find in themselves, from what they find recorded in history. To this we will go on in the next chapter.[1]

[1] Cp. Series I, lecture 2, "The Arguments from Order and Design."

CHAPTER VII

CONSCIENCE

"Ecce intus eras et ego foris, et ibi te quærebam." (Lo! thou wast within and I abroad, and I sought thee there.)—AUGUSTINE, *Confessions*, Bk. X, chap. xxvii, section 36.

"Noli foras ire, in te ipsum redi; in interiore homine habitat veritas." (Go not abroad, return into thyself; in the inner man dwells the Truth.)—*De Vera Religione*, xxxix, 72.

IF moral qualities are necessary to make us able to judge of things, still more are they necessary if we are to judge of man. I claimed that for a right understanding of arguments for Theism drawn from the world round us we need a readiness to turn to higher things, a hopefulness of outlook, and a sane judgment of what matters in life. To feel the full force of those still stronger arguments drawn from "the moral law within" they are required in heightened degree. We must be convinced that "the proper study of mankind is man"; we must be free from the cynicism that disbelieves in human nature; and in studying ourselves we must look to what is characteristic in man; to that which makes him man, rather than that which connects him with the beasts; to that which is proper to him as man, rather than to that which he shares with the brute creation as an animal.

Edel sei der Mensch,
Hilfreich und gut!
Denn das allein
Unterscheidet ihn
Von allen Wesen,
Die wir kennen.

. . .

Er allein darf
Den Guten lohnen,

Den Bösen strafen,
Heilen und retten,
Alles Irrende, Schweifende
Nützlich verbinden.[1]

Besides—or perhaps for this very reason—we are always more interested in men than in things, and we are specially interested in how they behave. In what use they make of the external world, how they bear themselves in their trials, what they ought to have done or what we should do in their place—in what, in short, we call moral questions—we are always interested. Arguments from these touch us more nearly; that is why we began with them in our first chapter. They are more varied; they come home to us more directly; they stir the depths of a deeper emotion, and, what perhaps matters more, they speak with greater sureness—the sureness of intimate experience in the depths of our being.

This is seen in the greater persistence with which Christian morals are attacked. By their side it is felt that questions of dogma matter comparatively little. Men argue that right and wrong are mere matters of convention. Misinterpreting Hamlet, they ask if it is not true that there is nothing good or bad, but thinking makes it so.[2] They

[1] Goethe, *Das Göttliche*, transl. E. A. Bowring, *The Poems of Goethe* (Bell, 1904), p. 185.

"Noble be man,
Helpful and good!
For that alone
Distinguishes him
From all the beings
Unto us known."

. . . .

He and he only
The good can reward,
The bad he can punish,
Can heal and can save;
All that wanders and strays
Can usefully blend."

[2] Act II, scene ii. Hamlet is, of course, not speaking of good and bad in a moral sense; but of pleasant and unpleasant. He regards Denmark as a

appeal in support of their contention to the variety of standards that have been, and are, in the world; they point out that once revenge and persecution were considered virtues, and that certain savages still think it a duty to kill off their parents when they grow old; they remind us that some peoples consider it wrong to eat pork, that others think cannibalism a virtue; they act, or at any rate talk, on this assumption; they say that when it rains we call it a bad day and the umbrella-maker calls it a good one, so there is no real difference between good and bad;[1] they accuse people of being "bound by conventions," which, apparently, is even a worse crime than being "fettered by dogmas."

Especially is this noticeable in controversy by the persistency of the popular attack on free-will. This is not based on any philosophic objection to our talking about "having free-will" instead of "willing freely," for detached reminiscences of Hobbes and Priestley prompt the men who make it to say that we are determined by our motives, as if our motives existed apart from us who create them.[2] Nor is it based on any preferred contrast of determinism with indeterminism, since they would use the term "free-will" for self-determinism. It is not very serious or consistent as a matter of argument; it is chiefly put forward as the most convenient weapon to attack Christianity with, for it is seen that it cuts at the root of all the Church teaches about sin and moral responsibility.

prison, whereas Rosenkranz and Guildenstern "think not so" and declare his "ambition makes it one."

Cp. Boëthius, *Consol*, ii, 4. "Nihil est miserum nisi quum putes." (Nothing is wretched except when you think it is.)

[1] It is only fair to add that the comment of a young girl in audience of the man whom I heard arguing thus was, "Oh! that's *your* opinion, is it!" See below, p. 238.

[2] Cp. J. Ward, *The Realm of Ends*, "Pluralism and Theism" (Cambridge, 1912), p. 290. "Percepts and appetites that nobody owns are not percepts and appetites at all. To talk of motives conflicting of themselves is as absurd as to talk of commodities competing in the absence of traders. Again, if there is only a bundle of percepts and motives, but no self to determine or control, it is obvious that there can be no self to be determined or controlled."

Not that its upholders are bad men; but it has a morally depressing effect. It can be taken as an excuse for not trying to do what men know to be their duty. It is the assumption, under the oft-repeated phrase, "Man is the creature of circumstances," which sounds like, and generally is, no doubt, a harmless commonplace; but sometimes, I fear, covers something very ugly. At best it tends to sap effort—not so much in those who with some heat and vigour argue for it, as in some of those who listen and are glad of a justification of what they really know cannot be justified.

Theologically it is the Christian doctrine of the Fall that is attacked—usually in crude forms based on a literal interpretation of the first chapters of Genesis. Thus men say, "If the story in Genesis is allegory, man is not fallen, and there was no need for Christ to die on the Cross to redeem him"—as if the fact of sin and the need of redemption depended on the story being true as history. It would be splendid if the sin of the world *could* be taken away by reinterpreting a story, but unfortunately it cannot. It costs more to redeem men's souls. Or it appears in a more reasoned and plausible form when men argue that sin is mere imperfection, with a corollary in the form of Sir Oliver Lodge's famous dictum that the higher man of to-day is not worrying about his sins.[1] Therefore, again, before we can go farther and feel the weight of the argument from conscience, the moral argument for belief in God, or realise what it shows us of His nature, there are certain preliminary ideas which must be settled. Before an apologetic can tell, or even a theology or philosophy of theism be possible, certain moral considerations must be made. We must make clear in our own minds our answer to the three questions :—

(i) What makes a thing right?
(ii) Is there any right at all?
(iii) Why does not man do right?

[1] *Hibbert Journal*, vol. ii, No. 3, "Christian Doctrine."

For, as we saw, we believe with the whole man, and not least by judgments of value, because things appeal to our moral sense.

I

The first is a question of ethics. What makes a thing right? It is a subject about which there has always been much discussion. It cannot be said that men have ignored it.

Ethical theories are usually grouped under four heads.[1] There are said to be four main types. Men are ranged under one or the other according as they make right or wrong depend on something in themselves or on something outside. In the one case they are directed by an aim, in the other they are guided by a law. "Every action and purpose may be said to aim at some good. Hence the good has been well defined as 'that at which all things aim.'" Such are the famous words with which Aristotle begins his *Nicomachean Ethics*. "Duty," says Wordsworth:—

> Stern Daughter of the Voice of God!
> . . . .
> Who art a light to guide, a rod
> To check the erring, and reprove;
> . . . .
> Thou dost preserve the stars fron wrong;
> And the most ancient heavens, through Thee, are fresh and strong.[2]

Or it may be, say others, that right and wrong depend on something within *and* on something without, on the inner obedience to an outer imperative, on a moral law—but one within.

The first theory is that of the hedonists, of those who say

[1] For a fuller working out of what follows see my *Lectures in Hyde Park*, Series II (S.P.C.K., 1927), lecture viii, pp. 86–108.

[2] *Ode to Duty*.

that right depends on your aim, that pleasure is the aim, and that that is right which gives pleasure.[1] Popular criticism condemned this almost as soon as it had misunderstood its first popular exponent, and Horace is speaking almost proverbially when he describes himself as a "hog of the sty of Epicurus."[2] Epicureanism very easily becomes a base philosophy, and Horace did little to prove his interpretation of it a nobler one. The ideal of Omar Khayyám renders his poetry, as versified with such grace by Fitzgerald, very popular to-day with those who like that sort of thing. But popular criticism is equally acute to see that it all depends on what kind of pleasure you make your aim. It recognises at once the difference of Plato's three classes of pleasures—those of wisdom, strife, and gain [3]—even if it does not follow his argument that the first are the greatest because they are dependent on reality. It is amused with Bentham's doggerel:

> Intense, long, certain, speedy, fruitful, pure,
> Such marks in pleasures and in pains endure.[4]

It sees at once that pleasures may be sensuous, intellectual, artistic, passive or active, of adventure and of rest, lasting or fierce—that in describing them as higher or lower you are merely begging the question, that a further criterion is needed.

Moreover, though it is pointed out that pleasure in the shape of satisfaction follows the doing of certain actions, it is common experience that this is only true if you forget it and do not seek the happiness of satisfaction. It is an old comparison to liken it to your shadow, which only follows

[1] Cp. J. S. Mackenzie, *A Manual of Ethics*, University Tutorial Press (Clive 1907), Bk. II, chap. iv. "The Standard as Happiness," p. 297.

[2] Horace, *Epistles*, Bk. I, iv, 16.

> "Cum ridere voles Epicuri de grege porcum."

[3] *Republic*, Bk. IX, 581.

[4] Quoted, J. S. Mackenzie, *Manual of Ethics*, p. 215.

you if you run away from it.[1] Any mere hedonistic theory is useless in practice as it gives no uniform or social standard. Men say, "It's what he likes to do; I don't." It even seems to take away the merit of good-doers, since "they have their reward."[2] It remains self-seeking and limited. Moreover, self-seeking does not lead to happiness, even if self-realisation be a real and proper end to be aimed at.

So the obvious step is to extend it to altruistic hedonism, to say that that is right which gives happiness to others. Obviously the self-sacrificing love of parents, the achievements of martyrs for a cause, the labours of men for their country, the self-forgetfulness of students, are among the best things the world has. So the old phrase "The greatest happiness of the greatest number," echoed from Hutcheson,[3] proves still capable of rousing genuine zeal and real enthusiasm, as a phrase may. Perhaps it has that power in part still from old political associations, but it also has a very real meaning and appeals to obvious common sense.

But as a theory it collapses on examination. Aristotle

[1] Cp. *The Proverbs, Epigrams, and Miscellanies of John Heywood* (1497), ed. J. S. Farmer (London, privately printed for the subscribers to the Early English Drama Society, 1906), "Proverbs," Pt. I, chap. xi, p. 32.

> "Follow pleasure and then will pleasure flee,
> Flee pleasure and pleasure will follow thee."

[2] So Schiller, *Die Philosophen*, "Gewissensskrupel":—

> "Gerne dien ich den Freunden, doch thu' ich es leider mit Neigung,
> Und so wurmt es mir oft, das ich nicht tugendhaft bin."

And "Entscheidung":—

> "Da is kein anderer Rat, du must suchen, sie zu verachten,
> Und mit Abscheu alsdann thun, wie die Pflicht dir gebeut."

(A Conscientious Objection:—

> Willingly serve I my friends, but I do it, alas! with affection,
> Hence I am plagued with the doubt, virtue I have not attained.

Decision:—

> This is your only resource, you must stubbornly seek to abhor them.
> Then you can do with disgust that which the law may enjoin.)

[3] *Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue*, p. 181. "That action is best which procures the greatest happiness of the greatest numbers."

deprecated trying to make ethical science too exact,[1] and, if subject to such criticism, it is seen to be based on the fallacy of composition.[2] The happiness of different people cannot really be added together. Each feels his own and no one else's. Moreover, there is the same difficulty about the different kinds of happiness, with the additional one of judging between different kinds of persons. There are men and women—which are to come first? There are young and old—are children to count for more or less? There are the sick and the whole, the sensitive and the callous, the nervous and the phlegmatic, the civilised and the simple. Some can bear more, others less. And besides the chief objection to the theory—that it is still pleasure that is sought—no reason has been given why we should prefer the pleasure of others to our own.

Something more, then, is required; and others seek this not in, but outside, ourselves—not in an aim but in a duty. A thing is right, they say, when done in obedience to a law. As to what the law is, opinions differ. It may be the law of Nature, as the stoic declared and Rousseau preached; it may be the law of the land, of country, or State, as the Greeks generally assumed, and as do those men of to-day whose arbiter of morals is the policeman; it may be the far-reaching tyranny of custom and public opinion, to which the schoolboy bows down, and which makes us uncomfortable if we do not know the use of finger-glasses; it may be the law of God, whether graven in tables of stone and delivered

[1] *Eth. Nic.*, I, iii, 1, 4. "*Τὸ γὰρ ἀκριβὲς οὐχ ὁμοίως ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς λόγοις ἐπιζητητέον, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς δημιουργουμένοις· . . . πεπαιδευμένου γάρ ἐστιν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον τὰκριβὲς ἐπιζητεῖν καθ' ἕκαστον γένος.*" (It would be wrong to expect the same degree of accuracy in all reasonings as in manufactures . . . an educated person will expect accuracy in each subject only so far as the nature of the subject allows.)

[2] Cp. W. S. Jevons, *Elementary Lessons in Logic* (Macmillan, 1909), p. 173. "The Fallacy of Composition is a special case of equivocation, arising from the confusion of an universal and a collective term. In the premises of a syllogism we may affirm something of a class of things distributively, that is, of each and any separately, and then we may in the conclusion infer the same of the whole put together."

from Mount Sinai, or formulated in customs and decrees of His Church. In all cases it is an external law which decides what it is our duty to do.

There is great value in law. In times of sudden temptation there is a great advantage in having a fixed norm, independent of changing moods and emotions, by which to judge. Men find a great help in a "must" when they do not feel inclined. A categorical imperative often makes us act, and when we have to act and act at once, and cannot stop to calculate the sum of greatest happinesses, it makes us act rightly. A "thou shalt not" often keeps us up to the mark when we feel inclined to make exceptions. And external law is a great help when we move from place to place. The Ten Commandments remain unchanged east of Suez, in spite of what Kipling's soldier said, and he knew it really, let alone the fact that "what the soldier said is not evidence."[1] The intransigence of total-abstainers has been in large part the cause of our increased sobriety; by binding themselves by an external pledge they broke down bad customs of society. A law was needed to break laws. A definite rule, too, clears up moral issues. When faced with it you have got to decide what you are going to do. This is one of the great advantages of the formal examination of conscience by set questions generally recommended before confirmation. It makes a boy or girl face things. Rules and laws are needed for most men. If there are souls who, as Wordsworth says,

> in love and truth,
> Where no misgiving is, rely
> Upon the genial sense of youth,[2]

[1] C. Dickens, *The Pickwick Papers*, chap. xxxiv. "'You must not tell us what the soldier, or any other man, said, sir,' interposed the judge; 'it's not evidence.'

"'Wery good, my lord,' replied Sam."

[2] Wordsworth, *Ode to Duty*. Cp. George Herbert, *The Temple*, "The Church Porch."

> "Slight those who say amidst their sickly healths,
> Thou livest by rule. What doth not so but man?

[*Note continued on p.* 187.

the majority are not fit for "unchartered freedom," and need the firm support of duty's unchanging laws when they "feel the weight of chance desires."

But there is always the danger of petrifaction of rules. They are apt to become a hindrance to progress, to stereotype ideas, and keep back advance; while there is a yet greater danger that man will come to regard life as a pass-examination where you need only do just enough to get through, where it will do if you keep the rules and no more.

So others say that a thing is right because it is done in obedience to law, but that it is a law within as well as a law without. They say that we know what is right intuitively because it is there, and we recognise it by that

> superior principle of reflection or conscience in every man which distinguishes between the internal principles of his heart as well as his external actions; which passes judgment on himself and them; pronounces determinately some actions to be in themselves just, right, good—others to be in themselves evil, wrong, unjust; which without being consulted, without being advised with, magisterially exerts itself and approves or condemns the doer of them accordingly.[1]

These were Antigone's "unwritten laws of God that know not change and are not of to-day nor yesterday,"[2] but were heard by her within. This was Socrates' δάιμων that he listened to rather than to the rulers of Athens.[3] There may be a danger of mishearing this voice within, of crankiness or of aberration in conscience.[4] It does not matter how it

> Houses are built by rule, and commonwealths.
> Entice the trusty sun, if that you can,
> From his ecliptic line; beckon the sky.
> Who lives by rule, then, keeps good company."

[1] Butler, Sermon II, § 8, "Upon Human Nature," *Works* (Macmillan, 1900), vol. i, p. 45. Quoted, Q.T., p. 45.

[2] Sophocles, *Antigone*, transl. E. H. Plumptre, line 455. Quoted, Q.T., p. 279.

[3] *Apology*, xix, 31.

[4] Cp. Goethe, *Iphigenie*.

> "Thoas. 'Es spricht kein Gott: es spricht dein eignes Hertz.'
> "Iph. 'Sie reden nur durch unser Herz zu uns.'"
> ('Tis no God speaks: there speaks just thine own heart.
> 'Tis through our hearts alone they speak to us.)

was evolved or what was its origin. The question is, "Does it lead men right now?" If it be no special faculty existing, as it were, apart from man, if it be ultimately grounded in the sentiment of self-regard, still the desire of the self that says "I shall realise in action the ideal of conduct which I have formulated and accepted" is the agent that effects all "the marvels of the moral life." [1]

Which of these theories is the true one? What makes a thing right? Is it self-interest, benevolence, duty, or conscience?

There is no contradiction between them; no need to reject the others if we take the one. For true self-interest lies in doing what is right. We so achieve the fullest self-realisation. Self-seeking and self-indulgence do not bring happiness as they are against our nature in that in which it is most distinctively human. Self-interest and altruism are not contrary to one another, since man finds his fullest self-realisation in society, in loving his neighbour as himself. The eternal laws of God should be embodied in those of State, Society, and Church. There is no clash between the claims of Cæsar and those of God if, in Crashaw's words, "Cæsar's self be God's." [2] In a perfectly Christian society we should feel no contrast between customs ecclesiastical and civil.[3] The voice within us, though it is the ultimate authority, chooses the pleasure it has learned to regard as the highest, sacrifices self for others, obeys authority. It directs the aim within; it recognises the duty without.

These are all assumptions of theism, which harmonises and unifies all these types of theory. They are not mutually exclusive, nor do they contradict one another if there is one

[1] W. McDougall, *An Outline of Psychology* (Methuen, 1923), p. 440 ff. Cp. also *Social Psychology* (Methuen, 1908), p. 364 ff.

[2] *Steps to the Temple*, Divine Epigrams, Mark xii. Quoted, Q.T., p. 207.

[3] Cp. Lord Acton, *History of Freedom and other Essays* (Macmillan, 1907). "The Protestant Theory of Persecution," p. 152. Quoted, Q.T., p. 200.

God. "We must not only love our neighbours as ourselves," said Coleridge, "but ourselves likewise as our neighbours."[1] There is no "peculiar contrariety between self-love and benevolence," wrote Bishop Butler.[2] Even if conscience is mainly developed by social sanction and it be true, as T. H. Green asserted, that "no individual can make a conscience for himself, he always needs a society to make it for him";[3] it makes little difference whether the voice of God speaks directly to the heart, or through the influence of men whom He guides. This is taught, and made effective for the mass of men, by Christianity with its teaching of one God, the Source of all good, as He is the Source no less of all beauty and truth.[4]

II

But the question is asked, "Is there any such thing as right and wrong at all?"—for all that we have been saying implies the existence of free-will in man. I use the word in the ordinary sense of the term, not as contrasting indeterminism and determinism. Possibly we should speak of self-determinism, but that confuses the mind of the ordinary man. It is not a term he uses. What is, perhaps, more correctly called self-determinism he calls free-will; and, of

[1] *Biographia Literaria*, chap. xxiv, ed. Shawcross (Oxford, 1907), vol. ii, p. 210. He continues: "And we can do neither unless we love God above both."

Cp. Augustine, *De Civ. Dei*, xix, 14. "Ille in se diligendo non errat, qui Deum diligit." (He who loves himself does no wrong if he loves God.)

Cp. W. R. Matthews, *Studies in Christian Philosophy* (Macmillan, 1921), p. 148. "If Theism is true I am justified in believing that, if I rightly judge my own good and pursue it, I am thereby pursuing the good of all other persons, and, conversely, if I rightly judge the good of others and pursue it, I am thereby pursuing my own good."

[2] Sermon xi, 12. "Upon the Love of our Neighbour," and Preface, 35–40. *Works* (Macmillan, 1900), vol. i, pp. 144 and 16–19.

[3] *Prolegomena to Ethics*, p. 351. Quoted by W. McDougall, *Social Psychology*, p. 220.

[4] Cp. my *Lectures in Hyde Park*, "Why Men Believe in God" (S.P.C.K., 1925), p. 71.

course, free-will is not something outside ourselves that we have "got," any more than we have "got" a soul. We *are* souls and we will freely; but the ordinary man says that we have *got* souls and have *got* free-will.

And it is in the popular sense that the statement is denied. This is no new thing, for though the present-day form of scientific determinism has no very long history, the denial of man's freedom has been the great enemy of progress and morality, so far as a theory can be, throughout the ages. In the grey dawn of civilisation, and before men learned to live in cities, it began to appear in the ideas underlying magic. In the ancient civilised world it lurked behind the belief in the gods whose free-will in helping or hindering man was controlled by Fate. Moira was above them. The power supreme was that which was εἱμαρμένη. Men believed that all within the spheres of the stars was controlled by them. You could only escape if you could make your way by magic and symbols and pass-words to the realm beyond.[1] Astrology was the great interest, and the seeking to find out the fates the gods had given hindered the advance of Natural Science at its birth. Men watched the flight of birds, and cut up beasts to pry into their entrails. It is difficult for us to realise the terror and the degradation fo ancient superstitions. The Jews never gave way to it. In the account of Creation in Genesis, as in the Psalms, the stars are just material things created by God;[2] man has free-will in Eden, and, though he misuses it and tastes of the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil, he does not lose it.

The fourth and fifth centuries were ages of speculation. Manichæism was the great rival to Christianity outside the Church. Augustine describes in his *Confessions* how he

[1] Cp. Edwyn Bevan, *Hellenism and Christianity* (Allen & Unwin, 1921), p. 77. "When men looked up to the stars, they shuddered to see there the Powers whose mysterious influence held them in the mechanism of an iron necessity. These were the world rulers (κοσμοκράτορες), who fixed men's destiny, without any regard to human will and human tears."

[2] Cp. C. G. Montefiore, *Liberal Judaism* (Macmillan, 1918), p. 197.

was caught by it, and how the beginning of his emancipation from its thraldom was his realising the untruth of its fatalism. People born at the same moment, and therefore under the same stars, did not lead lives exactly alike. It contradicted the idea of a good God; it prevented men from recognising sin as sin.

> One thing [he wrote] lifted me up towards thy light; it was that I had come to know that I had a will, as certainly as I knew that I was alive. And so when I willed to do, or not to do, anything I was absolutely certain that it was I, and not somebody else, willed it; and I was beginning to see that there was the cause of my sin.[1]

Some declare that he never entirely got rid of it, and certainly in his later teaching in opposing Pelagius he seemed at times to deny free-will—but that was because Pelagius seemed to deny man's need of the grace of God. "We must discriminate," says Mr. D. Mackenzie, "between what thinkers are defending and what they are denying. Thus Augustine denied free-will in order to defend God's free-grace. The defence was the real aim, the denial was incidental."[2] Even so, it was disastrous even to *seem* to deny it.

[1] *Confessions*, Bk. VII, iii, 2, transl. C. Bigg, in Methuen's "Library of Devotion." See also Bk. IV, iii, 1.

So in Bk. VII, vi, 1, he speaks of "mathematicorum fallaces divinationes et impia deliramenta." Cp. *De Doctr. Christ.*, ii, 21.

So the *Code of Theodosius*, L. ix, Tit. 18, "De Malificis et Mathematicis," leg. 2. "Ars autem mathematica damnabilis est et interdicta omnino." Quoted Bingham, *Antiquities of the Christian Church*, Bk. XVI, chap. v, 1. "There is a law of Diocletian in the Justinian Code which allows the art of Geometry as a useful science, but forbids the *ars mathematica, the astrologer's art*, as a damnable practice" (Oxford Ten Volume Edition), vol. vi, p. 238.

So Mark, the deacon, says in his *Life of Porphyry*, § 85, transl. G. F. Hill, Oxford, 1913), p. 95, of the Manichæans: "They acknowledge nativities and fate and the science of the stars, in order that they may sin without fear, holding that the commission of sins is not in us, but cometh from the necessity of fate."

[2] D. Mackenzie, in Hastings's *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, vol. vi, art. "Free-Will," p. 126.

There is a fine passage on free-will in Guizot's "Meditations," reprinted from his *History of Civilisation*, written some twenty-five years before, in which he considers the issue between Augustinianism and Pelagianism.

The centuries which followed were ages of fighting. The old civilisation was wellnigh destroyed by the barbarous tribes that overran Europe and Africa. Of these the worst were the followers of Mohammed; the others could, and did, learn. Islam has many grave faults. It teaches the duty of Jehad or religious persecution by the sword; it permanently degrades women; it accepts slavery as part of its system. But its worst fault is its teaching of fatalism, from which it takes its name—its worst because it is this which prevents all reform and induces stagnation of life. But for it it might learn toleration, it might come to honour women, it might grant freedom to those it rules.

The fifteenth and sixteenth centuries were pre-eminently ages of law. With the rise of nations, and the weakening of the power of the Empire and of the Papacy, men thought more and more in terms of law. Calvin was one of the greatest, if not the greatest, theologians of his time. His conception of God was that of an all-powerful and all-knowing law-giver. If he distinguished between predestination and necessity, his followers could not. Calvinism produced fine fighters; Puritanism was stern in its morals; Calvinists and Puritans often fought the battle of political freedom and individual liberty. But in theology Calvinism was Determinist and proved the great enemy of Christianity—all the more serious because it was of its own household. It spoiled the Reformation, which began so hopefully with the desires of the new learning; it was the cause of endless schisms; it has been responsible for unspeakable spiritual distress;[1] it discredited Christianity in the minds of the masses of the people, who identify it with this doctrine that God sends

[1] An example of such spiritual distress may be found in "that sad account of years of morbid preoccupation with his sins which Bunyan gives in *Grace Abounding*," R. H. Thouless, *An Introduction to the Psychology of Religion* (Cambridge, 1923), p. 53. Professor Pratt, in *The Religious Consciousness* (New York, 1920, p. 140), considers that "Bunyan's struggle was altogether without moral significance. Even admiration for Bunyan's later heroic struggle against persecution cannot blind us to the fact that this judgment is correct."

men to Hell for what is no fault of their own. To this day the greater part of popular attacks on religion are directed against a crude Calvinism that it is hardly an exaggeration to describe as a caricature of the religion of Christ.

The three centuries following witnessed a wonderful development in Natural Science. In them the old enemy turns up again in a new form, and in the controversy between the Libertarians and the Necessitarians the latter claimed the support of Science, which for them meant Natural Science alone. At first dominated by mathematics, then by mechanism, then by physics, popular thought looked on man as a sum to be worked out, a machine set going, as a product of his body. "The brain secretes thought as the liver secretes bile," represents its metaphysic.[1] Scientific Determinism, the doctrine that "human action is not free but determined by motives regarded as external forces acting on the will," as the *Oxford Dictionary* defines it, is the chief opponent of Christianity to-day among the masses.

Many people in the nineteenth century cared little for doctrines and much for practical life; here, again, the old enemy was, and is still, to the fore. Popular social reform lays the chief part, if not the whole stress, on circumstances, and little, if any, on character. It denies in the face of obvious facts that a man "can be a Christian under present economic conditions."[2] It encourages men to rely on the State, which is to alter the conditions, promising that then all will be well. The assumption is that man is the creature of his natural surroundings.

[1] J. R. Illingworth, *Personality, Human and Divine* (Macmillan, 1894), p. 49. "When Cabanis, and others after him, call thought a secretion of the brain, they merely conceal this gulf [between matter and thought] under a cloud of imaginative phrase which, as Fichte says, 'has never conveyed a thought to any man and never will.'" Cabanis, according to the *Petit Larousse Illustré*, was a "médecin matérialiste français . . . ami de Mirabeau. Au début du XIX siècle, il exerça sur les idées et sur les mœurs une grande influence, aujourd'hui éteinte (1757–1808)." (A materialist French doctor, a friend of Mirabeau. At the beginning of the nineteenth century he exercised a great influence on ideas and morals which is now extinguished.)

[2] For my answer to the question whether this is possible, see Q.T., p. 252.

The twentieth century has seen a great interest in psychology and a great development of knowledge of human nature. Especially noteworthy is the realisation of the part played by the sub- and the un-conscious. Here, again, the old false idea has caught hold of the new knowledge, vitiating what otherwise was doing us so great a service. It declares that all we do is the result of complexes which we did not make, but were made for us by events or instincts. It is exploiting the new discoveries in the old way, emphasising the base at the expense of the noble, declaring the organ to be what matters, not the end, explaining the higher by the lower, stressing the unconscious at the cost of the conscious, ignoring the teaching of those who argue that exact study shows that free-will goes down far lower in the scale than we imagined and finds its germ, at least, in the lowest forms of life.[1]

It has been an age-long controversy. It is admitted that we are conditioned in our lives. We live within limitations; we realise that there is a very large area of reflex action and subconscious life; we concede that much in our lives is determined, that we only act deliberately from time to time; we grant that the formation of habits does continually relegate more and more of our lives to mechanical processes, that far more of our actions are fixed beforehand than we know.

Yet, for all that, our free actions are those which make our characters, which distinguish us from the brutes, which individualise us and differentiate one man from another. It is our free actions that men judge us by; we don't blame people for things they cannot help. It is we who create our conditions. Our subconsciousness is the storehouse of our conscious actions which have sunk down thither. Our habits are built up by effort, our characters forged by our acts of will. All moralists insist on free-will, unless we are to reduce good and evil to mere beauty and ugliness. "Moral choice

[1] Cp. W. McDougall, *An Outline of Psychology*, chap. ii, "The Behaviour of the Lower Animals."

is plainly voluntary." "Virtue is a habit of choice," said Aristotle in the fourth century B.C.[1] "It is the presumption of all morality that the self is the cause of its own actions," writes Dr. Rashdall in the twentieth century A.D.[2] At least as great philosophers may be claimed on the side of free-will as on that of determinism. "Ubicunque est intellectus ibi est liberum arbitrium," said Aquinas, in the thirteenth century;[3] "La Liberté est donc un fait," says Bergson to-day;[4] and if it has been characteristic of psychologists that they have denied the freedom of the will, the whole trend of the modern movement in psychology seems to be in favour of finding not merely purposive behaviour down all ranks of life, but actual free-will in part in animals and in chief in man. "The theory of action," writes Mr. McDougall, "most widely accepted by psychologists at the present time is, perhaps, the theory which regards all organisms as merely machines and all behaviour as mechanically determined. I put this aside for the reasons already stated."[5] "It is not possible," writes Mr. James Ward, "to reconcile thoroughgoing determinism with our actual

[1] *Eth. Nic.*, III, ii, 2, and II, vi, 15.

[2] *The Theory of Good and Evil* (Oxford, 1907), vol. ii, p. 200.

[3] *Summa*, I, lix, 3. "Wherever there is intelligence there is Free Will." Quoted, A. J. Butler, *The Paradise of Dante Alighieri* (Macmillan, 1891), p. 53, as the source of Dante's words (Paradiso, v. 19):—

> "Lo maggior don, che Dio per sua larghezza
> Fesse creando, e all sua bontate
> Più conformato, e quel ch' ei più apprezza,
> Fu della voluntà la libertate,
> Di che le creature intelligenti,
> E tutte e sole furo e son donate."
>
> (Supreme of gifts which God creating gave us
> Of His free bounty, sign most evident
> Of goodness, and in His account most prized,
> Was liberty of will, the boon wherewith
> All intellectual creatures, and them sole,
> He hath endowed.)

[4] *Essai sur les données immédiates de la Conscience* (Alcan, Paris, 1909), p. 169. "Liberty, then, is a fact."

[5] *Social Psychology*, p. 364.

experience." [1] And among all, moralists, philosophers, and psychologists, it is not difficult to find those who argue passionately that it is impossible to believe that the world, with all its hopes and fears, is a delusion, that it must be emptied of all meaning, by the denial of all that is meant by effort, struggle, temptation, and victory.

Meanwhile, while the question is being fought out by argument, Christianity reckons with the phenomenon of remorse, which is only a darker name for man's conviction of his own free-will; it insists on free-will as necessary for the religious life as well as on the grace of God; and makes the belief in it real in practice by ordering examination of conscience and confession of sins.

III

Our third question remains, Why do men sin? Is it simply imperfection? Will it be remedied by evolution? Is it ignorance? Will not greater knowledge cure it?

No! says the Church. Sin lies in misuse of this will that God has given us and left free to use. Man is fallen—not merely undeveloped, ignorant, or imperfect. Browning was inclined, he tells us, to believe in Christianity for reasons and reasons; but this for chief, because it launched its dart

> At the head of a lie—taught Original Sin,
> The Corruption of Man's Heart.[2]

Original sin is not a thing outside man that he "has," and that can be washed away in baptism, any more than a motive is something outside him compelling him to act. It is "the fault and corruption of the nature of every man," as our ninth article says, so that he needs to be regenerated in baptism, to start again by death unto sin and a new birth

[1] *The Realm of Ends*, "Pluralism and Theism" (Cambridge, 1912), p. 288.

[2] Browning, *Gold Hair: a Story of Pornic; Works* (Smith, Elder, 1896), vol. i, p. 571.

unto righteousness, as a child of grace. This is a matter of fact. There is a kink and perversion in our wills; there is an entail of evil—explain it by heredity, tradition, or social solidarity as you will. It is a matter of experience. We know we are all wrong, that the world is out of joint, that we are in no Eden. And this knowledge grows with the knowledge of the world: when we see the failure of lives that gave such promise; when we think of the "true old times"

> When every morning brought a noble chance,
> And every chance brought out a noble knight,[1]

and then see what Lancelot and Guinevere have come to; when with Childe Roland we think back amid "penury, inertness, and grimace" for "one taste of the old time" that "sets all to rights," and fancy "Cuthbert's reddening face" and "Giles the soul of honour" ten years ago, and then realise the "one night's disgrace" that followed and the scene when shifted;[2] when we turn from individuals to nations and wonder with Bishop Butler if they, too, have not "gone mad";[3] and still more when we turn in on ourselves and see what we once hoped to be, what we once

[1] Tennyson, *Morte d'Arthur*.

[2] Browning, *Childe Roland to the Dark Tower Came*, xv–xvii, *Works*, vol. i, p. 436–7.

[3] T. Bartlett, *Memoirs of the Life, Character, and Writings of Joseph Butler* (Parker, 1839), p. 92. "His custom was, when at Bristol, to walk for hours in his garden in the darkest night which the time of the year could afford, and I frequently had the honour to attend him. After walking some time he would stop suddenly and ask the question, 'What security is there against the insanity of individuals? The physicians know of none; and as to divines, we have no data, either from Scripture or from reason, to go upon relative to this affair.' 'True, my lord, no man has a lease of his understanding any more than of his life; they are both in the hand of the Sovereign Disposer of all things.' He would then take another turn, and again stop short. 'Why might not whole communities and public bodies be seized with fits of insanity as well as individuals?' 'My lord, I have never considered the case, and can give no opinion concerning it.' 'Nothing but this principle, that they are liable to insanity equally at least with private persons, can account for the major part of those transactions of which we read in History.'"

felt we might be, with all the better knowledge of ourselves that has come with years; and in proportion as we get that knowledge, we say, "I confess that I have sinned exceedingly, in thought, word, and deed, of my fault, of my own fault, of my own grievous fault."

Now all this is a matter of direct experience and of universal experience—except perhaps for the superior person, if he exists, who, we are told, is not worrying about his sins. It is not in the least bound up with the story in Genesis, which is an attempt to explain how this undoubted state of things came to pass. It may not be true in history, but that does not alter what it tries to explain; and if, regarded as parable—and we have good authority for teaching by parable—it goes right to the point in saying that sin comes from practical knowledge of good and evil, gained by disobedience on the part of men, who are united in one race, who are sons of man, or, to use the Hebrew word, of Adam.

But Genesis is generally quoted as teaching a doctrine of total depravity, another bad legacy of Calvinism. It is a fact of experience that man is fallen; but equally, as the writer of that old story also insisted, that he is "made in the image of God." That is the irony of it. If he were totally depraved he would not mind; he would have no sense of being fallen. We say he is fallen not because of any event in time, but because he falls below what he was meant to be and must be. He is, as Pascal said, "un roi dépossédé," a king dethroned. There is the sting of it; he was made for better things. His true nature is in God—in God Who is humane, Who includes in His perfection all that makes human nature as it is in the image of God. This was the ground of Pascal's appeal to the sceptic, the *libertin*, of his day:—

La grandeur de l'homme est si visible, qu'elle se tire même de sa misère. Car ce qui est nature aux animaux, nous l'appelons misère en l'homme; par où nous reconnaissons que sa nature

étant aujourd'hui pareille à celle des animaux, il est déchu d'une meilleure nature, qui lui était propre autrefois. Car qui se trouve malheureux de n'être pas roi, sinon un roi dépossédé ? [1]

In the words of Sir John Davis,—

I know my soul hath power to know all things,
Yet she is blind and ignorant in all;
I know I'm one of Nature's little kings,
Yet to the least and vilest things am thrall.

I know my life's a pain and but a span;
I know my sense is mocked in everything;
And, to conclude, I know myself a man—
Which is a proud, and yet a wretched, thing.[2]

Quelle chimère est-ce donc que l'homme ? Quelle nouveauté, quel monstre, quel chaos, quel sujet de contradiction, quel prodige ! Juge de toutes choses, imbécile ver de terre ; dépositaire du vrai, cloaque d'incertitude et d'erreur ; gloire et rebut de l'univers.[3]

In other words, as we saw before, things are good in themselves. The world is an Eden. "God Almighty first planted a garden." Sin lies in the misuse, that is, of the will. Evil is not a thing, nor a mere imperfection ; it is a perversion, a disease, a choice of the lower at the expense of the higher. It is not created by God, even if permitted by His giving man free-will. If we realise this we shall be saved from a false asceticism which places evil in the world of matter. We shall be delivered from self-indulgence which chooses carnal things rather than the things above.[4]

[1] *Pensées*, ed. Brunschvicg, No. 409. "The greatness of man is so clear that it can be deduced from his very wretchedness. For what in animals is nature we call in man wretchedness ; by which we recognise that, his nature being now like that of animals, he has fallen from a better nature which once was his. For who is unhappy at not being a king, except a king dethroned ?"

[2] *The Oxford Book of English Verse*, p. 212.

[3] Pascal, *Pensées*, No. 434. "What a chimera then is man ! What a novelty, what a monster, what a chaos, what a contradiction, what a prodigy ! Judge of all things, senseless worm of the earth ; depositary of truth, sink of uncertainty and error ; the pride and refuse of the universe."

[4] See above, pp. 145–6, and Q.T., pp. 57, 62, and 287–9.

But man does need redemption. Conversion, the surrender of the will to God, is a thing that actually takes place. Man does need grace. Growth in grace in the life of the Church is no less a matter of fact which must be reckoned with, to which we can appeal.

To quote Pascal once more :—

Il faut, pour faire qu'une religion soit vraie, qu'elle ait connu notre nature. Elle doit avoir connu la grandeur et la petitesse, et la raison de l'une et de l'autre. Qui l'a connue que la chrétienne ? [1]

IV

We have considered our three questions, What makes a thing right? Has man free-will? What is sin? We are now in a better position to consider, and feel the force of, what is called the moral argument for belief in God.

We can be certain about nothing in the material world. We do not know *for certain* that it exists ; we know only our impressions of it. But of some things within we *are* certain. We know that we exist. "Cogito ergo sum." "I think" or "am conscious," said Descartes, "therefore I exist." "Etiam si fallor sum," said Augustine.[2] "Even if I am deceived, I exist to be deceived." We are each of us certain that we can say, "*I am.*"

Again, we know that our wills are free. We know that we have power to do or not to do, to act upon the world outside, or to alter our impressions of it if they are all that exist. We have power to consent or to refuse consent, even if overborne. We are, each of us, certain that we can say, "*I can.*"

[1] *Pensées*, No. 433. "For a religion to be true it must have known our nature. It must have known its greatness and its littleness, and the reason of the one and of the other. What religion but the Christian has known this ? "

[2] *De Civ. Dei*, xi, 26. Quoted in my *Lectures in Hyde Park*, i, "Why We Believe in God," p. 84.

But we pass judgment on our actions. We weigh alternatives; we regret decisions. There is something within us, and yet other than us, which tells us what we ought to do. We are, each of us, certain that we must say, "*I ought.*"

This, it is argued, implies an absolute right independent of ourselves, and this right we say is God. That it is personal is implied in the fact that a person can only feel a sense of obligation to a person, can only feel penitence as he does if he has offended against a person. God, we say, is personal in the sense that He is at least not less than what we mean when we say that we are persons.

That is briefly the argument; but the force of the argument depends not so much on its logic, or even on preliminary considerations such as we have been reviewing, as on the conviction of sin by conscience and the experience of grace in life.[1]

[1] *Ibid.*, pp. 63–88, Lecture III, "The Moral Argument for Theism," pp. 63–81, where I have tried to work this out more fully.

CHAPTER VIII

CHRISTIAN THEISM

"S'il y a un seul principe de tout, une seule fin de tout, tout par lui, tout pour lui." (If there is one only source of all, one only end of all, all is by Him and all for Him.)—PASCAL, *Pensées*, ed. Brunschvicg, No. 489.

ONE of the great needs of the day is that of a popular philosophy for the masses. For the masses need a philosophy, a philosophy both of life and of the world about them. They need it since men, inasmuch as they are men, will think, and should think; and to think clearly of ourselves—what we are and why we act—of the world about us—what it is, how it came to be, and what it may become—is to frame a philosophy of life and of the world. How far they are from thinking well, how unable to see aright, and the seriousness of this inability has been our constant theme throughout these pages.

Philosophy, too, has its needs—needs which the masses must supply. That which is based on the common experience of men has peculiar value. Plato was wrong when he said that the multitude cannot be philosophical. The Church is the great purveyor of philosophy to the masses. As we said above,[1] the wisdom of the ages is diffused in sermons. What sages have puzzled out is enshrined in catechisms; what students have sought for by research Christians have "gained by prayer."[2]

But especially do men need moral philosophy—the guide for conduct which Aristotle, according to Shakespeare,

[1] See above, Chapter. V, p. 132.

[2] J. I. von Döllinger, *The First Age of the Church*, transl. H. N. Oxenham (Allen & Co., 1887), vol. ii, p. 211. "All that Philosophy in its noblest form had promised to the Greeks—repose of mind, regulation of the affections, stilling of the excited passions, moral perfection—Christians gained by prayer." Cp. my *Pastoral Theology and the Modern World* (Oxford, 1920), p. 165 ff., "Religion the Most Effective Instrument in Education."

thought young men unfit to study.[1] For in life direct and immediate action is often wanted. Temptations come when men are off their guard, or in new surroundings where they are no longer fenced round by custom. Then they need clear definite guidance by principles already thought out. Yet how far they are from having them! Novels written for the masses, and reflecting their ideas, present simple questions of moral duty, thought out and settled by the Church long ago, as new and interesting problems. Their authors seem to be quite at sea, almost unaware that anyone has ever thought about them before, sometimes even unconscious that they exist.

Individuals need a philosophy of life no less. We like the man who is always the same, the man we can always rely on. The consistent "foursquare" man is the man who gets things done in the world. We hate ourselves for our inconsistency, for our moods, for our inability to be ourselves, for our dependence on times and seasons, for the laws warring in our members in the "body of this death."

A philosophy of life that will not only satisfy the intellect but will also guide the will—one imaginable and effective, one that will dwell continually by us whether consciously or unconsciously, but at once available in time of need, one that not only tells us what to do but gives us strength to do it—this Christianity claims to have ready to hand. This was what it was the glory of the Early Church to have provided. That it can provide it to-day is our theme in this last chapter and our task to have proved when it is done.

[1] *Troilus and Cressida*, Act II, scene 2. It was, of course, Political Philosophy that Aristotle spoke of, and he said that they were unfit to discuss it because of their lack of experience, since, in Hooker's words, "the secret lets and difficulties, which in public proceedings are innumerable and inevitable, they have not ordinarily the judgment to consider." *Eccles. Pol.*, I, i, 1.

Eth. Nic., I, iii, 5. "*Διὸ τῆς πολιτικῆς οὐκ ἔστιν οἰκεῖος ἀκροατὴς ὁ νέος· ἄπειρος γὰρ τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον πράξεων, οἱ λόγοι δ'ἐκ τούτων καὶ περὶ τούτων.*" (The young are not proper students of political science, as they have no experience of the actions of life which form the premises and subjects of the reasonings.)

I

If there is one God there is one moral law—one law in all places, one law for all classes, one law for both sexes.

If there is one God there is one reign of law over the whole of life. Yet how we depend on our surroundings! We are swayed by custom; we bow to public opinion; we are carried away by association. The test of what we are comes when we are away from our usual environment. Boys at football matches do things they would never do at home; girls away at the seaside behave as they would not dream of behaving where everyone knows them; soldiers away in a foreign land find themselves morally bewildered. Unless they have within themselves reasoned principles, only too often there comes a moral collapse that horrifies us in its results.

This it is that makes problems in our Colonies. The "custom of the country" did not save Gretchen,[1] but when the custom of the Pagan world "east of Suez" surrounds a man who has never thought whether the Ten Commandments extend so far, what chance has he of withstanding its baleful force? So individual sins swell into national dangers. Slavery, though now abolished, has left a legacy of trouble in America—a legacy being paid with compound interest. The half-caste problem in our own Colonies is in large degree the direct consequence of white men's sins.[2]

[1] Goethe, *Faust*, scene 10.

MEPHIST. "Ist's nicht ein Mann, sei's derweil ein Galan
's ist eine der grössten Himmelsgaben
So ein lieb Ding im Arm zu haben."
MARGARET. "Das ist des Landes nicht der Brauch."
(MEPHIST. If not a husband, then a beau for you,
It is the greatest heavenly blessing
To have a dear thing for one's caressing.
MARGARET. The country's custom is not so.)

Cp. a story of Kipling's with the title, *The Custom of the Country*.

[2] Cp. my *Pastoral Theology and the Modern World*, p. 118. Cp. the *Cape Times*, quoted in *The East and the West*, January 1916, in an article by

The " clash of colour " presents difficulties enough in itself, when races with different temperaments, civilisations, and traditions meet and compete, and it needs a strong power to weld into one harmony the harsh din of its disproportioned and jarring elements.

But, only too often, these differences are justified and stereotyped by theories of the supremacy of the State. Morals are regarded as " matters of latitude." " Truth on one side of the Pyrenees," as Pascal said, " falsehood on the other." [1] Divorce " allowed " in one State and marriage upheld in another, as if a government could alter facts and justice be " bound by the course of a river." [2] Or it is the supremacy of the white man that is upheld—not as a fact entailing the duty of service to raise the other to an equal status, but as a dogma excusing the exploitation of weaker and subject races.

And even at home a double standard is defended. Mr. Wemmick, with his " aged parent " at Walworth and his office manner in the City, is taken seriously as a model.[3] Men who would insist on truth in their children at home tell their office-boys to lie; men who are selfish and rude to their wives in the suburbs will be courteous to their customers and good fellows to their City friends; men who will be scrupulously honest in their country seats—or, at any rate, expect their servants to be so—will justify dishonesty in trade under the pretext that business is business.

B. Margaret Wilson, " The Position of Women in South Africa," p. 67. " It is not too much to say that the debauchery of their womenfolk is the greatest grievance which the natives have against the white man at the present time—a grievance which, if it is not remedied and removed, may lead to very serious national danger in the direction of discontent, rising, and bloodshed. The only satisfactory solution will be found in the creation of a purified public opinion." See also G. Stanley Hall, *Adolescence* (Appleton, 1905), vol. ii, chap. xviii, " Ethnic Psychology and Pedagogy, or Adolescent Races and their Treatment," p. 648 ff.; and an article in *The Nineteenth Century* for June 1920 by the Bishop of Zanzibar (Frank Weston).

[1] *Pensées*, No. 294. " Vérité au deçà des Pyrénées, erreur au delà."

[2] *Ibid.* " Plaisante justice qu'une rivière borne ! "

[3] C. Dickens, *Great Expectations*, chap. xxv.

And this can go on for a time. But sooner or later Mr. Hyde will find himself unable to turn back again into Dr. Jekyll; for behind all there is only one God, and we ignore the fact at our peril. If there is only one God, He is Lord of the whole earth—east and west, at home or in the playing field and at the seaside, in France as in England, in the Colonies as in the Mother-land. If there is only one God there is only one law for the white man and for the black man. Naturally missionaries who insist on this are hated by the trader, who denies it and says they are at the bottom of all the trouble and corrupt the native by their schools. People who are married in one country are married in every other as well. There is only one law for home and office, for city and suburb, for town and country. Like His physical laws, God's moral laws work everywhere,[1] and man does well to realise it.[2]

If there is only one God there is only one law for all classes. Much nonsense is talked about class differences. On the one side men propose to ignore them, with much talk about "snobbery" (using the word in a sense precisely opposite to its real meaning)[3] and about "privilege." But class differences are there and will not be got rid of by pretending that they do not exist. On the other hand, the same people will often talk of class consciousness, exalting it as a

[1] People recognise this at once in the case of physical laws. Cp. W. James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience* (Longmans, 1902, 30th impression, 1919), p. 41. "'I accept the universe' is reported to have been a favourite utterance of our New England transcendentalist, Margaret Fuller; and when someone repeated this phrase to Thomas Carlyle, his sardonic comment is said to have been: 'Gad! she'd better.'"

[2] I have worked out the ideas of the following pages more fully and popularly in my *Lectures in Hyde Park*, Series II (S.P.C.K., 1927), Lecture VIII. "One God, one Law," pp. 64–85.

[3] The definition in the *Oxford Dictionary* is "(*a*) A person belonging to the ordinary or lower classes of society; one having no pretensions to rank or gentility. (*b*) One who has little or no breeding or good taste; a vulgar or ostentatious person. (*c*) One who meanly or vulgarly admires and seeks to imitate, or associate with, those of superior rank or wealth; one who wishes to be regarded as a person of social importance." It was in this last sense that Thackeray used it when he wrote his *Book of Snobs*.

virtue and expressing their determination to foster it as if the conspicuous inequalities of social life were desirable to maintain.

For there *are* differences of class and it is foolish to ignore them—foolish if they are evils to be got rid of, equally foolish if they represent differences of function valuable to the common stock. The differences are glaring in externals. The contrast of poor and rich, the economic conditions of whole classes of labour, the housing, wages, and food of the masses in town and country, are things to be remedied; but the point to remember is that no one is worse off merely because someone else is better off. We want to get equality not by dragging down but by levelling up.[1] There is much to be done in such equalising of material wealth; but far deeper down are seated the class differences of education and taste. Money, after all, makes comparatively little difference. The *nouveau riche*, the profiteer, the working-man master still remain really in the class they came from, and as long as there are differences they will clash, as men must mix in the world.

It is necessary, therefore, to recognise class differences. There is in England a wonderful tradition of the duty of public service in the "upper" classes. The landowner has always regarded himself as in many ways at the service of his tenants: this is a survival of feudal ideas, which disappears in plutocracy. The Government official is called a Civil Servant and serves the public. There is all the difference between a colonial governor and a tradesman in the Colonies. There is as a fact, though there is, of course, no reason why trade should not be equally regarded as an opportunity for service. Further, gentleness of manners does, as a rule, go with breeding and tradition. Good schooling makes a gentleman, and schooling and maintenance of tradition depend largely on money. There is, as has been pointed out, a difference of taste in jokes which forms a real bar between class and class.

[1] See above, p. 24.

But it need not be so. The policeman has the same conception of his duty though he is reckoned as being in another class. He is the servant of the public, primarily a man to help you in difficulties, and only in the second place a man to keep you in order.[1] Why should difference of calling make all this difference? Browning wanted to know that butchers painted, and bakers rhymed for their pursuits.[2] Why should not they? All this talk about "the working classes" and "labour," "the idle rich" and "capitalists," is fundamentally mischievous. All idleness is bad, whether in rich or poor. All men outside the workhouse are capitalists in some degree or another, and though some who have more capital misuse the power it gives them, others use it to far greater profit to the world than the small owner. The dividing-line is one of morals, not of class. To talk so, unless in describing abnormal and temporary contrasts and with a view to getting rid of them, is to stereotype whatever in them is bad.

There is perhaps little need to dwell on the obligations of the rich. It is a continual note in the Gospels; it is the commonplace of the social reformer. The Church has always taught that wealth is a trust, whether intellectual or material, that it comes from God to be used for our fellow-men, that getting without giving is wrong, that the greater the opportunity the harder the task, that it is difficult for a rich man to enter into the Kingdom of Heaven. She has pointed it out; she has trained men to do what is implied; she has honoured the saints who, rich in faith,

[1] As recognised in the once popular song with the refrain, "If you want to know the time, ask a policeman."

[2] "Shop," *Works* (Smith, Elder, 1896), vol. ii, p. 481.

> "Because a man has a shop to mind
> In time and place, since flesh must live,
> Needs spirit lack all life behind,
> All stray thoughts, fancies fugitive,
> All loves except what trade can give?"

And then follow the often-quoted lines referred to.

were poor in spirit; she has led them to Him Who, being rich, became poor, and still helps them to do the difficult task.

But there is another side to the question. Whole classes of men are content to acquiesce in lower standards. They allow themselves to be worse-mannered because their work is rougher. They give themselves a licence in speech which often makes them awkward in decent company because they can hardly open their mouths without an oath or an indecency. They tolerate a lower standard of morals in sobriety or in anticipation of marriage that constitutes a real class difference.[1] As long as decency is described as "bourgeois morality," if dirty work is regarded as an excuse for a dirty tongue, as long as bad manners are considered to show independence, it is hopeless to expect class differences to disappear. But only a real belief in God can unite men, who are not "naturally" brothers but competitors. Phrases about the Fatherhood of God and the Brotherhood of Man bring us no farther unless men are really united in a common creed and bound together in a common Church. The fact that the working classes as a whole "have no use for" institutional, that is practising, Christianity means that the one great effective means for raising all men out of the inequality of class distinctions that is ready to hand is being ignored. No doubt classes will always be different, but there is no reason why one should be held inferior to another.[2]

[1] I took part once in a scheme of emigration by which picked men of the labouring class were sent out to Canada. Marriage certificates had to be seen and the ages of children entered on the application form. I did not take any exact figures, but certainly in more than one-third of the cases (my impression is that it was in more than half, but I do not wish to exaggerate), the marriage had been anticipated and the eldest child was born within a few months of wedlock. I have no reason to believe that the standard was higher among the less satisfactory men of the same class, though it probably would have been among artisans with a trade.

[2] Cp. Sir Thomas Browne, *Religio Medici*, Pt. II, chap. i. "Let us speak like politicians: there is a nobility without heraldry, a natural dignity, whereby

There is another cleavage in society which goes even deeper, based as it is on an inner falsity. Men and women are different. They have different functions and different duties. Women bear and nurture children. Their place is primarily in the home, and they are naturally interested in domestic affairs. They have to clothe their children and are more normally interested in dress. They have to educate them and make better teachers. Their children fall sick easily and they make better nurses. This produces certain characteristics which, broadly speaking, are found in women more than in men. Patience, endurance, attention to detail are more often found in women than in men. They are more continually led by emotion, but by emotion under control.

Men, on the other hand, are the natural wage-earners. This takes them outside the home. They have to initiate action; they do things on a bigger scale; they have to work with others and must often strain their powers to the utmost. This, again, produces certain characteristics. Resource and energy, interest in politics, power of concentration, violence of emotional response, readiness to give and take—these, it may be, are more characteristic of men.

But men and women are equal before God. The same Ten Commandments are given to each. Sin is as much sin in a man as in a woman. This needs to be said in face of the false judgment of the world on which such glaring inequalities are built, especially in the case of carnal sin. If it is less in a man because chastity is not demanded by public opinion, while a woman who transgresses not only defies her conscience but also the protection of popular

one man is ranked with another, another filed before him, according to the quality of his desert, and pre-eminence of his good parts."

Cp. Burns, *Is There, for Honest Poverty.*

"For a' that, and a' that,
Their dignities, and a' that,
The pith o' sense and pride o' worth
Are higher ranks than a' that."

demands, it is, on the other hand, *more* in that he escapes the consequences which he leaves the woman to bear, and because—a fact strangely ignored in popular judgment—that, if not always the seducer, he must always be the aggressor.

The test is to turn the sexes round, to ask, "What should I say if a man did this? How should I judge a woman who did that?" Is the act intrinsically wrong for either sex, or merely unnatural to one and natural to the other? Only an abiding theism can correct the false world idea.

II

If there is only one God, each one of us is only one self. This is even more important to recognise than the need of one standard. For society is made up of individual men, and there will never be a morally unified society without consistent and sincere men. We are all of us individualist enough to see that. The "unstable" child is the trouble in our school. The bulk of criminal paupers and ne'er-do-weels are not, as was formerly believed, intellectually deficient, but temperamentally unstable. "The failure of the future is the unstable child," says Professor Cyril Burt.[1] We need men who can sustain their efforts and carry things through to the end, as Adam Bede admired Moses for doing[2]—men who can concentrate and stick to their jobs, who can, as we said in the war, "do their bit"—men who can be relied on, who are sound metal all through.

It is easy to see the social value of consistency in others, but it is only seldom that any power "gies us the giftie" of seeing ourselves. We do not like to look at ourselves, or to pry within, for fear of what we should find there. Like the people in Rossetti's picture, if we by chance meet ourselves

[1] British Association, September 1, 1925.

[2] George Eliot, *Adam Bede*, chap. i. "Ah," said Adam, "I like to read about Moses best in th' Old Testament. He carried a hard business well through, and died when other folks were going to reap the fruits; a man must have courage to look at his life so, and to think what'll come of it after he's dead and gone."

in the wood, in the *selva oscura* of life,[1] and see ourselves as we are, we are struck with horror.

Consistency from day to day is wanted. The steady man is trusted. We say he is slow and sure. The hare in the fable lost the race to the tortoise. It is high praise of a man to say he is always the same. This consistency comes easy to some people, but even to the most steady-going it always demands some effort. It is part of politeness that must be acquired. Marcus Aurelius tells with gratitude how he was taught by Alexander the Platonist always to appear at leisure to his guests.[2] The old definition of genius is that of an infinite capacity for taking pains.[3]

But we are very conscious of ups and downs in our faith, in our moods, in our energies. We are dependent on the weather; we vary according to the time of day; we change with our company—reacting quickly to those who stimulate us, feeling ourselves paralysed by those who frighten us, or smothered by those who bore us. Sometimes we even feel proud of the fact, talking of the artistic temperament when we only mean bad temper, of being impulsive when we mean being selfish and without self-control. But generally it makes us feel rather helpless. We want something outside us to regulate our course, as a flywheel equalises the throb of the piston. We dislike ourselves. We feel with Dante that we are of our very nature

Trasmutabile per tutte guise.[4]

[1] The picture is in private possession but has been frequently exhibited.

[2] *To Himself*, Bk. I, § 12, transl. G. H. Rendall (Macmillan, 1898), p. 4. "From Alexander the Platonist, seldom, and only when driven to it, to say or write, 'I have no time'; and not to indulge the tendency to cry off from duties arising out of our natural relations with those about us, on the pretext of press of business." I think my interpretation of his words is justified.

[3] *Hoyt's New Cyclopedia of Classical Quotations* (Funk & Wagnall Co., 1922). "La Génie c'est la Patience." Buffon as quoted by Madame de Staël in A. Stevens, *Study of the Life and Times of Mme. de Staël*, chap. iii, p. 61 (1881). "La génie n'est qu'une plus grande aptitude à la patience." As narrated by Hérault de Séchelles's *Voyage à Montbar*, p. 15, when speaking of a talk with Buffon in 1785 (not in Buffon's works).

[4] Dante, *Paradiso*, canto v, 99. "Changeable through all fashions."

We reach out for something firm, something abiding with us in the change and decay all around. Only with a sense of God do we go on, do our interests revive, do we find that "tasks in hours of insight willed" can be fulfilled in hours of gloom;[1] and, in proportion as we have it, we are raised to the ranks of those men who do things—men not always clever or gifted, but simply consistent from day to day.

Consistency from thing to thing is also wanted. The versatile man is disliked no less than the unstable man.

> Any individual [said Plato] may pursue with success one calling, but not many; or, if he attempts this, by his meddling with many he will fail in all, so far as to gain no distinction in any,[2]

and he declared in his *Republic* that

> if any man should arrive . . . so clever as to be able to assume any character and imitate any object . . . we shall pay him reverence as a sacred, admirable, and charming personage, but we shall tell him there is no one like him in our state . . . and we shall send him away to another city, after pouring perfumed oil on his head, and crowning him with woollen fillets.[3]

Nowadays we call such men cranks, and say that Jack-of-all-trades is master of none—and, after all, Bottom was not a great actor for wanting to play Pyramus and Thisbe and the Lion as well. Some people, of course, may do many things well. It is the mark of a gentleman that he is at home in any society; but even that is because he is always himself. Most people are ordinary folk who stick to their jobs, and if some things are only got done by fanatics it is because they keep to an unswerving purpose. These steady people are often the best to work with. This is what people mean who say that there is a certain real value in stupidity, that

[1] Matthew Arnold, *Morality*.
[2] *Republic*, Bk. III, 394.
[3] *Ibid.*, 398. Cp. Bk. VII, 561.
So Juvenal disliked the Greeks as being too versatile. See R. W. Livingstone, *The Greek Genius* (Oxford, 1912), p. 198.

there is much to be said for the East India director who declared that "the style *as we* like is the Humdrum."[1] This is why they said long ago that "the fox has many tricks, but the cat one good one."[2] But concentration is just what we find so difficult. It is so hard to feel that things are worth doing. As soon as we start on them they seem such waste of time. To stick to one thing seems so narrowing. It seems a larger life if we go to see people, if we read the newspaper or strum on the piano. We get reactions; interests slacken; pleasures pall. We get the "day-after-the-fête" feeling. After speaking our keenness ebbs, and we begin to think it was perhaps rather silly. We feel we have been talking too much. After music we feel pumped out. Nothing seems to satisfy us long. We keep things only with "repining restlessness."[3] The Faust in us never says, "Verweile doch, du bist so schön."[4] We get dissipated; we go to pieces like Peer Gynt in trying to be ourselves first in one way and then in another; we feel our lives growing narrower and narrower; we feel we

[1] W. Bagehot, *Literary Studies*, "Letters on the French Coup d'État of 1851," Letter III, Dent's Everyman's Library, vol. i, p. 299. "Hear what a dense and aged attorney says of your peculiarly promising young barrister: 'Sharp! oh yes, yes! he's too sharp by half. He is not *safe*; not a minute, isn't that young man.' 'What style, sir,' asked of an East India Director some youthful aspirant for literary renown, 'is most to be preferred in the composition of official dispatches?' 'My good fellow,' responded the ruler of Hindostan, 'the style *as we* like is the Humdrum.' I extend this, and advisedly maintain that nations, just as individuals, may be too clever to be practical, and not dull enough to be free."

[2] Bacon, *De Aug. Sci.*, VI, iii, Sophism 12, *Works* (Routledge, 1905), p. 545. "Hence the fable in Æsop of the fox and the cat. For the fox boasted how many tricks and shifts he had to escape the hounds; but the cat said she had only one help to rely on; which was the poor faculty of climbing a tree; yet this was a far better protection than all the fox's tricks; whence the proverb, 'The fox knows many tricks, but the cat one good one.'"

Cp. Erasmus, *Adag.*, I, v, 18, *Opera* (Lugduni Batavorum, MDCCIII), Tom. II, p. 187. "Multa novit vulpes, verum echinus unum magnum."

[3] George Herbert, *The Temple*, cxxix, "The Pulley."

[4] *Faust*, Pt. II, Act V, scene vi.

> "Then dared I hail the moment fleeting:
> Ah, still delay—thou art so fair!"

are losing our individuality and are only fit to be melted down for the button-moulder.[1]

It is only a consciousness of God that can prevent this dissolution of life.[2] That is a commonplace of the pulpit, of any art that preaches. It is the theme of Dürer's *Melencolia*; it is the burden of Augustine's *Confessions*, with its "Inquietum est cor nostrum donec requiescat in te."[3] For all things we desire come from God, and in Him have their stability and union.

> Sith [said Hooker] there can be no goodness desired which proceedeth not from God Himself, as from the supreme cause of all things; and every effect doth after a sort contain, at leastwise resemble, the cause from which it proceedeth; all things in the world are said in some sort to seek the highest, and to covet more or less the participation of God Himself.[4]

When a man realises that all his several acts are strung together by their dependence on God he becomes ready to do detail "with this tincture 'for His sake,'"[5] to sweep a room as for His laws. He proves to be the man who can combine with others for bigger and larger ends.

Deeper down still we need a unifying of ourselves, not merely from day to day but at each moment. It was said

[1] Ibsen, *Peer Gynt*, Act V, scene 7.

> "PEER. What do you want?
> THE BUTTON-MOULDER. Why see here;
> I'm a button-moulder. You're to go in my ladle.
> PEER. And what to do there?
> THE BUTTON-MOULDER. To be melted up."
>
> . . . . . .
>
> "Look, here it is written: 'Peer Gynt shalt thou summon.
> He has set at defiance his life's design;
> Clap him into the ladle with other spoilt goods.'"

[2] Cp. Thomas à Kempis, *De Imitatione Christi*, i, 3. "Purus, simplex, et stabilis spiritus in multis operibus non dissipatur, quia omnia ad Dei honorem operatur." (A pure, simple, and steady spirit is not dissipated in many undertaking because it does all to the glory of God.)

[3] "Our heart knows no rest till it rests in Thee." Augustine, *Confessions*, Bk. I, i.

[4] *Ecclesiastical Polity*, I, v, 2.

[5] George Herbert, *The Temple*, clvi, "The Elixir."

that Mme. Rachel, a Jewess, when asked how she could say the words "Je crois" in Corneille's *Polyeucte* [1] with such conviction, replied, "C'est mon art." So some people are always acting, as if all the world were really a stage. There have been poets who have written beautiful poetry of repentance without altering their lives one jot.[2] We all know men who always give the right answer—and we know how useless those answers are to us because we feel they have cost nothing to give. They come from a quickly reacting surface life and have no root in character. Some people live in a constant succession of universes. Like Zimri they are "everything by starts and nothing long," [3] and the worst of it is that they are perfectly sincere in the mood so long as it lasts. Faust lamented that two souls, alas! resided in his breast,[4] but of many a man it is true that

[1] Act V, scene 5. It is with these words that the heroine Pauline declares her conversion to Christianity after seeing her husband led away to martyrdom. I have quoted it in my *Lectures in Hyde Park*, Series II, "If We Believe in God," p. 126.

[2] M. Gustave Lanson says of François Villon, in his *Histoire de la Littérature Française* (Hachette, 4me ed., 1896), p. 172: "Plus faible encore est une âme de poète que nos âmes à nous. Pour nous, l'action seule réalise nos intimes pensées: le poète leur donne réalité, et mieux, éternité, par son œuvre. Quoi d'étonnant si les plus vifs, ses plus impérieux mouvements, aussitôt exprimés, passent? Ne doit-il pas lui sembler qu'il a agi?" (More frail still than ours is the soul of the poet. For us action alone makes real our inmost thoughts; the poet gives them reality, nay more, eternity, by his writing. What wonder if his most active, his most insistent impulses pass away as soon as they are expressed? Must it not seem to him that he has done his deed?)

[3] Dryden, *Absalom and Achitophel*, Pt. I, line 545.

[4] Goethe, *Faust*, scene ii.

"Zwei Seelen wohnen, ach! in meiner Brust.
Die eine will sich von der andern trennen;
Die eine hält, in derber Liebeslust.
Sich an die Welt, mit klammernden Organen;
Die andre hebt gewaltsam sich vom Dust
Zu den Gefühlen hoher Ahnen."

(Two souls, alas! reside within my breast
And each withdraws from, and repels, its brother.
One with tenacious organs holds in love
And clinging lust the world in its embraces;
The other strongly sweeps, this dust above,
Into the high ancestral spaces.)

[*Continued on p.* 217.

He is some twenty several men at least
Each several hour.[1]

Modern psychology is calling attention to this disease, and making us realise the danger and horror of split personalities.[2]

How we hate ourselves for it! If we become conscious of this inner insincerity, how it troubles us! We are all familiar with the phenomenon of intellectual confusion, and it is the aim of education to bring it to order.[3] But moral confusion is worse, for it goes deeper. We are conscious of conflict within. There are things in our lives we should not like people to know. There are "fightings within and fears without," but as long as you can fight that does not much matter. It is when you begin to glide that the horror comes. Our day-life is often horribly like our dreams, in which the

Cp. Augustine, *Confessions*, VIII, x, 22. "Pereant a facie tua, Deus, sicuti pereunt vaniloqui et mentis seductores, qui cum duas voluntates in deliberando animadvertant, duas naturas duarum mentium esse asseverant, unam bonam, alteram malam . . . Nam si tot sunt contrariæ naturæ, quot voluntates sibi resistunt; non jam duæ, sed plures erunt."

(Let them perish from Thy presence, O Lord, yea, and they do perish, those vain talkers and seducers of the soul, who, because they have observed that in the act of deliberation there are two wills, maintain that there are two minds of differing natures, the one good and the other bad. . . . For if there are as many opposing natures as opposing wills, there will not be two but many more.)

Cp. Pascal, *Pensées*, No. 417. "Cette duplicité de l'homme est si visible, qu'il y en a qui ont pensé que nous avions deux âmes. Un sujet simple leur paraissait incapable de telles et si soudaines variétés d'une présomption démesurée à un horrible abattement de cœur." (The twofold nature of man is so evident that some have thought that we had two souls. A single subject seemed to them incapable of such sudden variations from unmeasured presumption to a dreadful dejection of heart.)

[1] George Herbert, *The Temple*, xcix, "Giddiness."

Contrast St. Paul, Philippians iv, 12. "I know how to be abased, and I know also how to abound: in everything and in all things have I learned the secret both to be filled and to be hungry, both to abound and to be in want."

[2] E.g. W. McDougall, *An Outline of Abnormal Psychology* (Methuen, 1926), chap. xxx–xxxiv, pp. 482–556.

[3] E.g. W. Boyd, *History of Western Education* (Black, 1921), p. 273. "The essential business of a school is not so much to communicate a variety and multiplicity of facts as to give prominence to an ever-living unity that there is in all things." He points out that the dominant idea of Froebel's educational work was that of the unity of all things in God.

connection of things fails, where we lose control of ourselves without losing consciousness, where we try to wake ourselves and cannot.[1] The fear of madness is more awful than the fear of death, yet madness is just what this dissolution means.

We stretch out for something firm and abiding outside ourselves. Yes, no doubt much can be forestalled by habit. We can build up a framework of custom outside ourselves which carries us through, but this does not cure the ill. Especially is this true of religious habits, of regular prayer, worship, and reading, or customs that become bound up with all that is best in us, which form a background to our lives, whose memories sink into our subconsciousness, ready to surge up into and to inspire our active life at any moment. But habit merely protects us. The *cure* can only come by conversion, as all theology has insisted. It depends

[1] Cp. Augustine, *Confessions*, Bk. VIII, chap. v, 12. "So the heavy burden of the world seemed delightful, as in a dream, and my musings on Thee were like the struggles of one who would awake, but falls back overcome by depths of slumber. And as no one wishes to sleep for ever, for all men rightly count waking better, and yet a man will not break his slumber when his limbs are heavy with drowsiness, and is glad to sleep on, though his reason disapproves and the hour for rising has struck, so I knew for certain that it was better to yield to thy love than to my lust, but the love charmed and could not prevail, the lust pleased me and bound me." Transl. C. Bigg, Methuen's "Library of Devotion."

Cp. *De Trin.*, xv, 51. "Libera me, Deus, a multiloquio quod patior intus in anima mea, misera in conspectu tuo, et confugiente ad misericordiam tuam. Non enim cogitationibus taceo, etiam tacens vocibus. Et si quidem non cogitarem nisi quod placeret tibi, non utique rogarem ut me ab hoc multiloquio liberares. Sed multi sunt cogitationes meæ, tales quales nosti, cogitationes hominum, quoniam vanæ sunt. Dona mihi non eis consentire, et si quando me delectant, eas nihilominus improbare, nec in eis velut dormitando immorari. Nec in tantum valeant apud me, ut aliquid in opera mea procedat ex illis; sed ab eis mea saltem sit tuta sententia, tuta conscientia te tuente." (Set me free, O God, from the stream of words which I suffer within my soul, which, pitiful in thy sight, flies to thee for pity. For I am not silent in my thoughts even when I am silent with my tongue. And if I thought of nought but what pleased I would not ask that thou wouldst deliver me from this stream of words. But many are my thoughts, as thou knowest them to be, thoughts of man, for they are vain. Grant me not to yield to them, and if at any time they please me, none the less to reprove them, and not as one sleeping to linger in them. Nor may they have such power in me that any thing pass from them into my deeds, but may my mind be kept safe from them, my conscience safe, safeguarded by thee.)

on our belief in one God, without which these habits are not justified at the bar of reason. Faith in one God steadies us.

> It fortifies my soul to know
> That, though I perish, Truth is so;
> That, howsoe'er I stray and range,
> Whate'er I do, Thou dost not change.
> I steadier step, when I recall
> That, if I slip, Thou dost not fall.[1]

And if what we believe is a fact, we can get out of our shifting selves—not into a Nirvana such as the Buddha offered, but into One in Whom is no shadow cast by turning.

So Christians have prayed—

> Be present, O merciful God, and protect me through the silent hours of this night, so that I, who am wearied by the changes and chances of this fleeting world, may repose upon Thy eternal changelessness, through Jesus Christ Our Lord.[2]

III

In all this there is need of effort. Certainly. Man must do his part; he must try. But there is also need of grace, of a supernatural force, of a power to make Theism effective.

But things we experience in our own lives come home to us most, and, next to these, those done in the lives of our fellow-men. In many ways, at least, we learn more from those round us than from great examples in other ages or under other conditions. Boys at school learn from the other boys most, then from their masters, and least of all from the abstract notions of their books. Therefore if this grace is to be effective it must come within us and through our fellow-men.

So Natural Religion is always less in force than revealed—

[1] Clough, *Poems* (Macmillan, 1892), p. 90. "With whom is no variableness, neither shadow of turning."

[2] Ambrosian Collect, transl. in *The Book of Private Prayer*. Prepared by a Committee of the Upper House of the Convocation of Canterbury. (Longmans, 1914.) Prayers for Friday evening.

that is, than that which comes through persons.[1] The heavens, it is true, declare the glory of God, and the firmament shows His handiwork; but the main stream of living religion is that which began with God's message given through the Patriarchs and Prophets of the Old Testament; that which is given us to-day by the Church, which is composed of our fellow-men; that which found its supreme revelation of God as incarnate in our fellow-man, Jesus the Christ. In all religion there is discovery and revelation. There is man's part and there is God's part. In all interchange of thought there is give and take. In the commerce of ideas there is mutual action between two persons. We learn from one another. The effort to teach may be greater at one time when pupils are dull, or the desire to learn at another when interest has been roused; but no one can teach unless there is some response in the taught, and no one can learn if the other will not reveal himself and what he knows.[2] So, even in the natural order, upheld by the indwelling presence of God, there is revelation when man makes his discoveries. "If we take our Theism seriously," says Dr. Gwatkin, "discovery and revelation must be the same process viewed from different standpoints."[3] But in revealed religion—in religion, that is, when He speaks through men—this activity is heightened. The self-revelation of God in Christ is able to evoke an enthusiasm of response in men. It is easy to criticise the popular forms in which this clothes itself, but the point is that it works, and is also capable of an intellectual justification. This is my theme through all that I have tried to say.

[1] Cp. Bacon, *De Aug. Sci.*, iii, *Works* (Routledge, 1905), p. 456. "The bounds of this knowledge [Natural Theology], truly drawn, are that it suffices to refute and convince Atheism, and to give information as to the law of nature; but not to establish religion. . . . For as all works show forth the power and skill of the workman, and not his image, so it is of the works of God: which show the omnipotency and wisdom, but do not portray the image, of the Maker."

[2] Cp. my *Lectures in Hyde Park*, i, "Why We Believe in God," pp. 92–4.

[3] *The Knowledge of God* (T. & T. Clark, 1907), vol. i, p. 156.

IV

Theism makes us know that there is one law for all places, all classes, and all sexes. In proportion as it is a real belief, it gives unity of purpose, character, and life. But there has always been this difficulty about theisms; they tend to be cold, abstract, intellectual, or negative. Theism reached by philosophy is apt to say a good deal about what God is not. Such was the theism of Ancient Greece; it was not a thing for the masses. "The Father and Maker of the universe," said Plato, "is past finding out; and even if we found Him, to tell of Him to all men would be impossible." [1] The Jews, on the other hand, had a theism vivid, moral, real, effective, but anthropomorphic, and increasingly difficult to justify intellectually. A solution of this dilemma has, we maintain, been found in Christian Theism, offering the Person of Christ for our allegiance—an allegiance that can be given without reserve if He is, as we believe He is, the Incarnate Word, presenting us with an intellectual justification in the Doctrine of the Trinity—a doctrine, it is true, historically developed from the necessity of ruling out false ideas of God and Christ, but seen, when beaten out, to have its philosophical value as an expression of the ultimate relation of the One and the Many.

And the difficulty of the spectacle of a loveless world, the difficulty that Newman felt so strongly when he said that without the Christian revelation the world was but the prophet's scroll wherein was written lamentations and mourning and woe,[2] that has made men ask whether the

[1] *Timæus*, xxviii, 449. Quoted, Q.T., p. 123.

[2] *Apologia Pro Vita Sua*, chap. v. "I look out of myself into a world of men, and there I see a sight which fills me with unspeakable distress . . . were it not for this voice, speaking so clearly in my conscience and my heart, I should be an atheist, or a pantheist, or a polytheist when I looked into the world. I am speaking for myself only; and I am far from denying the real force of the arguments in proof of a God, drawn from the general facts of human society and the course of history, but these do not warm me or enlighten me; they do not take away the winter of my desolation, or make

man who loves is not after all greater than God: this difficulty is met by Christian teaching theologically with its doctrine of the Incarnation, and its scientific discussion of "person," "substance," and "nature" for those who think; but is answered for all by Christ Himself raised on the Cross, showing us One Whom we must love because He first loved us.[1]

It is the work of theology to explain—or at least to see how far we can explain—the mysteries of God. It is the work of Apologetics to defend them from attack, to show that our faith is reasonable. It is the work of general education to prepare the way, to teach men how to think, that they may understand theology and feel the force of Apologetics. But, above all, it is the work of the Church to act, to guide men, both thinkers and the simple, and to uphold the right in those questions where the ways part, as we saw when we began, in "the things that matter."

the buds unfold and the leaves grow within me and my moral being rejoice. The sight of the world is nothing else than the prophet's scroll, full of 'lamentations, and mourning, and woe,'" ff.

[1] I have tried to work this out more fully in my *Lectures in Hyde Park*, i, "Why We Believe in God," Lecture IV.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

THE UNEDUCATED MIND

MEN who are engaged in teaching are apt at times to be rather depressed at finding how confused are the minds of their pupils, but they can comfort themselves with the thought (if the thought does give comfort) that the mass of men are in a state of still far worse mental confusion. At any rate, the failure to realise the fact is serious for us who live under a democracy. We may easily give too much weight to the sayings of people who do not really know what they mean, or give credit to well-set-up and capable men for an understanding which they do not possess. It is, perhaps, only when you meet them in the free court of open-air propaganda, and allow yourself to be heckled, that you realise the workings of the uneducated mind.

Christian Evidence work in Hyde Park reproduces many of the features of the ancient world, and the conditions under which our religion and our philosophy had their origin. There are many coming and going, hearing and asking questions, trying to entangle teachers in their talk. As in Origen's day, "the philosophers who talk in public make no distinction in the choice of their hearers. Anyone who likes stands and listens." [1] "The first quality of all," if a man is to be at all successful, is still that of Socrates, who, as Epictetus reminds us, "never lost his temper in argument, never uttered anything abusive, never anything insolent, but bore abuse from others and quelled strife." [2] He has still just the same types to deal with, the man who, like the Queen of Sheba, comes to prove him with hard questions, the man who, like Thrasymachus, makes speeches

[1] *Contra Celsum*, iii, 44.

[2] *Discourses*, Bk. II, chap. xii, ed. P. E. Matheson (Oxford, 1916), p. 186.

instead of answering, and after, "like a bathman, deluging our ears with his words, has a mind to go away," [1] as well as the man who, like Rosa Dartle, "only asks for information."

And if you leave your platform and go and mix with the crowd, you will find worse behind. In putting questions only the bolder and more thoughtful come forward, and the cranks and queer people have to be short in speech; if they are not you can control them and bring them to the point. But to listen to or to take part in the informal discussions that go on all round the speakers is to come into direct contact with the way masses of men think and talk.

I

It is not too much to say that the vast majority are quite incapable of thinking logically—unable, that is, to use words properly, or to think by any accurate reasoning process. A large number are quite incoherent in their speech. When they try to ask a question they ramble on in a flow of continuous talk in which one part has no obvious connection with another, of which the sentences frequently begin in one way and continue in another, and do not end at all. Mrs. Nickleby is a close reasoner compared with them, and Miss Bates an utterer of terse epigrams. I cannot give an example, as I have never been able to get down notes of the variety of subjects touched on in one such "question." The attempt to fix on some salient point to answer I can only compare with the attempt to catch your hat when the wind has blown it off your head: just as you think you have got it, off it goes again out of your grasp. This is quite the most exhausting work in open-air propaganda.

Others will put a quite intelligible question to you, and when you have answered it, will simply repeat it. I have had a man do this half a dozen times in succession. He

[1] Plato, *Republic*, Bk. I, 344.

kept on asking, "Do you not think that the laws of God sometimes contradict the laws of man?"—a matter which had occupied perhaps a third of my previous lecture. Others will repeat the same question Sunday after Sunday. One man has asked me, "Is there any evidence in the Bible for the immortality of the soul?" at intervals for two and a half years. The same man asks me from time to time, "Doesn't your creed say that Christ is of one substance with the Father, and don't your articles say that God is without body, parts, or passions?" I regularly explain to him what "substance" means in the creeds, and that it does not mean "matter" as in common speech. In vain. He listens apparently, but he takes nothing in. Even better educated men are often incapable of listening. I have had a man, who, I am told, is a doctor, ask me a question about cruelty to animals and, as I tried to answer it, gaze at me, like Mrs. Jellyby, with a vague, far-away look, "as if I were a steeple in the distance," as Caddy would have said, and then just repeat his question. The same man had heard me answer the old question about the Bishop of London's income, and a week or two after I heard him repeating from the Secularist platform the old taunts as if it were all for his private use. I do not think he was dishonest; it was merely that his mind was closed to new ideas.

Sometimes the mental defect seems to be due to a very limited experience or to arrested mental development. It is not an uncommon thing to have the question put, "Who made God?" It is, I think, quite sincerely asked, just as it is a quite common question of children at a certain age. I once got into conversation with some navvies on the top of a North London tram who were arguing about Adam and Eve, saying that God ought to have been locked up for appropriating the Tree of Knowledge just as much as Eve (I think it was), but they supposed He was not because there was no one to do it. I thought at first that they were

joking and trying to draw me, but apparently they were quite serious and sincere.

The majority, of course, have a quite inadequate command of words. "Isn't all ethics the outcome of economic conditions?" is a typical question the meaning of which is quite clear. Even where the language is more confused it is generally fairly easy to see what the questioner is driving at; even if he rambles on from one subject to another the connection is, as a rule, easy to supply. The chief exceptions are Jews, who, in addition to an imperfect command of English, seem to think in quite a different manner, so that I am often quite at a loss to attach any meaning at all to what they say. Sometimes another Jew in the audience with a better command of our tongue will explain.

Sometimes the unaccustomed attempt to put thought into definite words seems itself to be the cause of confusion. The other day a man found himself arguing that all the examiners in the University of London were bribed. I do not think that he really meant it, but he began by saying that money had more to do with education than brains, and went on to say that examinations were no fair test, and that all examiners were human, and that it was human to take bribes; but my impression all the time was that the effort to find words absorbed all his consciousness, and that he was unable to think at the same time of what he was saying. A leader of some of the unemployed not long ago was offered the work of painting lamp-posts, and replied that "he would like to paint them red in the blood of the aristocracy." He was a very decent man, and when afterwards he was asked why he had said it he replied, "Well, you know, when you are at the head of a lot of men you've got to say something." I was once at a big meeting at the Albert Hall in favour of women's suffrage, and at one time a dear old lady with white curls was crying out, "Blood, blood! I shan't be satisfied till I have had blood." I do not believe really that she would have willingly hurt a fly. People

are often surprised to see Secularists, who an hour before were saying all sorts of things about Christians, shaking hands with them and sitting down to tea with them in a quite friendly way. They do not realise how much that is said on platforms is said in a purely Pickwickian sense.

Sometimes, I confess, I am baffled completely. A man once asked me, "How do you reconcile a sterile and fertile being denying himself his physical rights and taking the consequences of his acts?" and by some flash of intuition I divined that he meant, "Do you think it possible for a man to live chastely?" and he did! But when, on another occasion, he asked, "I have a taste with highly problematical evolutionary problems. Which should I prefer? I mean, which alternative should I prefer, if I choose between highly possible and highly impossible theories, between theism and atheism?" I confess that I was puzzled for an answer. Nor was the matter cleared up when he continued, "Should I not prefer the highly impossible to the highly probable which is worked out by the atheist in evolutionary problems?" explaining that he thought that "the principles of the universal are potentially subject to a qualitative and quantitativeness of the human mind in all the categories." I suppose it meant something to him, and I have seen the same man attending public University lectures. At any rate, he threw some light for me on the problem of Christian Science, and how certain persons may be able to find a meaning in *Science and Health.*

One other habit of the uneducated mind is not infrequent, namely, that of catching at words. There are large numbers of people in the same stage of mental development as were the Athenians who were struck by the methods of Euthydemus as described by Plato. They put words in the place of things, and fly off at tangents where two meanings coincide in one word. "You say the Gospel is free. Then you ought to give away your books instead of selling them." I have had this said several times. I was once arguing against

Determinism by an appeal to experience. I said, "At half-past two this afternoon I was sitting by the fire." My feelings said, "Stay where you are!" My mind said, "If you do you will be late for the Park." So with my will I determined . . . "Oh," interrupted my questioner, "you determined. Then you are a Determinist!" As Coleridge said, "Controversy is not seldom excited in consequence of the disputants attaching a different meaning to the same word." [1]

Or sometimes it is a thing irrelevantly connected that brings conviction. Smith the weaver, who corroborated Jack Cade's assertion that he was the son of Edward Mortimer, who was stolen away and brought up as a bricklayer, by saying, "He made a chimney in my father's house, and the bricks are alive at this day to testify it," [2] or even Catcot, who proved the genuineness of the Chatterton discoveries by showing the actual chest that he found the manuscript in,[3] would be quite at home with the man who corroborates the assertions that missions do more harm than good, and that missionaries go with a Bible in one hand and a brandy bottle in the other by saying, "I know that is true because I have been there [*sic*] myself."

II

These, it may be argued, are exceptions—too many, no doubt, in number, but not forming the mass of ordinary men. This is so, no doubt, but common logical faults and fallacies are surprisingly frequent even among the more intelligent type. The majority seem to be quite unable to hold more than one idea at a time in their minds. They have no idea of seeing the other side while they are thinking

[1] *Biographia Literaria*, chap. xiv, ed. Shawcross (Oxford, 1817), vol. ii, p. 10.

[2] 2 *Henry VI*, Act iv, scene 2.

[3] Boswell's *Life of Dr. Johnson*, April 29, 1776.

of one. Consequently they have no power of balancing evidence. They like clear-cut answers and are bored by any attempt to present a complex piece of evidence. Qualifications puzzle them, and they are apt to be chiefly impressed by the last word.

This leads to what has been called the *Entweder-Oder*—the "Either-Or"—mind. For a long time I was puzzled at the way in which the old problem of free-will and determinism presented a difficulty to so many, till I realised that to a large number "free" means absolutely unconditioned, that the alternative presented to them was omnipotence or rigid mechanism. "How can you call a man free under present economic conditions? Is a bird in a cage free?" they ask, and when I answer, "Yes, free to hop from one perch to another inside the cage, and if, as is often the case, the door of the cage is open, free to fly out," they only think that I am quibbling. They see that a man's life is conditioned by his surroundings; but the idea of a limited freedom seems to be unintelligible to them, so they argue that the only alternative to "freedom" is determinism. At first I thought they were only arguing so for arguing's sake, but the difficulty has come up too often, and that from men obviously sincere, though I could not have believed iI was a real puzzle to them.

The same "Either-Or" dilemma appears in various forms. "Should we believe on grounds of authority or of reason?" not "To which should we give most weight?" That the grounds of belief are many and complex does not enter their minds. "Either the Bible is true or it is a pack of lies." If the stories of Genesis are not literal history they conclude that we have no reason to believe that Christ ever existed. "Which is best, a good life or a right creed?" You must apparently be either good or orthodox. "If a man is ill, should you pray for him or call for a doctor?" and they think it quite a good and original answer if you say, "Why not do both?" "Do we know things

by discovery or revelation?" and they listen with a real, if puzzled, interest when you point out that what is discovery from man's point of view is revelation if we are thinking of the work of God, that revealer and discoverer must co-operate. It is the same mode of thought that has been observed elsewhere. "It seems," writes Mr. Edwyn Bevan, "as if there were some general inability in the popular mind to conceive anything between the two extremes. It must be all or nothing. Either the influence of our civilisation must be *nil*, or it must efface every vestige of distinction; either it must make India an exact duplicate of England, or our government must be a momentary phantom which will vanish and leave not a trace behind." [1] The hero of Ibsen's *Brand*, with his motto, "All or nothing," was only exceptional and different from the ordinary run of men in that he chose "all" when it was a question of self-sacrifice.

This inability to hold more than one idea in the mind at a time has also the effect that men find no difficulty in holding mutually contradictory ideas in close juxtaposition without either being influenced by the other. Thus Socialists are often strong individualists in certain points. They will argue that the question of the indissolubility of marriage must be settled for individual hard cases. They will adopt ultra-individualistic ideas of Protestantism as against the social conception of the Church. Ultramontanes who will declare that the English Church ceased to be a Church when she was no longer under a foreign prelate will be ardent upholders of Home Rule as the only way to preserve national continuity.

Another characteristic of the uneducated mind is its inability to think back or to look ahead. I have suggested elsewhere that this is one of the great factors of class division, that our social grades are based upon the length of the span of time by which we live, whether by the day, week, month, or year.[2] But I do not think that we realise that the

[1] E. Bevan, *Hellenism and Christianity*, p. 19.

[2] *Pastoral Theology and the Modern World* (Milford, Oxford, 1920), chap. i.

majority of men have no sense of history at all. Their knowledge of the past is limited to their own recollections and those of their relatives whom they knew. Beyond that imagination fails them. A hundred years ago is no different really than a thousand. The past is divided into that in their memory and that before. So they are entirely without guidance from any but the immediate past. I have always found that an historical lecture interests them very little. The development of an idea through centuries is hard for them to grasp. There is the Bible in the past and the Church in the present. Between the two it is practically a blank except for a vague knowledge of the Reformation. In collecting questions put to me on historical subjects I found that there were practically none. There were generalisations about persecution, education, and slavery, but, except for those about Henry VIII, who seems to have impressed the popular imagination, they had no historic setting.

So, men with no historic sense, when suddenly confronted with the question, "How do you know that Christ ever existed?" wake up to the fact that they do not know at all. They do not realise, however, that this is no exceptional case in their general ignorance, that they have no knowledge of the reasons for belief in any matter of the past, and so fall a ready prey to the theories of Drews, J. M. Robertson, Edward Carpenter and their popularisers, or among a rather more intelligent class of those of Jung, or Sir James Frazer as popularly misunderstood. Or, again, a constant source of difficulty is the fact that the oldest copies of the New Testament date from nearly three hundred years after the events they describe, or, as it is popularly expressed, "the New Testament was only written three hundred years after the life of Christ." That, of course, is exceptionally good MS. authority, but it is natural that people unversed in history, to say nothing of palæography, should not at once realise that it is so. Even good historians who specialise on one subject, as is necessary if history is to be written, are

apt to lose their balance and forget how much else went on in the world, so it is not strange that uneducated people, finding, like Catherine Morland, that political history is "all about the quarrels of popes and kings, with wars and pestilences on every page,"[1] should conclude that nothing else took place, or that Protestant propagandists should sincerely believe that the Papacy spent its whole time condemning Galileo and burning Giordano Bruno.

"Analogies," said Plato, "are slippery things,"[2] and they are doubly dangerous to people who find a difficulty in seeing more than one thing at a time. The similarity in them has enormously more force than the differences, and the finding a same or similar thing in the midst of these confusing variations is unfortunately most attractive. They fall a ready prey to arguments against Christianity based on analogies in other religions. They are ready to believe it when told that the story of the birth of Our Lord is closely paralleled by the myth of the visit of Zeus to Semele. They ask, "Do you know that an exact parallel to all [*sic*] the events of Christ's life can be found in the life of Buddha?" (or "Krishna," or "Mithra," as the case may be). I have even been asked if hot cross buns are not like the hieroglyphic symbol of the sun, and if that does not prove that Christianity is a solar myth and the Apostles the twelve signs of the Zodiac! Many similar examples of the use of analogy can be found in the publications of the Rationalist Press Association, which are not indeed read by the frequenters of the Park, for they read very little, but are by the Secularist speakers who draw from them and find such analogies effective arguments in their propaganda.[3]

Behind all this mental confusion is the trouble of our composite language. I do not think that those of us who

[1] Jane Austen, *Northanger Abbey*, chap. xiv.

[2] Plato, *Sophist*, 23, i.

[3] A man who was a better historian than most did once ask me how I could say that the Iceni who fought under Queen Boadicea drew up the "Icene Creed"!

know any Latin or Greek, or have even learned any foreign language, realise quite what this means to us. The majority of men do not attach any exact meaning to half the words they use; the greater number of our abstract and scientific terms have meanings clear to us which they can only attach to them with great difficulty. To the Frenchman, the German, and the Welshman the difficulty is less, for their long words are built up for the most part out of the short ones in daily use. I remember once speaking of something in a lecture as "*quasi*-liturgical," and a day or two after in a Latin class we came across the word *quasi* for "as if." "So that was what you meant the other day!" said a member of the class—and he was a student! I am frequently asked if "God" is not the same word as "good." It is a real puzzle to some people to be asked to believe in a God who is incomprehensible, because they think it means that you are to believe in one who is altogether unintelligible. "Substance" means "matter" to them, so naturally to say that the Son is of one substance with the Father seems meaningless anthropomorphism. "Faith" often means believing against the evidence of your reason, or perhaps saying that you believe when you do not. "Capital" means any wealth on a large scale, or wealth used to exploit others. We laugh at the old man in *Punch* who said that the new doctor's imprecations had done his leg more good than any he had used before, but to a man of that sort the one word might equally well express what he meant as the other. It is often only after a long discussion that you begin to realise how entirely at cross purposes you are with one another, and how some men, like Humpty-Dumpty, seem when they use words to make them mean whatever they choose. If we realised how little exact meaning men attach to single words we should hesitate far less to repeat ourselves and should pay far more attention than we do to form and structure in our sermons and speeches.

III

What, then, does influence the uneducated mind? It works very largely by what our psychology books call "*contra*-suggestion." The mother of every adolescent will tell you of her boy that "he is a peculiar boy: he must be led, not driven." Long after we have passed youth, if anyone tells us we are looking well, we say in an aggrieved tone, "I'm not *feeling* well at all," or if we are told we are looking poorly we remonstrate, "I'm all right." Even Pascal saw how arguments may have quite an unintended effect: "*Je me roidis contre.*" [1] But the uneducated mind retains the characteristics of adolescence in full age, and, like Alice, as the White Queen saw, "wants to deny something, only it doesn't know what to deny." I was present once at a conference between representatives of the Church and of Labour with a bishop in the chair. It was a splendid opportunity for railing at dignitaries when you knew they would not mind it. Several speakers in impassioned tones justified or excused "ca'ing canny" in scarcely veiled terms, till a representative of the Church indirectly accused trade unions of encouraging the policy they had been excusing. At once a Labour representative jumped up and indignantly challenged him to prove that any union had ever encouraged limitation of output, denouncing the practice in terms the Churchman would never have dared to use. During the war, after an air-raid, a New Zealand soldier began to talk to me as we looked at the damage done, saying, "This war has killed religion. No one will believe in Christianity after this," and as I did not oppose him, went on talking, and in about five minutes was saying, "You see, there'll be a great deal more religion after this war. It has made people think," and so on. "The truth is," as Hooker found in controversy long ago, "they wave in and out, no way

[1] *Pensées*, ed. Brunschvicg, No. 615.

sufficiently grounded, no way resolved what to think, speak, or write, more than only that, because they have taken it upon them, they must (no remedy now) be opposite." [1]

Frequently, I believe, it is a personal grievance that decides men's views, though they are often quite unaware of the fact. Of this I have no proof, but it is a well-known fact that the habit of finding justifications for beliefs held on emotional grounds is so common as to demand the use of a technical term "rationalisation." Mr. Thouless, in his *Psychology of Religion*, quotes from Dr. Bernard Hart's *Psychology of Insanity* the case of a Sunday-school teacher who became a convinced Atheist not, as he sincerely thought, because he had given "a long and careful study to the literature of the subject, but because the girl he was engaged to eloped with a fellow-teacher." [2] There is a certain man whom I have known for nearly eight years as a Secularist lecturer in the Park, and as a constant asker of questions, who, in the course of his questions, which, though generally reasonable, have a peculiar bitterness in them, has given various reasons for his Secularism, none of which, I am convinced, is the true one. I do not doubt his sincerity, though I have not taken his objections very seriously since he once turned to his neighbour in the crowd, who happened to be one of my own pupils, and complained with good-humoured irritability, "I can't get his hair off," but from things he has let drop I am pretty sure that the real reason is some injury done by a professing Christian to himself or to some near relation.

At any rate, without doubt the natural instinct of suspicion of all that you do not know plays a very large part in the convictions of the uneducated mind. There is a fairly general assumption, sometimes expressed, sometimes subconscious, that the man who is an expert is not to be trusted.

[1] *Ecclesiastical Polity*, Bk. V, chap. xliii, § 5.

[2] R. H. Thouless, *Introduction to the Psychology of Religion* (Cambridge, 1923), p. 82.

An unbiased mind is demanded, by which is meant one in a state of virgin ignorance. This appears in the common question, "Would it not be better to let a child grow up without any religious teaching, and when he is older to let him choose for himself?" It appears in the general vague dislike of authority in religion, and in particular in the anti-vaccination movement, behind which is the belief that "doctors recommend it because they are interested in it," and in the anti-clericalism that finds its popular voicing in such expressions as "I'd never believe anything a man said that wore a collar like yours." The man I referred to above who declared that all examiners took bribes would not, I am sure, have said so in his calmer moments, but when his conscious thoughts were occupied by the task of finding words the instinct of suspicion underneath led him to say it. Obviously, if these are motives that guide men's minds, books of controversial divinity are not very likely to convert them.

But these people are by no means lacking in common sense, and are often really good judges of moral qualities. If they cannot refute false logic, it makes little effect on them when its conclusions are obviously foolish. I heard a Secularist lecturer once arguing that good and evil were mere matters of convention. Hamlet's dictum about thinking them so making things good or bad is often misquoted in this direction. He said that when it rains people say that it is a bad day, while umbrella-makers say it is a good one. The difference between good and evil, therefore, he said, is merely one of what we choose to say. I was inclined to think that it was a very serious thing that the foundations of morality should be attacked in this way before a large crowd of interested listeners. Two quite uneducated girls were standing near me. "Oh, that's *your* opinion, is it?" commented one, and I recognised her plain common sense in so disposing of his arguments. And though I do not think that argument has much effect either for or against a cause,

I am sure that patience and courtesy in debate always tell. These are what the uneducated mind really judges by, and it does not so much differ from one that is trained and cultured. So, perhaps, in spite of our general need of education, democracy is not so unsafe after all.

(*Reprinted by permission from the "Nineteenth Century," November* 1923.)

APPENDIX II

THE TEST OF CHANCE

"Moreover, to speak truly, unless critics be learned in the sciences which the books they edit treat of, their diligence is not without its danger."—BACON, *De Augmentis Scientiarum*, Bk. VI, chap. iv.

A GOOD many people are a little uneasy at the back of their minds. They know that the Rationalist Press Association has published a number of books. They read in the papers reviews of works by authors who attack Christianity. They come across bold statements in magazines about the origins of our Faith which the writers, surely, would not make unless they knew their subject. They do not actually come across the books themselves, but they are rather troubled at the thought of what they may contain. They cannot criticise the magazine articles, but they look very learned: so a vague fear haunts them that the foundations of their religion may not perhaps be so sure as they could like. They wish someone would "answer" these attacks.

I

But the difficulty lies in the fact that to do so advertises them. Moreover, a refutation often only suggests doubts and causes pain if it is not thorough; while, if it is full and complete, the chances are that people will not read it. It may even have the effect of making them feel that "if the objection needs so much in reply there must be something in it after all." And there *are* difficulties in our religion. We cannot expect to understand everything. As Bishop Butler said: "Our ignorance is the proper answer to many things which are called objections against religion." But the great mass of those put forward by popular anti-christian

propaganda are singularly unfounded, and simply crumple up when critically examined.

The best way, perhaps, to avoid advertising any single bad book is to select several for criticism. But if we are to be brief we cannot go through many in detail; while if we pick out mistakes . . . Well, we all make mistakes, and it is not fair to condemn a book by hunting for slips. The only thing to do, therefore, seems to be to adopt the methods of trade and to sample them, to open them by chance and see what you find: to do this first with one book two or three times, and then with three or four others of the same school.

II

Now there is a certain publication of the Rationalist Press Association that has had a very large sale. I am not going to give its name, as I do not wish to advertise a very bad book more than is necessary. It is excellently got up. It is very readable. It has plenty of footnotes. It has run through several editions: the fourth in 1915 brought the number of copies printed up to 21,000. I have been told by an Australian bishop that it is quoted everywhere in the Antipodes. Mr. Mark Twain read it three times. A don at one of our Universities, I believe, sent a copy of it to each man in his college. It has all the appearance of a serious contribution to popular theology. A chorus of extracts from reviews sing its praises.

When I first took it up, I opened it by chance. I have found many more striking passages since, but the first thing I read was—

> In Southern Italy the Church's methods remind one of what Paschal tells us concerning the Jesuits—how they kept men wicked, lest, if they became virtuous, the priests should lose their hold upon them.

Now the state of the Church in Southern Italy is not due to "methods." Indeed, the methods of the Roman Church are much the same everywhere, though they may be less satisfactorily carried out there than, say, in England. The name of the author of the *Provincial Letters* seems invariably (with the single exception of his baptismal register) to have been spelled "Pascal" and not "Paschal." It is not, I suppose, absolutely incorrect to say that he "tells" us things about the Jesuits, though his method was rather to suggest by clever dramatic satire. But let that pass. It is good men who are in danger of being under the undue influence of priests, not bad. The policy of the Jesuits of the seventeenth century was, so Pascal implies, to be easygoing with sinners so as to keep some hold on them in the hopes of reclaiming them, or at least restraining their vices—a plausible but fatal policy. As Pascal makes his provincial say, with one of his most delicate touches of satire: "Their object is not to corrupt morals: that is not their *aim*" ("Sachez donc que leur objet n'est pas de corrompre les mœurs: ce n'est pas leur dessein"). All these blunders in three lines. And similar results could be got from almost any page. By picking out the plums the list could be extended "from here to Mesopotamy."

* * * * *

The book has an imposing array of references. A number of these collected in an appendix look very scholarly. They range from St. Augustine to Mr. McCabe; from the Bible to the *Daily Graphic*. Turning over the pages, the next thing that caught my eye was a reference to an article I remembered reading some years ago in a well-known monthly magazine. The author referred to it in support of a suggestion that the fact that Æschylus's play, the *Prometheus Vinctus*, was acted in Athens five hundred years before the Christian Era "rouses suspicion" of the Gospel narratives! Prometheus, it will be remembered, stole fire from heaven

and was chained to a rock by Zeus, while a vulture gnawed his liver. The connection with the Gospel narratives is perhaps not convincingly obvious to the ordinary reader.

The article in question, I remember, struck me at the time as reaching the limit of absurdity in Biblical criticism. I have looked it up again and find it was more absurd than I thought. It suggested that since in the Eleusinian Mysteries the candidate for the highest grade alone was allowed to carry a certain vessel into the temple, St. Mark described Our Lord as suffering no one to carry a vessel into the temple at Jerusalem; that the believer in the mysteries had a linen cloth in which to keep a memento, and therefore Christ's Body is described as being wound in a linen cloth and put in a memorial (*mnemeion*), which St. Matthew altered to "a tomb" (*taphos*) lest the secret meaning should have been understood (he need not have been afraid); and, finally, that the temples of Demeter were fenced round, and that σταυρός (the Greek word for "cross") also means a pale, and that this is, or at least may be, the origin of the story of Our Lord's crucifixion!

The writer of the article, says our author, "takes in turn all the main features of the Gospel narratives, and shows their close resemblance to the incidents of Greek mystery dramas." So much for the value of his references.

* * * * *

Turning over the next page, I found that the public would "soon be asking the Church for a satisfactory explanation, and she must be prepared to furnish it." Of what, do you ask? Why, the *Daily Telegraph*, "during the Christmas of 1904," let the cat out of the bag. It published the damning fact that "professors of Church History confess" that the keeping of Christmas on December 25th had its origin in the early fourth century, and that the date was possibly, or even probably, chosen to "replace the festival of 'sol invictus' in Southern (why 'Southern' particularly?) Italy,"

as well as "the Yule or winter solstice festival among the ancient Teutons." Why they should have bothered about the latter in Ancient Rome does not appear, nor exactly what it is that has to be "satisfactorily explained."

But worse remains behind. The *Daily Graphic* has let the public know (alas! for our desire to keep it secret) that

> There is no particular sanctity in the Table to find Easter: based as it is upon the calculations of a pagan astronomer who lived four hundred years before Christ.

How terrible! Well may the author warn us that

> The time is coming, and is even now at hand, when the English public will discover ugly facts about Christianity without having to read books published by freethinking firms—books which the parson advises us to leave severely alone.

Dear, dear! But perhaps, after all, the parson may have other reasons for his advice.

III

It is no crime to be unfamiliar with great literature, and not to know how Pascal spelt his name. It is not necessary to have read *Les Provinciales*, or to be up in the Jesuit policy of the seventeenth century. It is not given to everybody to be able to estimate the value of references. Knowledge of Greek plays, of the Eleusinian Mysteries, or even of the simple meaning of Greek words, is not for all. We cannot every one of us have critical and historical knowledge about the origin of the Calendar. It is even a pardonable error to believe that the truths of Christianity are bound up with a belief in the sanctity of the Table to find Easter in the Prayer Book.

But it *is* a very serious matter to rush into print and attack

the dearest and deepest convictions of men without making sure that you know what you are talking about. As Pascal himself said: "Though no one is obliged to be learned any more than he is obliged to be rich, no one can be excused from being honest." [1]

(*Reprinted by permission from the "Church Times" for September* 29, 1922.)

[1] "Encore que personne ne soit obligé d'estre sçavant non plus que d'estre riche, personne n'est dispensé d'estre sincère." Second letter to M. de Ribeyre, 8 August, 1651, *Œuvres*, t. ii, pp. 500–502. Quoted by H. F. Stewart in his *The Holiness of Pascal* (Cambridge, 1915), note 72, p. 109. The words refer, I take it, not to personal sincerity in private life, but to the honest use of facts in controversy.

APPENDIX III

RATIONALISM SAMPLED

"I think, sir . . . you will find it a very good practice always to verify your references, sir."—Dr. Routh in his ninety-second year. J. J. Burgon, *Lives of Twelve Good Men* (Murray, 1888), p. 73.

In a former article I gave the result of an experiment made on a book published by the Rationalist Press Association. I opened it by chance three times, and examined the first statements that caught my eye. But, of course, that was only one book, and any publisher may publish one unscholarly book without thereby condemning his whole output. So let us try the experiment again with some more books of the same school, and see if the result is very different.

I

Mr. McCabe is a voluminous and able writer. He has specially devoted himself, among much other work, to popularising the teaching of Professor Haeckel and to defending him from the many criticisms that have been made upon it. I picked up one of his books at a library and read the following:—

> Seven years ago they began to circulate a silly and obviously incredible charge that Professor Haeckel "forged" illustrations in support of his case, and though the libel was at once thoroughly refuted by Professor Schmidt, it is still current. Only a few months ago I received from India documents which showed that the Jesuits there were still insisting on it.

Professor Haeckel did not, as he says, "forge" illustrations. What he did was to use the same genuine woodcut to illustrate three different things, telling his readers to compare

them and that they would find them indistinguishable. He acknowledged and defended what he had done when it was found out, though later he described it as "an unpardonable piece of folly." No doubt it was very wrong of the Jesuits in India to call this "forging," when it was only . . . What was it exactly? Equivocation means using the same word in two different senses. We must invent a new word —let us call it equillustration. But which was the more dishonest, the people who called this forgery, or the man who, on the strength of this very slight difference, writes of Professor Haeckel as an injured innocent for readers who have no means of ascertaining what he really did?

II

Mr. J. M. Robertson is a diligent and effective author whose works are considerably drawn upon by Secularist writers and speakers. I have already, in my *Question Time in Hyde Park* (Series II, p. 10), tested the accuracy of a passage in his *History of Free Thought*. I think it was not the first I came across on opening it, but the first I was able to test. I thought it was perhaps fairer to try again, so I took another of his works, his *Christianity and Mythology*, and this was the first sentence that I read:—

> To the disputant who sets out with a belief in the truth of the Christian religion, miracles and all, impartiality is impossible.

This is the familiar logical fallacy known as "begging the question." He assumes that only people who disbelieve in Christianity can be impartial, and then shows his own impartiality by declaring that those who believe say that

> Any other story of a virgin-born demi-god is to be presumed posterior to Pontius Pilate, and any morality which coincides with the Christian is to be presumed an echo of that; otherwise revelation would be cheapened.

But Christ, according to Christian belief, was not a demi-God: He was the Word Incarnate, perfect God and perfect Man. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to find stories of virgin-born demi-gods. Christians since the first century have been familiar with the unedifying stories of the old Pagan religions, which were not "posterior to Pontius Pilate," while many non-Christian scholars believe that Buddhist and other stories of miraculous births *are* "posterior" to, and even influenced by, Christianity. Since the days of Justin Martyr (*circa* A.D. 130) Christians have been quite ready to recognise good in Greek philosophy, though occasionally they attributed it to the influence of Moses. Christ Himself declared that His moral teaching was based on the older Jewish law and fulfilled it, and such pre-Christian morality could not possibly be an echo of Christian, while it is difficult to see how the admission that it was older could "cheapen" revelation.

I tried once more. This is what I found next:—

> The Gospel story of Mary and Joseph going to be taxed under the edict of Augustus is obviously myth. There was no such custom in the Roman world.

But there was. They went, as a matter of fact, to be enrolled, not taxed, as he would have found out if he had consulted the Greek or even the Revised Version. Census papers have been found among the Egyptian papyri. I thought the book must have been written before their discovery, and before Sir William Ramsay wrote his *Was Christ Born at Bethlehem?* But no! It was printed for the Rationalist Press Association in 1900, and Messrs. Hodder & Stoughton published the other in 1898.

III

One of the non-Christian writers who think that the features of late and apocryphal Buddhism are "probably

borrowed by Buddhism from Christianity at a late period" is Mr. Salamon Reinach, from whose popular *Orpheus: A General History of Religions*, I quote these words. It was the attack on Christianity in this book that was the occasion of Mgr. Pierre Batiffol's brilliant *Orpheus et L'Evangile*, an English translation of which has been published by Messrs. Longmans under the title *The Credibility of the Gospels*. Opening *Orpheus* by chance at the Preface, I found these words :—

> The figure of Orpheus charming the beasts with his lyre is the only mythological motive which appears and recurs in the Christian paintings of the Catacombs.

On the contrary, Genii, Amor and Psyche, Tritons, Oceanus, Nereids, River Gods, the Seasons, the Phœnix, and (if we may include works of art other than Catacomb paintings) Juno Pronuba and Sirens all appear. The Church evidently considered the matter and decided that in these cases the figures were merely decorative or symbolical, and that there was no danger of syncretism in their use.

IV

Quite recently Mr. Edward Carpenter wrote a book on *Pagan and Christian Creeds*, which was reviewed in various journals as a serious contribution to the study of comparative religion. One in the *Hibbert Journal*, for instance, spoke of his "penetrating and sympathetic treatment of the subject." Opening it by chance, I read the following :—

> When you remember that it was more than five hundred years after the supposed birth of Jesus that any serious attempt was made to establish the date of His birth—and that then a purely mythical date was chosen, December 25th, the day of the Sun and the time of the supposed birth of Apollo, Bacchus, and other Sun-gods . . .

There was no particular anxiety in the Early Church to establish the date of Christ's birth (why "supposed" birth? —if He ever lived He must have been born), because the exact date is a matter of no importance. December 25th was chosen for its commemoration about the beginning of the fourth century; Mr. Carpenter is nearly two hundred years out in his chronology. This date is first found suggested a hundred years before, and various others had been calculated. In the East there was a tendency to commemorate the Incarnation on January 6th or 10th till the December date was (possibly but by no means certainly) decided on to supply a Christian festival to be a rival to the Mithraic one. He could have found out all these facts if he had taken the trouble to look at, for instance, such a well-known work as Duchesne's *Christian Worship*. He continues :—

> Mithra was reported to have been born on December 25th. . . . Why were so many of these gods . . . Mithra, Apollo, Krishna, Jesus, and others, born in caves or underground chambers?

But Apollo was born in a grove under a palm or olive-tree and on the 7th of Busios, the first spring month. He had festivals in spring, summer, and autumn, but none are known to have been in the winter. Mithra was born, not in a cave, but from a stone by a river's bank, and Krishna apparently in a royal palace. The legend that Christ was born in a cave is late, and not part of the original tradition, though it may well be correct. If Mr. Carpenter had said that *none* of them were born in caves he would have been right, or nearly so. But, then, neither were most of us, and that does not prove that we are syncretistic myths. And this book was described by the *Daily Chronicle* as "a sincere contribution to the world's stock of knowledge"! Well, perhaps it is. It certainly tells us things that no one ever knew before.

V

Not long ago, Mr. Wells's *God, the Invisible King*, was a nine days' wonder. Much of it was excellent and all of it was interesting, but it was marked by an irritable hostility to anything like orthodox Christianity and to the Church. When I first opened it I came across these words :—

> Even the Apostles' Creed is not traceable earlier than the fourth century. It is manifestly an old patched formulary.

This is a loosely expressed statement, but, under any interpretation, it is inaccurate. The Apostles' Creed is not found in exactly its present form till the *seventh* century. In substance it is traceable to the early part of the *second*. It is found more fully developed, not "patched," and practically as we know it, in the fourth. He could easily have found this out from any students' manual, such as, for instance, that by Dr. Burn in the *Oxford Church Text Books*. We are not surprised, perhaps, when in opening a book by another interesting and popular novelist, "Rita," we come across the statement that Professor Momerie was a happy heretic who pointed out that the vexed question of our Saviour's Divine nature "depended for solution on the mere significance of a letter of the Greek alphabet, and the smallest letter at that," but in works which profess to be serious and scholarly, surely it is not too much to ask that the authors should take the trouble to verify their quotations. And all the above matters, except perhaps those about the birth of Krishna, are to be found dealt with in quite easily accessible and standard works of reference.

VI

Pascal tells us that when he was asked if he had read all the books which he had quoted in his *Provincial Letters*, he

replied: "No. In that case it would have been necessary for me to have passed a great part of my life in reading very bad books." He added, however, that he had not made use of any passage without having read it himself in the book quoted, without having read it in its context and in connection with the matter it was written to illustrate.

I have not read through all the books spoken of above for Pascal's reason, but I have not rested content merely to test them by chance. I have in all cases read further, and my further reading has confirmed my first impression. There are, of course, difficulties in our religion, and there are able and sincere men who urge them reverently and with a full consciousness of their responsibility in so doing. But theirs are not the works of popular anti-christian propaganda, nor are their objections those which are so lightly flung about in the Press and in the parks.

(*Reprinted by permission from the "Church Times," November* 10, 1922.)

APPENDIX IV

"THE SPIRIT THAT DENIES"

"She's in that state of mind," said the White Queen, "that she wants to deny something—only she doesn't know what to deny!"
"A nasty vicious temper," the Red Queen remarked.

LEWIS CARROLL, *Alice Through the Looking Glass.*

A FEW weeks ago I tried the effect of testing some of the works of anti-christian propaganda by opening them at random and criticising the first statement so come across. We saw how in one after another careless blunders, what in schoolboy examinations would be called "howlers," did not have to be hunted for. This may not be an entirely satisfactory method of criticism, and demands, of course, that the rest of the book should be looked at to see if similar ignorance is displayed elsewhere, but perhaps it is the most effective. To answer in detail would be exhausting. As soon as you have fixed one misstatement you have to fly off after another. It is like chasing a runaway hat in a wind. And people will not follow you on a wild-hat chase.

The same method of piling up one unverified statement after another is followed in the open-air Secularist propaganda by its lecturers in the parks. A good many people listen to these orators and are quite unable to test their statements. A good many more refuse to listen to them because of their flippancy, but still have an uncomfortable feeling that they may have something of a case after all.

It may be interesting, therefore, to give the results of a similar testing by chance, in the case, this time, not of anti-christian publications, but of the people who to a great extent rely on them for their popular open-air attacks on Christianity.

I

I stood one afternoon and listened for about ten minutes. This is what I heard :—

Christian teaching is immoral. Christ said that you have only got to believe and it doesn't matter what you do.

Whereas our Saviour said : "Not every one that saith unto me, Lord, Lord, shall enter into the Kingdom of Heaven, but he that doeth the will of My Father, Which is in Heaven." Moreover, St. Paul insisted that the man with faith so that he could remove mountains was nothing without the love that suffereth long and is kind, and St. James said that faith without works was dead. The New Testament is a quite easily accessible book.

The next was :—

Christ said : "I and My Father are one." This is nothing else than Monism, which we Secularists preach.

Monism is of three kinds. Sometimes it means belief in one God as opposed to belief in many. In this sense Christ's words teach Monism. Sometimes it means much the same as Pantheism, the doctrine that God is everything and everything is God. This unity in all nature is sometimes regarded as spiritual, as by Hindus ; sometimes it is regarded as material. The Monism preached by Secularists is generally of the materialistic type. Sometimes, however, it is Pantheism of the type taught by Spinoza. In either case it denies the Personality of God. Christ certainly did not teach Monism in this sense. A man who takes on himself to speak in public really ought not to use terms he does not understand.

Then he said:—

> Christ said: "I came not to destroy but to fulfil." To the woman taken in adultery He said: "Neither do I condemn thee"; and He said: "Judge not, that ye be not judged." Judges sentence people to death. Therefore they are not Christians.

He, of course, failed to distinguish between the official duty of a judge, acting as a representative of Society and the State, and the inner condemnation of others which Christ forbade. But perhaps that is not a very easy idea for men to grasp, and he may be excused for not seeing it clearly. It is a difficulty especially to men who have not been trained by education to analyse our social system. But what, practically, did he want? To abolish all magistrates and judges? Surely not. Or did he think that Christ was wrong in opposing the carrying out of the law, and that the woman ought to have been stoned? His complaint seems to have been that Christ did abolish judges, and equally that Christians do not. Which did he think right? I do not think he himself knew. He wanted to deny something—only he didn't know what to deny.

Then he got on to the "Unjust Steward." "He swindled his master," he said. "Christ upholds dishonesty. He told him to alter his bills." But the steward in the parable to whom the estate was farmed had a perfect right to make a lower assessment and be content with less profit for himself. The pity was that he did not do it before. The parable was not meant as a lesson in honesty, but was told first as an example of men's greater practical sense in worldly matters, and was then designed to emphasise the duty of consideration for others in money matters from a better motive than the steward's. I grant that this is not very obvious. Our present methods are so different. But any commentary could have told him this if he had taken the trouble to look

the passage up.[1] It is, surely, a very serious thing to speak on these subjects in public without taking the trouble to inform yourself on them.

II

Then he warmed to his work and became more confused. He jumbled his ideas together and the blunders came fast and furious. He referred to "Plato's Work on the Nature of the Gods." (It was written by Cicero.) He declared that the philosophers believed that all religions were equally false, and the people that they were equally true (but it was only Gibbon who said this); that Christianity was only a new edition of the religion of Greece and Rome (the men who practised that religion, or rather those religions, did not think so, at any rate, when they persecuted the Church, and perhaps they were more likely to know); that every clergyman knows that they are the same and are all myths (I, for one at least, do not know it); that Perseus was born of a virgin (that was not quite the way the Greeks told the story of Zeus and Danaë); that the fundamental principle in the Gospel story was the same (but this is just what the Early Church, which knew both, so indignantly denied); that Buddha had no earthly father (at last he had got something correct—at any rate, as regards the later legends); that no evidence can exist of the Virgin Birth, and that the Church merely declares it (but the evidence does exist in the Gospels, and apparently comes from the only two people who could give it).

Then he became merely offensive, saying things I do not care to repeat, and showing, I fear, that he had a really nasty mind. He further declared that the clergy got their living by saying what they knew was untrue, and made objectionable

[1] Cf. Latham, *Pastor Pastorum* (Deighton, Bell, 1890), p. 393. Quoting Edersheim, *Life and Times of Jesus the Messiah* (Longmans, 1883), p. 267; see above, p. 103.

suggestions about women who go to church. But, as I went away, I caught one more gem when he appealed to us to "consider all that we had read of the writings of Socrates"!

III

It was all very sad, though the common sense even of uninstructed Englishmen helps them to discount most of this sort of thing. There are real difficulties in our faith, but they are, it has always seemed to me, difficulties of imagination and practice rather than of intellect:—

> The task of making real
> That duty up to its ideal.

The task of seeking the things that are above, of keeping fresh and vivid the things realised in hours of insight. Yes! and there are real intellectual problems also—problems due to our limitations, problems due to our ignorance. But the objections trumped up in the parks are not particularly serious in themselves, whatever their consequences may be.

(*Reprinted by permission from the "Church Times" for December 15, 1922.*)

APPENDIX V

THE MIND OF THE CROWD

" Qu'ils apprennent au moins quelle est la religion qu'ils combattent, avant que de la combattre."—PASCAL, *Pensées*, ed. Brunschvicg, No. 194.

" THEY might at least find out what the religion that they attack is, before they attack it." So we may translate Pascal's words—words that still ring with the sincerity, anger, and directness that made his style so great and so living. " They ought, if they want to attack it, to be able to say that they have done all they could to search for the truth everywhere, in what the Church puts forward to teach them as well, but without being satisfied. If they spoke like that they would really be attacking her claims—they think they have taken great pains to inform themselves when they have spent an hour or two reading some book of the Bible, and have asked some parson (*quelque ecclésiastique*) a few questions about the truth of the Faith."

After a couple of hours of lecturing and answering questions a Sunday or two ago, when I had had my tea and been to Evensong, I went back again to Hyde Park to listen to some of the others. On the Secularist platform a speaker was arguing against the historical character of the first chapter of Genesis. He assumed that if it was not scientifically accurate the whole Bible was invalidated and the Christian Faith found false. He was still mentally in the seventies of the last century. He might never have heard the old pulpit commonplace, that " for Natural Science we must go to God's other great book, the Book of Nature." It was not that he had not had opportunities of learning better. I know him quite well. He has often listened to me and asked me questions, and I have often answered questions about Genesis to others, if not to him. He is

not, I am sure, dishonest; but he has a prejudice against Christianity for some personal reason, I gather, and seems to be mentally incapable of examining the subject and readjusting his views.

I

His case is typical of a large class that forgathers near the Marble Arch. You can easily get into conversation with them, and in about five minutes you will have a little crowd round you like a swarm of bees. It is a thing I seldom do, as little good can be done by it. They talk continuously and incessantly, and it is almost impossible to get a word in edgeways. They do not want to listen; their minds are made up; they know all about it already.

One of the bystanders made some comment on the speaker and I answered him. That was what he wanted—an opportunity to have his say to a parson. "Yes," he began, "I know all about it. I was a Seventh-Day Adventist for a short time. The Bible is all one. If Genesis is untrue, we have no reason to believe that the Gospels are true. There can't be degrees of inspiration. Either the Bible is inspired or it is not. The Christian God is a brutal, bloodthirsty God demanding human sacrifice, taking delight in the sufferings of Christ. Judas wasn't to blame, because it was foretold of him. You are prejudiced. Are you likely to change your belief? No? Then you are not open to conviction. You only believe because you were biased as a child. You can't argue from music or education to religion; they have nothing to do with one another. No one can give any reasons for believing in a God."

In vain I tried to wedge in suggestions that the small and eccentric sect that he had belonged to did not exhaust the possibilities of Christianity: that in our Church practice we always put the Old Testament on a lower level than the New;

that Christ Himself contrasted them: that there certainly *are* degrees of inspiration: that the idea that God delights in blood is not exactly the orthodox doctrine of the Atonement, and is meaningless to the Christian who holds that Christ was God Incarnate; that Judas clearly was very much to blame, as common sense tells us; that when people have made up their minds, after giving full weight to the evidence, to change their convictions is not a sign of open-mindedness but of imbecility; that we all believe because of the bias given us in youth, and believe rightly if the bias given is a right one; that the object of education is to give such a bias; that if you want a child to be musical when it grows up you must not neglect his musical education when he is young, and that it is exactly the same in religion; and that, finally, to say nothing of the vast array of apologetic works on Theism, I had myself several times given a course of four lectures in the Park on "Why We Believe in God," and devoted most of the first of my little books of *Question Time in Hyde Park* to the subject.

It was of no use; he did not stop to listen. He had no idea that there could be any other conception of Christianity than that of the Seventh-Day Adventists, from which he had revolted. There was no thought behind his words; his mind was occupied with phrases. The ground was not clear. I had presently a curious illustration of this fact. He declared himself a Materialist. "We know nothing of mind," he asserted; "we *do* of matter": and repeating Dr. Johnson's refutation of Berkeley, he said, "If a brick hits my head, I know there is matter there. I can feel it." "No," I said; "if someone hypnotises you and tells you a brick has hit your head, you will feel it, but there will be no brick there. But he can't hypnotise you unless you have a mind." "That's true," he said in a quite altered tone of voice, and was silent. The idea was new and the ground unoccupied by any catch-phrases—and he suddenly began really to think.

II

Another bystander cut in. He took up the line of distrust of parsons. As I had been saying, the reason why many people disbelieve is an instinct of suspicion. This is true in all life and not only in religion. They are anti-vaccinationists because they suspect doctors; they are Communists because they suspect capitalists. A man once shouted at me, "I'd never believe anything a man said who wears a collar like yours." This is what is called "having an unbiased mind." The expert is a man to be distrusted. If a man knows his subject he is suspect. The necessary condition for a valid judgment is, it would seem, to be in a state of blank ignorance on the subject in question.

He began by saying that money counts for more than brains. He probably had some confused idea in his mind of the undoubted fact that education costs a good deal, so that the wealthy have an advantage. But presently he was casting doubts on the results of examinations. The examiners were unfair. Yes, he meant in the University of London. I asked him if he really meant to suggest that they took bribes. Yes, he said, he knew of a case. "Then," said I, "you ought to have reported it to the authorities at once." "No," he replied; "I did that once about the food regulations, and I was told to mind my own business." I assured him that I knew the sort of men who examine, and the way examinations were conducted, and that such a thing was unheard-of and impossible. He replied that I was prejudiced, that I was standing up for my class. "Aren't examiners like other men? No man is above bribes."

He probably did not really believe it. I think he was carried on by his own words into making statements he would not have made at other times. They were said in a purely Pickwickian sense. In his confusion of mind his impulse of distrust, stronger than his weak ratiocination, surged up and led him to say these things. The bystanders

saw this clearly, and when he began to deny that he had accused examiners generally of being unfair, they said, " Yes, you did." But it is this attitude of suspicion and distrust which produces anti-clericalism and prevents such men even seeing the necessity of examining the Christianity that they reject. The parson preaches it, and that is enough.

III

Then another took up his parable. " I've tried Christianity and I've found it false." He did not and would not say what the trying had consisted in. " It says those who don't believe will be damned, tormented for ever and ever—all the people who have never heard of Christ." I suggested that the words hardly meant that; that even if people couldn't be expected to know Greek, there were commentaries, or they might at least consult the Revised Version, which gave the best sense of the original. " Oh; I haven't time to go into it like that," he replied. So much for his " trying Christianity and finding it false."

Then he went on: " The idea of God is always changing. When people were always fighting He was the God of battles; then He was the God of Israel. It's just like antiseptics and surgery: they are always finding out new things and scrapping the old." " Yes," I said; " so the best thing, of course, for us to do is to get rid of all medicine, sack the doctors, and pull down all our hospitals." Again the bystanders saw the point and laughed; but he quite failed to see that advance in theological as in medical science represents an ever-growing knowledge of the truth.

IV

The common sense of English people is great, but the majority seem to be unable to think clearly or deal with ideas. These people really think they have studied the

question, only they do not know what study means. When we realise this we shall also realise that, though it has to be made, the intellectual appeal has little power with the majority. We must acknowledge that with our present methods we have failed not so much to convince people or to make them think, as to make them know what Christianity is, and that it is not the strange bundle of inconsistencies that they hold it to be.

(*Reprinted by permission from the "Church Times," August 24, 1923.*)

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